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0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
We, humans, are a hyper-social species. We are highly dependent upon each 
other. However, when we act together we are capable of creating things that no 
other species is capable of creating, such as culture, science, and technology. 
Social cognition – the ability to interact with and to understand others1 – is 
crucial to almost every aspect of our lives. Most of the time, we are rather good 
at understanding the people around us and we can efficiently and often 
effortlessly coordinate our behaviour with our family, friends, colleagues, and 
even strangers. But how do we do this? What are the basic cognitive processes 
that enable humans to understand and to interact with each other? This is the 
main question of contemporary interdisciplinary research on social cognition. 
This question also drives my dissertation.  
For more than 30 years, philosophers and psychologists have assumed that 
the key competence in human social cognition is mindreading: the ability to 
predict and explain other individuals’ behaviour in terms of their mental states – 
perceptions, beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, etc. The mainstream theories 
of mindreading are the theory-theory, the simulation theory, and some com-
binations of the two. Simply put, theory-theory says that when we mindread, we 
make inferences about other people’s mental states by using an implicit theory-
like body of knowledge consisting of law-like principles that describe how 
different types of mental state interconnect and causally link to behaviour. 
According to simulation theory, we read other people’s minds by mentally 
putting ourselves in their shoes: we imagine what it would be like to be in the 
other person’s position and then attribute the mental states that arise in us to that 
other person.  
Recently, theories of mindreading – both theory-theory and simulation-
theory – have come under serious attack by authors who have a background in 
phenomenology and/or in accounts of embodied, embedded, enactive, and 
extended cognition. The critics are not only criticising the specific explanations 
that the mainstream theories of mindreading provide, but they argue against the 
idea that mindreading is as central to human social cognition as the proponents 
of standard theories of mindreading have assumed. The critics emphasize that 
the central question should not be ”How do people read minds?” but rather 
”What enables people to interact?”  Many of the critics argue that most real life 
social interactions take place in the absence of mindreading and thus that 
mindreading plays no important role in human social cognition. I’m calling the 
latter approach interactionism.2  
                                                 
1  I borrowed the definition of social cognition from Spaulding (2012, p. 431). 
2 John Michael (2011, pp. 559–560) has defined interactionism as referring to a family of 
positions that endorse the claim that “social understanding and interaction do not require 
mindreading because various embodied and/or extended capabilities sustain social 
understanding and interaction in the absence of mindreading.” 
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My thesis focuses on the current debate between theories of mindreading and 
interactionism. I think that interactionists correctly point out that the underlying 
assumption of theories of mindreading, that mindreading is at the core of human 
social cognition and necessary for human social interaction, is unwarranted. The 
standard research on mindreading has been based on laboratory experiments 
that are specifically designed to elicit mindreading. However, such experiments 
cannot possibly tell us how commonly people mindread in real life or what 
motivates them to do so. Since the prevailing assumption of the standard 
mindreading paradigm has been that mindreading is ubiquitous in human social 
cognition3, the question “When and why do people actually mindread?” has, 
unfortunately, not been posed. However, it would be premature to buy the 
opposite interactionist claim that mindreading is marginal and plays no essential 
role in human social cognition. The truth is that we simply do not know how 
much people actually rely on mindreading in real life social situations. It is time 
to do some serious research on this issue! It is time to take a critical, yet open-
minded look at the current debate between theories of mindreading and 
interactionism. 
My dissertation consists of a summary article, three theoretical research 
articles that have been published in international peer-reviewed journals (appen-
dices 1–3), and another shorter summary in Estonian. The summary article 
begins with a chapter on methodological issues, where I discuss the specific role 
of philosophy in social cognition research. I analyse methods that philosophers 
can and should adopt when they are involved in interdisciplinary research on 
social cognition and I explain what methods I have been using in the research 
articles that form the main part of the thesis. The methodological chapter is 
followed by an overview of the current approaches to social cognition. Chapter 
2 is dedicated to the mainstream theories of mindreading, each of which 
assumes that human social cognition is first and foremost a matter of attributing 
mental states to others: theory-theory and simulation theory. Chapter 3 intro-
duces a more recent approach that challenges the mainstream view: inter-
actionism.  
As becomes apparent in the summary article, the current theoretical situation 
of the field has in recent years taken the form of a heated debate between 
theories of mindreading and interactionism, wherein one side assumes that 
mindreading is crucial for social cognition, and the other side argues for the 
opposite. I’m convinced that the way forward is to move beyond the black-or-
white battle between theories of mindreading and interactionism. What we need 
is a broader perspective on social cognition that would include the study of 
mindreading as well as the study of non-mentalistic social cognitive abilities, 
and which would, among other things, enable us to study empirically when and 
why people actually engage in mindreading in everyday life.  
The first research article (co-authored with the neuroscientist Wouter van 
den Bos, who is currently working at the Max Planck Institute for Human 
                                                 
3 See Slors (2012) for a possible explanation of why mindreading seems ubiquitous. 
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Development in Berlin) is entitled “Towards an integrative account of social 
cognition: Marrying theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes.” It was published as part of the research topic 
“Towards a neuroscience of social interaction” in a special issue of Frontiers of 
Human Neuroscience in 2012. In the article, we use the term “theory of mind” 
as a label for the mainstream theories of mindreading – i.e. for both theory-
theory and simulation theory. We argue that instead of treating the standard 
theories of mindreading and interactionism as mutually exclusive opponents, 
these two approaches should be integrated into a more comprehensive account 
of social cognition. We rely on dual process models of social cognition that 
differentiate between two types of social cognitive processing.  Processes of the 
first type (labelled Type 1) are typically fast, stimulus-driven, relatively 
inflexible, and therefore also highly efficient. In contrast, processes of the 
second type (labelled Type 2) are relatively slow and cognitively effortful, but at 
the same time allow for more flexibility, and may involve some conscious 
control. We argue that while interactionism focuses on aspects of social 
cognition that are mostly related to Type 1 processes, theories of mindreading 
typically focus on aspects of social cognition driven by Type 2 processes. We 
argue that it is plausible that in the majority of real life social interactions, both 
types of process are involved and that social cognition and behaviour may be 
sustained by the interplay between them. Finally, we look at how the new 
integrative theoretical framework can support experimental research on social 
interaction.  
As the first author of the article, I am responsible for working out the overall 
idea of the paper and for doing most of the writing. My co-author Wouter van 
den Bos took care of the empirical details, especially with respect to the parts of 
the paper wherein we review the relevant neuroscientific studies and 
neuroscientific methods. His support was a great help throughout the whole 
process of writing and publishing the paper. Collaborating on the paper was a 
truly inspiring interdisciplinary experience. The most valuable contribution of 
the article derives from its theoretical content. Theoretical considerations led us 
to a new empirically testable hypothesis that Type 1 and Type 2 processes may 
mutually influence each-other during social interactions. I and my co-author are 
members of an interdisciplinary research group which forms part of the 
European Platform for Life Sciences, Mind Sciences, and the Humanities. Our 
group is currently designing pilot-experiments to test the above described 
hypothesis.  
The article received a commentary by Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di 
Paolo (2013), who consider “Bohl and van den Bos’s proposal as a research 
heuristic that can surely enrich empirical data” (p. 2) and estimate the integra-
tive account as having “empirical potential” (p. 1). De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
outline two possible interpretations of our integrative proposal: “1. Individual 
sense-making is largely supported by Type 2 processes and interaction by Type1 
processes” and “2. The relation between individual sense-making and inter-
active performances is analogous to the relation between Type 2 and Type 1 
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processes.” They claim that since the first interpretation is implausible (it is 
indeed explicitly denied by myself and van den Bos as we argue that social 
interaction involves an interplay of both types of process), the second 
interpretation must be correct. However, this is not what we had in mind either. 
Our aim was to argue that interactionist accounts have been focusing largely on 
Type 1 processes, whereas theories of mindreading have been mainly targeting 
Type 2 processes, and to hypothesize that both types of process are involved in 
real life social interactions. This in turn was meant to highlight the necessity of 
a broader theoretical framework that would enable the study of both types of 
process and would include insights from both, theories of mindreading and 
interactionism. Our approach does not, however, translate into claim 2.  
De Jaegher and Di Paolo also point out that their own position is not as 
radical as portrayed in our article, where it is classified as “interactionist.”  They 
explain that they do not assume that interactive factors can account for all social 
cognition or that supra-individual explanations can replace sub-personal 
explanations. It is good to have this issue clarified because it shows that our 
views converge in this respect. However, in the research agenda of De Jaegher 
and Di Paolo, no essential role is given to mindreading. This is where our views 
really do come apart. Unlike De Jaegher and Di Paolo, I think that mindreading, 
although not necessary for all social cognition, plays a specific role in human 
social understanding and that the standard theories of mindreading have the 
potential to partly explain how human social cognition works.  
The second research article (co-authored with the philosopher Nivedita 
Gangopadhyay who currently works at the Ruhr-University Bochum) carries the 
title “Theory of mind and the unobservability of other minds” and was 
published in Philosophical Explorations in 2013. This article largely draws on 
conceptual analysis and philosophical clarification. Initially, I wrote the first 
two parts of the paper and my co-author wrote the third part. The manuscript 
then went through several rounds of rewriting by both of us, which was a source 
of great intellectual enjoyment because the text improved and condensed with 
every round. The idea for the paper was born during my stay at the Center for 
Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen, where I started to seriously think about 
the interactionist critique, which is based on the claim that theories of 
mindreading make the assumption that other minds are unobservable. Very 
simply put, interactionists argue as follows:  
 
Premise 1:  Theories of mindreading are based on the assumption that other 
minds are unobservable.  
Premise 2:  Other minds are not unobservable, because we can directly 
perceive (some) mental states of others.  
Conclusion:  Ergo, theories of mindreading are mistaken.  
 
This kind of argument is ubiquitous in the critical accounts of interactionists: 
almost every interactionist account begins with a critique of the alleged under-
lying unobservability assumption of theories of mindreading. After systematic 
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re-reading of the standard accounts of mindreading, I became convinced that 
interactionists are attacking a straw man. The article explains why the inter-
actionist critique is problematic. It analyses metaphysical, phenomenological, 
epistemological, and psychological readings of the unobservability claim and 
proves that it is not the case that theories of mindreading assume the meta-
physical, phenomenological, or epistemological unobservability of other minds. 
However, theories of mindreading support a psychological version of the un-
observability claim – a claim about cognitive processes responsible for mind-
reading. The psychological claim can be interpreted in a stronger or weaker 
sense. It can be read as a claim that “(a) neither the other’s ‘mindedness’ in 
general nor the other’s particular mental states are observable (i.e., apprehended 
perceptually); (b) particular mental states are unobservable, whereas some 
aspects indicative of ‘mindedness’ are observable; or (c) some mental states are 
unobservable but some are also observable” (Bohl & Gangopadhyay, 2013, p. 
1). The critics tend to attribute the strongest psychological claim (a) to the 
proponents of theories of mindreading, but most of them actually support the 
weaker positions of (b) or (c). The conclusion of the article is that the 
allegations against theories of mindreading are seriously misdirected. The re-
mainder of the article investigates constraints on the observability of other 
minds. It is argued that, given Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the 
structure of perception, any satisfactory account of social cognition must take 
into consideration the constraint that mental states and sensory properties of 
physical objects are not observable in the same way. It is shown that theories of 
mindreading are in a good position to deal with the above-mentioned stipulation 
and thus that interactionism has something to learn from theories of mind-
reading.  
The third research article is entitled “We read minds to shape relationships.” 
It was published in Philosophical Psychology in 2014. I consider it to be the 
most important part of my dissertation, not only because I am the sole author of 
the article, but because it makes an important original contribution by intro-
ducing a new dimension into the research on social cognition: the dimension of 
social relationships. Social relationships are extremely important for humans 
and our social behaviour largely depends on them, but the role of social 
relationships has been ignored by both theories of mindreading and interactio-
nism. I introduce a theory of basic structures of social relationships and their 
cognitive underpinnings – the relational models theory by Alan Fiske – and use 
it for thinking about the function of explicit mindreading in human social 
cognition. As I will explain in chapter 2 of the summary article, a lot of effort 
has been made to develop theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mind-
reading. However, the issue of the function of mindreading in human social cog-
nition has remained uninvestigated because of the prevalent assumption that 
mindreading is ubiquitous in human social cognition and serves the purpose of 
explaining and predicting other people’s behaviour. I argue that the standard 
view does not capture the specific role of mindreading. Working from the 
relational models theory of Alan Fiske, I outline a hypothesis that the 
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evolutionary function, as well as the individual purpose, of mindreading is to 
monitor and shape social relations. I cache out the hypothesis into empirically 
testable claims and I suggest experience sampling as a possible method for 
testing them. I put forward reasons in favour of the view that relational 
cognition is more fundamental than mindreading in human social cognition. I 
pay separate attention to the issue of the motivational mechanisms of 
mindreading and hypothesise that explicit mindreading is often motivated by 
social emotions.  
Although, the three research articles target the empirical debate about human 
social cognition, first and foremost they make a philosophical contribution. 
What is the role of philosophy in the interdisciplinary research of social cog-
nition? The following chapter focuses on this issue.   
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1. THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN SOCIAL COGNITION RESEARCH4  
 
Among other things, philosophy invites  
us to understand understanding.  
Alvin Goldman 
 
Like many other topics of cognitive science, questions related to social cog-
nition have first been posed and addressed by philosophers. For instance, 
Descartes asked how we come to apprehend other people as having minds when 
we only see their bodies. He concluded that since we do not directly see other 
people’s minds, we need to infer that they have minds by using the faculty of 
judgement: 
If I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I have just done, 
I say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax; yet do I see 
any more than hats and coats that could conceal robots? I judge that they are 
men. Something that I thought I saw with my eyes, therefore, was really grasped 
solely by my mind’s faculty of judgment. (Descartes, 1998, p. 68).  
The classical philosophical problem of other minds is the question “How can 
we justify the belief that there are other minds besides our own?” The question 
at the centre of the current interdisciplinary research on social cognition is 
related but different: “What cognitive processes enable and sustain people’s 
understanding of, and interaction with, others?” This question is also at the 
focus of the current doctoral thesis. It is first and foremost an empirical 
question, so one may wonder: Is philosophy at all necessary for answering this 
question, and if so, how? In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the 
relevance of philosophy to interdisciplinary research on social cognition. I will 
also bring out how I have used philosophical methods in the research articles 
that form the main part of my doctoral thesis. 
It has been said that philosophy is to cognitive science as tin cans tied to a 
car are to a wedding or as alcohol is to sex (Thagard, 2009, p. 237). These 
comparisons express a serious doubt about what philosophical methods can 
contribute to the answering of empirical questions about cognition. One might 
be equally sceptical about the role of philosophy in the study of social cog-
nition. Even when there is a sense that philosophy should be part of inter-
disciplinary research on social cognition, there is a lack of clear understanding 
about what philosophers can and should contribute to this field and how to 
effectively combine empirical and philosophical methods. When I started doing 
                                                 
4  This chapter is based on Bohl, V. (2011). Milleks on sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimis-
valdkonnas tarvis filosoofiat? (Why does social cognition research need philosophy?) Studia 
Philosophica Estonica 4.1, 20–51. 
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research on social cognition, I soon came to ask myself: what it is that I as a 
philosopher can contribute to this field? Does my research make me less of a 
philosopher and more of a scientist? What are the distinctive philosophical 
methods that could be used to help solve puzzles about human social cognition?  
Let me begin by borrowing the distinction between philosophy in and philo-
sophy of cognitive science from Andrew Brook (2009). When a philosopher’s 
focus of study coincides with the object of scientific research, for example when 
a philosopher asks “How does social cognition work?”, we are dealing with 
philosophy in science. In contrast, when a philosopher makes scientific research 
itself an object of inquiry by asking, for example, “What is good science?” or 
“What are scientists doing when they are studying social cognition?”, we are 
concerned with philosophy of science. Since the role of philosophy of science is 
relatively well understood and appreciated (Brook, 2009, p. 218), and since it is 
not the focus of my thesis, I will here primarily analyse the second issue: What 
is the contribution of philosophy within research on social cognition?  
We can distinguish between two questions: “Do we need philosophy in 
research on social cognition?” and “Do we need philosophers in research on 
social cognition?” I think that when we answer “yes” to the first question, the 
second question also needs to be answered in the affirmative and vice versa. 
One might want to argue that instead of hiring professional philosophers, 
scientists should be trained in philosophical methods, so that scientists would be 
able to handle the philosophical part of research. But this would mean that 
scientists would partly become philosophers, so it would not change the claim 
that if philosophy is needed, so are philosophers. Both of these questions con-
verge at the issue of whether philosophical competence can contribute to re-
search on social cognition. In the following, I will argue that it can and it 
should.  
 
1.1. Philosophy is not just “armchair speculation” 
There is a widespread view that, although philosophers have in the past come 
up with many interesting speculations on important (e.g. mind-related) issues, 
today various scientific disciplines are in a position to provide empirically 
informed answers to most of the questions that long ago used to belong to 
philosophy (Brook, 2009, p. 219). Therefore, it is argued, philosophy has lost its 
relevance in many areas. For example, philosophers are no longer working on 
questions such as “What is life?” (at least not the way they used to); this issue 
now belongs to modern biology. One could argue that social cognition is 
another such area wherein philosophy has no real role to play.   
It is important to notice that the view above implies that when philosophers 
are studying social cognition, they are in principle not doing anything different 
from what psychologists, neuroscientists, or other researchers are doing – they 
are looking for answers to the very same questions that scientists are wrestling 
with. The problem is, it is argued, that philosophers are not doing it very well, 
since they lack the necessary empirical tools and they thus merely engage in a 
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poor substitute for proper empirical research – armchair speculations. If this is 
the case then philosophers are simply doing bad science. 
These allegations strike me as doing an injustice to philosophy. Indeed, 
except for experimental philosophers, philosophers are not collecting data or 
running experiments. But although philosophy is not empirical research in the 
narrow sense of data collection, philosophers are in a good position to develop 
theories and to generate new empirically testable hypotheses. While theorising 
and hypothesising, philosophers are not necessarily doing anything principally 
different from what scientists are doing when they theorise or come up with 
hypotheses. However, philosophers can have a distinctive role in this process. 
This is because: they are especially well trained in critical thinking; they have 
(or should have) background knowledge of the history of philosophical thought; 
and their theoretical interests are typically somewhat broader than those of most 
empirical scientists.  
The field of social cognition is rich in examples of fruitful collaboration 
between philosophers and empirical scientists where theoretical claims and 
hypotheses first offered by philosophers have subsequently been experimentally 
tested and the results of the experiments have in turn been integrated into 
theoretical discussions. For example, the classic paper “Does the chimpanzee 
have a theory of mind?” (by primatologists Guy Premack and David Woodruff 
(1978)) is a report of experiments that were inspired by the ideas of Daniel 
Dennett (see Dennett, 2009, p. 233) and influenced by the functionalist con-
ception of mind (see Morton, 2009, p. 714, Goldman, 2006, p. 10), as well as by 
prominent ideas in philosophy of science (Goldman, 2006, p. 11). Later on, in 
commentaries to the paper, three philosophers – Dennett (1978), Bennett 
(1978), and Harman (1978) – independently argued that the possession of the 
concept of belief is crucial to understanding others’ mental states. They came up 
with the idea that one could test whether a person possesses the concept of 
belief by investigating the ability to attribute false beliefs. As a result, psycho-
logists Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner created the first false belief task in 
1983, which became an important landmark in the developmental psychology of 
social cognition – it triggered extensive research on children’s development of 
meta-representational abilities. 
Another important role of philosophers besides theory and hypothesis 
building is to critically evaluate the theoretical frameworks and methodologies 
of current research and to suggest new research directions. For example, philo-
sophically inspired critique of the so-called third-person mindreading paradigm 
(see e.g. Leudar & Costall, 2009a) has fostered the search for new methods that 
would enable the investigation of more direct second-person interactions 
between people in more natural settings (Schilbach et al., 2013). New metho-
dological frameworks lead to new discoveries; for example Wilms et al. (2010) 
have recently shown that when a person is interacting with someone from a 
second-person perspective, there are significant differences in her brain pro-
cesses as compared with a situation in which she is merely observing another 
subject from a third-person perspective.   
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What is the relationship between philosophical reflection and empirical 
findings? As far as social cognition is concerned, although philosophers are not 
collecting empirical data, they frequently rely on empirical evidence to support 
their theories. Thus they are not to be blamed for succumbing to a priori arm-
chair speculations instead of finding out how things really work in the world. 
For example, in a recent book “Simulating Minds”, Alvin Goldman (2006) 
relies extensively on neuroscientific and psychological evidence to support his 
version of simulation theory. Nevertheless, no piece of evidence by itself proves 
a theoretical claim – it first needs to be interpreted accordingly. For example, 
Goldman refers to evidence of mirror neurons in humans in order to argue for 
the simulation theory. However, this evidence also allows for different inter-
pretations so that it can serve as support for a non-simulationist approach 
(compare e.g. Gallese & Goldman, 1998, Gallagher, 2007, and Slors, 2010 for 
different accounts of the function of mirror neurons). This demonstrates that 
theoretical issues cannot be solved by simply piling up more empirical results. 
Rather, conceptual clarification and a scrutiny of assumptions that are implicit 
in the current research paradigm are often necessary. For this kind of work, 
philosophers are suitably “armed.” At the same time, without new empirical 
findings, there would be little progress in theories of social cognition. So it is 
best to see empirical data collection and theory-building (including the use of 
philosophical analysis) as complementary. It is not a coincidence that since 
empirical disciplines and philosophy joined forces to study social cognition, 
more elaborate accounts of social cognition have emerged than there ever did in 
the course of the rest of the history of philosophy and science.  
These and other similar examples of successful cooperation between philo-
sophy and the empirical sciences demonstrate that philosophical discussions 
have guided empirical research of social cognition in important ways and I see 
no reason why this should not continue. Obviously, successful interdisciplinary 
cooperation demands a special effort from both philosophers and scientists. A 
meaningful exchange is not always easy to achieve. An expected problem is that 
theoretical claims originating within philosophy tend to be too abstract or too 
general to be linked with particular empirical findings or to allow for direct 
empirical testing. For example, Ian Apperly (2011, p. 5) charges that “nobody 
has yet come up with a generalizable test, or set of criteria, that could be used to 
discern whether a given mindreading problem was solved by simulation or by 
theorizing” and argues that for this reason the philosophical debate between the 
proponents of the two major theories of how people attribute mental states – 
theory-theory and simulation theory – is not particularly useful from the point 
of view of experimental psychology. This highlights the need to focus more on 
the operationalization of philosophical concepts without distorting or trivia-
lizing them. But it also shows that in frontier science, figuring out what ques-
tions to ask and how to ask them is not a trivial matter. As Dennett (2009, p. 
232) has put it: 
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One of the reasons cognitive science is such a land of plenty for philosophers is 
that so many of its questions – not just the grand bird’s-eye view questions but 
quite proximal, in-the-lab-now questions – are still ill thought out, prematurely 
precipitated into forms that deserve critical reevaluation. If philosophy is, as my 
bumper sticker slogan has it, what you’re doing until you figure out just what 
questions to ask, then there is a lot of philosophy to be done by cognitive 
scientists these days. 
There is, no doubt, also a lot of philosophy to be done by researchers of social 
cognition.  
 
1.2. Painting with broad brush strokes? 
Another distrustful view on what philosophers are doing in science is that 
unlike scientists, philosophers are only interested in the most general questions 
and in the “big picture” of the world. They thus tend to paint with brush strokes 
that are too broad (compare Brook, 2009, p. 219). Of course, science is also 
interested in questions of a general nature but according to the critics, philo-
sophical ambitions go far beyond empirical evidence and bring along a risk of 
ignoring, oversimplifying, or distorting scientific facts. 
It is probably true that “philosophers often comically misjudge their com-
petence to evaluate concepts, arguments, theories with which they have only the 
most passing acquaintance” (Dennett, 2009, p. 232). However, the development 
of more general theoretical frameworks is certainly necessary when it comes to 
issues that call for an interdisciplinary approach. Social cognition is one of the 
areas of research that does not fit nicely within the boundaries of only one 
discipline – the study of social cognition has become a truly interdisciplinary 
enterprise involving philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, 
and various other disciplines. However, interdisciplinarity brings along its own 
problems. On the one hand, people who do interdisciplinary work must be 
experts in their own field of research and know where the limits of their 
competence and the boundaries between disciplines lie: strong fences make 
good neighbours. On the other hand, truly interdisciplinary work requires that 
specialists are able to overcome the theoretical, conceptual, and methodological 
limits of their home discipline, see the object of study from a wider perspective, 
and pose questions from a more general point of view. But who should be 
reflecting upon how the theories and empirical results of different disciplines 
hang together? Who should clarify questions that surge up at the intersection of 
different disciplines? Philosophers are good candidates for this task because 
they have both the means and the motivation to think about how results of 
various disciplines hang together (or contradict one another) on a larger scale. 
In addition to fulfilling the general desire for a more coherent and holistic 
understanding of the world, such an integration process potentially leads to new 
empirical questions, stimulates the development of new methods, and thereby 
creates new knowledge. Research results of one discipline can set constraints on 
or provoke questions about processes that could be better investigated by using 
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the means of some other discipline. In short: philosophers can and should have 
a distinctive role in interdisciplinary research (see also Sellars, 1962, Thagard, 
2009, p. 238).  
The articles that form the main body of my thesis have largely stemmed from 
a truly interdisciplinary approach to issues related to social cognition. In appendix 
1, with the neuroscientist Wouter van den Bos, I integrate aspects of the “theory 
of mind” paradigm with aspects of phenomenologically inspired interactionist 
approaches by relying on dual-process theories, to build a new comprehensive 
theoretical framework. The process of developing an integrative framework also 
gave rise to a new empirical hypothesis: the idea that in social interaction, Type 1 
and Type 2 processes mutually influence each other. In appendix 3, I integrate the 
perspectives supplied by cognitive and developmental psychology on mind-
reading with the cognitive anthropology of relational cognition in order to argue 
that the function of mindreading is to shape social relationships. The main claim 
of the paper is developed into empirical hypotheses and supplemented by a 
description of a possible method for testing the hypotheses.  
Not all attempts to integrate the findings of different disciplines with philo-
sophical insights result in new empirical hypotheses. Sometimes the result is 
more abstract. Whether theories that have gained a certain level of generality 
and abstractness can be called empirical science is debatable but the gap 
between general claims and empirically proven particular claims is in principle 
similar to the problem of induction – a problem that is unavoidable in most 
scientific thinking. Philosophers engaged in interdisciplinary research contri-
bute to the answering of empirical questions but they also sometimes weigh 
empirical findings in order to answer specifically philosophical questions. 
Philosophically oriented theories that rely on scientific research for finding 
answers to traditional philosophical problems can be called empirical philo-
sophy instead of empirical science (Prinz, 2008). The boundary between empiri-
cal science and empirical philosophy is, however, not sharp. We can think of 
traditional philosophy and data collection rather as two ends of a continuum 
(Prinz, 2008, p. 206). When it comes to the danger that philosophers may easily 
misunderstand or overlook scientific facts, it is in every philosopher’s interest to 
get the facts straight, since any theoretical claim that ignores or misrepresents 
facts becomes an easy target for its critics. This ensures the interest of natura-
listically minded philosophers5 in keeping up with empirical research that is 
                                                 
5  With the expression ”naturalistically minded philosophers” I have in mind philosophers 
who may not agree upon the definition of naturalism but who, one way or another, think that 
philosophy needs to take scientific knowledge seriously. It includes philosophers who 
support either a) ontological naturalism (the claim that everything that exists is natural, i.e. 
no supernatural entities or processes exist); b) methodological naturalism (a claim that we 
can aquire true knowledge about the world only by using the methods of natural science or a 
claim that philosophy and science use the same kinds of methods in principle (see Papineau, 
2009a)); c) a broad definition of naturalism (see e.g. Zahavi, 2004) which emphasizes that 
philosophers must take scientific knowledge into consideration without necessarily agreeing 
to ontological or methodological naturalism. 
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relevant to their field of interest. At the same time, it is also a philosopher’s job 
to pay close attention to how scientific results are produced and to scrutinize the 
tacit assumptions that are left implicit in research routines. 
 
 
1.3. Conceptual hygiene 
Analytic philosophy is known for its emphasis on conceptual analysis, so one 
way to fit philosophy into empirical research is to give philosophers the job of 
taking care of the conceptual tool kit of the research field. Empirical scientists, 
however, may not like the idea of philosophers telling them which concepts they 
should be using and how. Also philosophers themselves have criticised the view 
that conceptual analysis should be an important part of philosophy. For 
example, Paul Thagard (2009) claims that philosophy operates best, not in the 
form of conceptual analysis, but rather as empirically informed reflection on a 
wide range of scientific findings. Jesse Prinz (2008) does not deny the necessity 
of conceptual analysis but argues against the view that it is a task for philo-
sophers in particular. According to David Papineau (2009b), philosophers who 
think that they are doing conceptual analysis are simply confused about what it 
is that they are actually doing.  
Conceptual clarity is certainly important not only in philosophy but also in 
science. Unfortunately, the conceptual tool kit of social cognition research is not 
in very good shape. Theorists of different backgrounds are frequently using the 
same terms for different concepts and different terms for the same concepts, 
which causes a great deal of confusion. It often leads to talking past one another 
and creates merely verbal disagreements. For example, in the framework of 
theory-theory and simulation theory, “social cognition” is primarily used for the 
ability to predict and explain other people’s behaviour by attributing mental 
states to them. Anti-mindreading approaches, such as interactionism (see 
chapter 3), use “social cognition” primarily to refer to the ability to successfully 
coordinate behaviour in social interactions. Another example is that the term 
“theory of mind” is sometimes used as a synonym for the ability to mindread 
(i.e. the ability to attribute mental states), sometimes for the theory-theory of 
mindreading, and sometimes as an umbrella term for a whole set of mainstream 
theories of mindreading (including both theory-theory and simulation theory, 
which I introduce in the next chapter). It is obvious that in order to avoid 
confusion and merely verbal disagreements, different parties should adjust their 
concept use or at least be aware of the fact that their use of some terms differs 
from that found in other contexts.  
There are various ways to improve conceptual clarity. The usefulness of con-
ceptual analysis depends on the exact method and the aims of the analysis. 
According to Tim van Gelder (1998, pp. 122–124), philosophers have at least 
three standard methods for conceptual analysis: 1) they consult their personal 
intuitions “from an armchair”; 2) they analyse how particular words and phrases 
are used in certain contexts (van Gelder labels this method “linguistic 
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analysis”); 3) they work out new concepts. A fourth method, known as experi-
mental philosophy, could be added: 4) the empirical study of how ordinary 
people use the concepts of interest. 
Often, philosophical conceptual analysis is identified with the first, “arm-
chair,” method. This method implies that philosophers at least implicitly possess 
the concepts in question and that, by analysing one’s intuitions, it is possible to 
make them explicit: “armchair conceptual analysis can be characterized as an 
introspective memory retrieval process” (Prinz, 2008, p. 191). The problem with 
this method is that, without due reason, it implies that philosophers’ intuitions 
are more trustworthy than the intuitions of non-philosophers. It is questionable 
whether philosophers’ intuitions about vernacular concepts are more reliable 
than those of non-philosophers. Even if it is the case, an additional complication 
is that the intuitions of different philosophers often contradict each other, so it is 
unlikely that any universally valid intuitions about concepts exist. In any case, it 
is highly implausible that philosophers’ intuitions about scientific concepts are 
more reliable than those of scientists. 
The second method is more likely to be useful for keeping the conceptual 
tool kit of a research field in good shape. Here the philosopher’s job is to apply 
her trained analytical skills to figure out how key terms are used in different 
research contexts. Based on such an analysis, it is possible to disentangle diffe-
rent concepts and to make suggestions about how particular terms could be used 
more clearly to avoid talking past one another and to prevent or resolve verbal 
disagreements. This kind of analysis of concepts is certainly of great value for 
research, especially because most scientists (except for linguists, but their moti-
vation is different from that of philosophers) lack the time and skills to carry it 
out.  
Both of these methods assume that the concepts of interest already exist 
“ready-made” either implicitly in one’s mind or within the linguistic practice of 
a particular (scientific) community. For this reason, conceptual analysis is seen 
as a process of making concepts explicit and linking them with specific terms 
(van Gelder, 1998, p. 123). However, such an assumption cannot be taken for 
granted. It is possible that everybody is confused about what is, for example, 
“social cognition” or “theory of mind.” If this is the case then the main task of 
conceptual analysis is not to make implicit concepts explicit but rather to create 
new and more effective concepts. The conceptual work becomes a prescriptive, 
rather than a descriptive, process. Whether any particular newly constructed 
concept will be adopted by a wider range of researchers, only time will tell.  
We have yet to discuss the fourth method – the one adopted by experimental 
philosophers. Experimental philosophers run questionnaire-based studies to 
uncover the intuitions of “ordinary folk” concerning concepts of central philo-
sophical importance (Knobe & Nichols, 2008). In some contexts, for example in 
ethics or epistemology, this method can provide important philosophical 
insights. Some experimental philosophers even argue that this method can be 
used to determine whether the intuitions of armchair philosophers are correct 
(Prinz, 2008, p. 201). However, in the context of social cognition research (as is 
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likely in many other scientific contexts), consulting vernacular concepts is 
unlikely to be helpful in building the conceptual apparatus of the field. The 
“ordinary folk” simply does not possess fine-grained concepts for describing 
and explaining the cognitive processes that are responsible for human social 
cognitive abilities.6  
We can conclude that just as with any other field of research, conceptual 
“hygiene” is important for research into social cognition and that philosophers 
are professionally well equipped for this job, especially when they take up 
linguistic analysis and work out new “tailor-made” concepts. 
The application of the tools of conceptual analysis is often implicit in any 
philosophical writing but I have more explicitly relied on conceptual analysis in 
appendix 2, where I and my co-author Nivedita Gangopadhyay analyse how the 
concept “unobservable” is used by proponents and critics of theories of 
mindreading. We disentangle four different senses of “unobservable” and show 
that confusing them has caused a great deal of verbal disagreement between the 
proponents and the critics of theories of mindreading. By clarifying the different 
meanings of the concept, we dissolve elements of verbal disagreement and 
show that the real issue of controversy between the theories of mindreading and 
the critics of it lies in the question of how to explain the cognitive processes that 
underlie mental state attributions. 
 
 
1.4. The role of phenomenology in  
social cognition research 
Until now, I have focused mainly on the role of traditional and analytic philo-
sophy in the research on social cognition. In recent years, philosophers with a 
background in phenomenology have started to enter the interdisciplinary de-
bates concerning social cognition. Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline 
founded by Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century which focuses 
on the study of the structure of experience. How can phenomenology contribute 
to research on social cognition?  
An obvious answer is that just as with many other philosophical works, the 
classical texts of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Hannah Arendt and other phenomeno-
                                                 
6  However, experimental philosophy can be useful for studying what in philosophy goes by 
the name “folk psychology” (according to one prominent definition of “folk psychology”): 
principles concerning human psychology that ordinary people are inclined to endorse in their 
interpretations of everyday human behaviour. Philosophers working on folk psychology tend 
to prematurely assume that they know how “the ordinary folk” reasons about the mind. For 
instance, it was thought that according to folk psychology, “intentions” are mental states that 
precede deliberate actions. By using the methods of experimental philosophy, Knobe (2008) 
showed that folk psychological attributions of intentions are much more complex: whether 
an act is judged to have been carried out intentionally or not depends on the moral con-
sequences of the act. 
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logists can serve as a reservoir of theoretical insights that can potentially be 
used as a basis for working out scientific hypotheses. However, for Husserl, 
phenomenological descriptions were supposed to operate on a more funda-
mental level than any scientific claim. He considered phenomenological truths 
to be untranslatable into scientific language. From a Husserlian point of view, 
phenomenology is a transcendental discipline for investigating the a priori 
structures of experience, which are presupposed by any scientific practice. 
Phenomenologists would therefore not necessarily welcome attempts to natu-
ralize phenomenology or to make phenomenology continuous with science (see 
Zahavi, 2010, p. 7). Nonetheless, some great figures of the phenomenological 
tradition have participated in a fruitful dialogue with the science of their time. 
One of the best examples of this is the great French phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty whose “Phenomenology of Perception” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, 
originally published in French in 1945) is informed by psychological research 
of the time and who famously analysed and reinterpreted various psycho-
pathological findings within a phenomenological framework. Thus it is an open 
question whether phenomenology can and should be naturalized. Although there 
is a lack of consensus among phenomenologists about this issue, one option for 
reconciling phenomenology with naturalism is to understand naturalism in a 
broad enough sense so that within the naturalistic framework the subjectivity of 
experience is done justice. “[W]hy let the reductionists monopolize the concept 
of naturalism?” asks Zahavi (2004, pp. 343–344), proposing that naturalism 
needs to be redefined so as to encompass phenomenology without reducing 
phenomenological claims to scientific claims. In other words, one could under-
stand naturalized phenomenology as that part of phenomenology which allows 
for a mutual exchange of ideas between science and phenomenology (Zahavi, 
2010, pp. 14–15).  
The use of phenomenology in the interdisciplinary study of social cognition 
is, unfortunately, hindered by a widespread view according to which pheno-
menology is restricted to describing experiences from the subject’s personal 
point of view. The standard accounts of social cognition (theory-theory and 
simulation theory) treat phenomenological descriptions as irrelevant to research 
on social cognition, since it is thought that the descriptions of subjective expe-
riences do not provide any useful information about sub-personal social cogni-
tive mechanisms. However, it should be pointed out that non-phenomenologists 
often misunderstand the nature of the phenomenological methodology and 
wrongly identify it with introspection (see Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, pp. 13–
43). Since introspection as a research method is considered to be unreliable and 
unsuitable for scientific research, it is no wonder that scientists and many philo-
sophers are sceptical about the prospects of phenomenology contributing to the 
solution of puzzles raised by social cognition. It may come as a surprise that 
phenomenologists are actually even more critical of the concept of introspection 
than scientists: they do not just claim that introspection as a method is un-
reliable but argue that introspection is a confused notion that corresponds to no 
real process. According to phenomenologists, the concept of introspection 
 
25 
draws upon a false distinction between the “inner” and the “outer”; it assumes 
that consciousness is locked inside one’s head and the world is outside of it 
(Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 21). Phenomenologists argue that subjective 
experiences are not locked inside our heads. They are ways in which we are 
open to the world as embodied beings. One of the aims of phenomenology is to 
show that experience and consciousness cannot be reduced to or fully explained 
from a scientific third-person perspective. Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. ix) expres-
ses it as follows: 
Scientific points of view, according to which my existence is a moment of the 
world’s, are always both naïve and at the same time dishonest, because they take 
for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, namely that 
of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms itself round me 
and begins to exist for me. 
Scientists and many naturalistically oriented philosophers tend to see science as 
fundamental for providing knowledge about the world, but traditional Hus-
serlian phenomenologists see phenomenology as more fundamental because it is 
seen as providing a foundation for science. I will not try to solve this contra-
diction here but I think that a fruitful cooperation between science and 
phenomenology is possible even without agreeing on a solution to this problem. 
For instance, there is no reason why phenomenological descriptions could not 
be treated as explananda for social cognition research: phenomenology could 
provide descriptions of first-person experiences that could at least partly be 
explained by the underlying cognitive mechanisms. Authors who criticise the 
standard accounts of social cognition appeal often to the argument that the 
explanandum of these accounts is phenomenologically inadequate (see e.g. 
Leudar & Costall, 2009b). But there is a further issue of whether providing 
explananda is the only thing phenomenology can contribute. Can phenomeno-
logy provide any explanations?  
Shaun Gallagher (2003) has written about three different ways in which phe-
nomenology can contribute to experimental science. The first option is neuro-
phenomenology, as originally outlined by Francisco Varela (1996) and applied 
in pilot experiments by Lutz et al. (2001; see also Lutz, 2002). The idea of 
neurophenomenology is that phenomenologically exact first-person data in-
forms the interpretations of physiological processes and, in turn, neuroscientific 
analyses help to refine phenomenological descriptions. In standard neuro-
scientific experiments, individual findings are highly variable but the variability 
is usually attributed to various subjective parameters that are treated as noise. 
The “noise” is “washed out” by averaging results across subjects and different 
trials. The neurophenomenological approach, however, treats first person data as 
a valuable source of information and combines it with a dynamical analysis of 
neural processes. The phenomenological part of this approach involves using 
phenomenological methodology to describe subjective parameters through a 
series of trials. Both empirical scientists and experimental subjects need to be 
extensively trained in phenomenological methods, in particular to be able to 
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shift their attention from what they experience to how they experience it in 
order to deliver consistent and clear reports of the experience. The subject’s 
reports are used as descriptive categories to divide the trials into pheno-
menologically based clusters, which are then correlated with dynamic neural 
signatures. (see Gallagher, 2003, pp. 86–88). 
The second option that Gallagher (2003, pp. 88–91) describes is what he 
calls retrospective and indirect use of phenomenology. It involves using pheno-
menological insights to critically reinterpret theoretical claims and experimental 
results much in the way Merleau-Ponty used phenomenology to re-evaluate the 
scientific claims of his time. However, this approach is incomplete unless the 
phenomenological reinterpretations are in turn empirically tested.  
This brings me to the third option, which Gallagher labels front-loaded 
phenomenology (ibid., pp. 91–97): using phenomenological insights to shape 
the way experiments are designed. More generally, the method should lead to a 
dialectical movement between phenomenological insights and preliminary 
trials, a movement which is aimed at specifying claims and concepts for the 
purposes of the experiments. Gallagher gives as an example the phenomeno-
logical distinction between self-agency and self-ownership that has informed 
several neuroscientific experiments, which have themselves helped refine the 
phenomenological distinction (see Farrer & Frith, 2002, Chaminade & Decety, 
2002). There are also recent examples of front-loading phenomenology to social 
cognitive neuroscience. Schilbach et al. (2006) have used fMRI to demonstrate 
that the phenomenological distinction between the second- and the third-person 
points of view (between the experience of being involved in social interaction 
and the experience of being a passive observer of social interaction) is cor-
related with different neural patterns in the two conditions. The distinction has 
inspired a whole new research paradigm in social cognitive neuroscience, out-
lined in a recent article by Schilbach et al. (2013). 
When we look at what role phenomenology has played in current research 
on social cognition, it just happens that it has mainly been used indirectly and 
retrospectively. To my knowledge, there have been no neurophenomenological 
experiments targeting social cognition and the contribution of front-loaded 
phenomenology is relatively modest. The main strategy for including phenome-
nology within the study of social cognition has been to use phenomenological 
or phenomenologically inspired arguments to criticise current theories of social 
cognition and to reinterpret empirical findings so that they would be more in 
accordance with phenomenological insights. For example, based on the views 
of Scheler, Sartre and other classical phenomenologists, Gallagher and Zahavi 
(2008) argue that instead of mindreading via theorising, social cognition is 
primarily a specific perceptual or empathic process targeted at the living body 
of the other person. They also reinterpret the function of mirror neurons in light 
of the phenomenologically inspired direct perception approach and thereby also 
oppose the simulationist interpretations of social cognitive processes.  
As for the role of phenomenology in my thesis, in the appendix 2, I and my 
co-author Nivedita Gangopadhyay use Husserl’s account of the structure of 
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social perception to argue that, ironically, phenomenologically inspired critics 
of the theory of mind approach tend to oversimplify the phenomenon of social 
cognition by characterising it as similar to non-social perception. We argue that 
Husserl’s account is not necessarily incompatible with theory of mind accounts, 
and that Husserl’s insights could help to develop a more adequate framework 
for studying social perception. In Husserl’s phenomenological analysis, the 
structure of social perception differs in important ways from the structure of 
perception of non-social entities: mental states are not perceivable in the same 
way as sensory properties of objects. In the future, it will be interesting to try to 
find ways to empirically test these claims (or more specific hypotheses based on 




In this chapter, I have focused on the issue of how philosophical methods can be 
used to study social cognition. Philosophers are not necessarily doing anything 
categorically different from that which scientists do when they try to answer 
questions such as “How does social cognition work?” However, because they 
possess a background knowledge that encompasses the history of thought, spe-
cial training in critical thinking, and motivation to unravel questions that exceed 
the boundaries of established scientific disciplines, philosophers can play a 
distinctive role in research on social cognition. Philosophers are in a good 
position to critically evaluate the theoretical frameworks and methodologies of 
ongoing research projects. Philosophical competence conjoined with a drive to 
understand the human mind and sociality provide a valuable basis for a truly 
interdisciplinary approach to social cognition and fosters efforts to build more 
comprehensive theoretical frameworks to cover various aspects of human social 
cognition. Philosophers have the necessary skills to reflect upon how the 
theoretical claims and empirical results of different disciplines and paradigms 
hang together (or contradict one another) on a wider scale. Integration of 
philosophical insights and research results stemming from different disciplines 
opens up new research avenues, raises important questions at the intersection of 
disciplines, stimulates theoretical discussions, and contributes to the develop-
ment of new hypotheses and research methods. In addition, because philo-
sophers are trained in conceptual analysis, they are well suited to do the neces-
sary conceptual work. Philosophers can best take care of the conceptual tool kit 
of the field, not by consulting their personal intuitions on particular concepts, 
but rather by analysing existing conceptual frameworks and by “tailor-making” 
new concepts. As far as phenomenology is concerned, it can contribute to the 
research of social cognition in several ways: 1) phenomenological descriptions 
of social experiences can serve as explananda for social cognition research; 2) 
by teaching the phenomenological method to test subjects, it is possible to carry 
out neurophenomenological experiments; 3) the phenomenological framework 
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can be used retrospectively and indirectly to reinterpret scientific findings; 4) 
phenomenological insights can be “front-loaded” into the experimental design.   
The research articles that constitute the main part of my doctoral thesis (ap-
pendices 1–3) include several ways of using philosophy in science as described 
above. In papers 1 and 3, contrasting theoretical and empirical perspectives for 
explaining the underpinnings of human social cognition are synthesised. This 
enabled me to outline more comprehensive theoretical frameworks but also 
resulted in novel empirical hypotheses and suggestions for testing them. The 
integrative approach outlined in “Toward an integrative account of social 
cognition: Marrying theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes” (co-authored with Wouter van den Bos, see 
appendix 1) merges the so-called theory of mind approach and the interactionist 
approach with the help of dual process theories. It also presents the hypothesis 
that the two types of cognitive process (Type 1 and Type 2 processes) that have 
so far been studied in isolation, and that have been thought to function 
independently, may interact and mutually influence each other in real life social 
interactions. In “We read minds to shape relationships” (see appendix 3), I focus 
upon an issue that has received little attention in the mainstream social cog-
nition literature – the function of mindreading. By introducing the relational 
model’s theory of Alan Fiske, it is hypothesised that the primary function of 
mindreading is to shape (create, sustain, negotiate etc.) social relationships. The 
hypothesis is cashed out in the form of specific empirical claims and experience 
sampling is suggested as a possible method to test those claims. The article 
“Theory of mind and the unobservability of other minds” (co-authored with 
Nivedita Gangopadhyay, see appendix 2), is mainly aimed at conceptual clari-
fication. It is shown that “unobservability of mental states” can be read in 
various ways. Most of the readings, contrary to what the critics of theory of 
mind have assumed, do not apply to theories of mindreading. This leads to the 
conclusion that the disagreement between the proponents and the critics of 
theories of mindreading over whether mental states are observable is largely a 
red herring. The second part of the paper makes use of Husserl’s analysis of the 
structure of social perception, thus offering an example of how phenome-












2. THE STANDARD APPROACH TO  
SOCIAL COGNITION:  
READING EACH-OTHER’S MINDS 
 
Attribution of mental states is to humans 
as echolocation is to the bat. 
Dan Sperber7 
 
Having introduced the meta-philosophical and methodological issues pertaining 
to the role of philosophy in the study of social cognition, we can now move on 
to the topic of social cognition itself. In this chapter, I give an overview of how 
social cognition has been studied within the past three to four decades by 
researchers who have assumed that the key to human social cognition is mind-
reading – the ability to attribute mental states in order to make sense of other 
people’s behaviour. I review the most influential experimental studies of the 
standard mindreading paradigm and introduce the mainstream theories of mind-
reading: theory-theory and simulation theory. 
 
 
2.1. From Premack and Woodruff ’s chimpanzee 
experiments to the false belief tasks 
In 1978, in a special issue of Behavioural and Brain Sciences on consciousness 
and cognition in non-human species, primatologists David Premack and Guy 
Woodruff published a seminal article “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of 
mind?” The article provoked the interest of philosophers and psychologists and 
triggered interdisciplinary research on the ability to understand mental states. 
The authors assumed that humans possess a “theory of mind” – an ability to 
impute mental states to oneself and others via theoretical inferences. They were 
interested in whether chimpanzees also have something like a theory of mind. 
On their account, the ability to impute mental states has a theoretical basis 
because “such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to 
make predictions about the behaviour of others” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 
515). Although the paper by Premack and Woodruff lacks references to philo-
sophical works, it was clearly influenced by the contemporary functionalist 
conception of mind8 (see Morton, 2009, p. 714, Goldman, 2006, p. 10), and the 
accounts of “theoreticity” in the philosophy of science (see Goldman, 2006, p. 
                                                 
7  The quote from Dan Sperber originates from a paper presented at a conference on Darwin 
and the Human Sciences, London School of Economics, June 1993. Cited via Baron-Cohen 
(1997, p. 4). 
8  According to functionalism, mental states are functional states that figure in causal 
explanations of behaviour.  
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11). The paper was also inspired by an exchange of ideas between Guy Premack 
and Daniel Dennett (see Dennett, 2009, p. 233).   
“Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” is a report of a series of 
experiments with a chimpanzee called Sarah. In the first experiment, Sarah was 
shown videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling to obtain bananas that 
were in different unreachable locations. With each video she was given a pair of 
photographs of which only one represented a solution to the problem. Sarah 
consistently chose the “correct” photographs. The authors argued that by 
choosing the correct photograph Sarah expressed her understanding of the 
actor’s intentions. Other possible interpretations were also considered (simple 
physical matching, associationism, and empathy or putting oneself in the place 
of the other) but the “theory of mind” explanation was preferred. The paper also 
reports several subsequent experiments that were designed to test different 
aspects of the “theory of mind” interpretation against other possible expla-
nations. Premack and Woodruff concluded that chimpanzees may possess a 
primitive theory of mind. 
The paper evoked a lively philosophical discussion in the commentaries. 
Philosophers Jonathan Bennett (1978), Daniel Dennett (1978), Gilbert Harman 
(1978), and the cognitive scientist Zenon Pylyshyn (1978) independently 
emphasized that in order to have a “theory of mind”, an individual must be able 
not only to have beliefs but also to represent them: one needs to have the ability 
to have beliefs about beliefs. Several authors suggested that it is possible to test 
the existence of such a metarepresentational ability by examining an indivi-
dual’s ability to understand that people can represent the world differently from 
the way it really is. For example, Dennett (1978, p. 569) wrote:  
Very young children watching a Punch and Judy show squeal in anticipatory 
delight as Punch prepares to throw the box over the cliff. Why? Because they 
know Punch thinks Judy is still in the box. They know better; they saw Judy 
escape while Punch’s back was turned. We take the children’s excitement as 
overwhelmingly good evidence that they understand the situation – they 
understand that Punch is acting on a mistaken belief (although they are not 
sophisticated enough to put it that way). Would chimpanzees exhibit similar 
excitement if presented with a similar bit of play acting (in a drama that spoke 
directly to their “interests”)?  
Harman (1978, pp. 576–577) outlined a very similar idea: 
Suppose that a subject chimpanzee sees a second chimpanzee watch a banana 
being placed into one of two opaque pots. The second chimpanzee is then 
distracted while the banana is removed from the first pot and placed in the 
second. If the subject chimpanzee expects the second chimpanzee to reach into 
the pot which originally contained the banana, that would seem to show that it 




These ideas were taken up by Austrian psychologists Heinz Wimmer and Josef 
Perner who designed the very first false-belief task for children. They published 
a paper (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) which described four experiments with 
children aged between three and nine years. The first two experiments tested 
children’s ability to represent other subject’s false beliefs; the other two 
experiments examined the ability to construct deceitful utterances without 
representing false beliefs.  
Let us look at the first experiment in detail. Children were presented with 
puppet sketches where a character (a boy called Maxi, or a little girl) placed an 
object (a chocolate bar or a book) into one location and then witnessed how, in 
the absence of the character, the object was transferred to a different location. 
Children were asked to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object 
after returning to the scene (“Belief question”). Subsequently, they were asked 
either: a) where the protagonist will say the object is when he (or she) wants 
another person to help him (or her) to obtain it (“Cooperative condition”); or b) 
where the protagonist will say the object is when he (or she) wants another 
person not to find it (“Competitive condition”). The correct answer to the 
“Belief question” is that the protagonist will search for the object in the first 
location. None of the 3–4 year old children answered the first question correctly 
but 57% of 4–6-year old and 86% of 6–9-year old children pointed correctly to 
the second location. Children at all ages who correctly ascribed to the prota-
gonist a false belief were also able to construct an utterance for the protagonist 
which was deceitful or truthful in relation to the protagonist’s belief. Impor-
tantly, the majority of children who failed to answer the “Belief question” 
correctly nonetheless remembered where the protagonist had left the object, so 
the cause of the incorrect answer was not a failure to recall where the prota-
gonist had left the object. In the second experiment, further conditions were 
added to the original stories to explore why the youngest subjects failed to 
ascribe a false belief to the protagonist. One hypothesis was that smaller 
children fail to answer the “Belief question” because they do not reflect on the 
situation and reply impulsively. To test this hypothesis, a “Stop-and-think” 
condition was introduced, where children were explicitly instructed to reflect on 
the situation before answering the “Belief question.” Since the “Stop-and-think” 
condition did not improve younger children’s performance, the hypothesis was 
not supported. The overall conclusion of Wimmer and Perner (1983, p. 126) 
was that “the emergence of children’s ability to understand another person’s 
beliefs … is not a mere side effect of an increase in memory and central 
processing capacity.” Instead they suggested that within the period of 4 to 6 
years a novel cognitive skill for representing false beliefs emerges.  
The false-belief task soon became a kind of a “litmus test” for the presence 
of a theory of mind (Barresi & Moore 1996, p. 118), so much so that a decade 
after the first false-belief experiments Gopnik, Slaugther and Meltzoff (1994, p. 
157) warned against “a neurotic task fixation” in developmental psychology. 
After the study of Wimmer and Perner there was an explosion of research on the 
astonishing improvement between 3 and 5 years of age in children’s perfor-
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mance on various false-belief tasks. Even today, 30 years after the first false-
belief experiment, the development of false-belief understanding continues to 
be at the focus of developmental psychology.  
Various versions of the false belief task have been designed and used on 
different populations. Experimenters typically use a two locations scenario (e.g. 
Maxi’s chocolate might be in the drawer or the cupboard), or an unexpected 
contents scenario (e.g. the candy box that usually contains candies now contains 
something else). Numerous studies have replicated the result that younger 
children, typically 3-year olds, fail the standard false belief task, whereas older 
children, typically 5-year olds, pass it. An interesting finding in the two 
locations condition is that younger children are found to make a specific false-
belief error: instead of answering randomly they typically assert that the prota-
gonist will look for the object at the location to which it was moved (Wellmann, 
Cross & Watson, 2001, p. 656). In the unexpected contents condition (e.g. 
Gopnik & Astington, 1988), children who see a box of a well-known brand of 
candies state that it will have candies inside; then they open the box and find 
that it contains pencils. They are asked what another person who has not 
observed the contents of the box will think is in it. Most five-year olds answer 
correctly, whereas 3-year olds typically say that another naïve person will think 
that the box contains pencils. Interestingly, when the younger children are asked 
what they themselves thought was in the box before it was opened, they tend to 
say that they thought from the start that it contained pencils, which suggests that 
younger children are just as unable to attribute false beliefs to themselves as to 
others (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). 
 The false belief-task has also been applied to populations with develop-
mental disorders and different cultural backgrounds. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and 
Frith (1985) found that the majority of children with high-functioning autism 
failed in a standard false-belief test, whereas children of equivalent mental age 
who had Down’s syndrome passed the test successfully. As for cultural diffe-
rences, in 1998, psychologist Angeline Lillard published a comparative review 
based on ethnographic studies to argue that there are remarkable cultural diffe-
rences in the practice of folk psychology (see Lillard, 1998). A meta-analysis of 
false-belief experiments based on 178 separate studies and 591 conditions 
(Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001) revealed that the country of children’s origin 
indeed influences performance so that at any one age, children from different 
countries perform better or worse than each other (e.g. children of a certain age 
in Australia and Canada perform better than children in the USA and those in 
Austria and Japan perform somewhat worse). Nonetheless, children in all 
countries demonstrated roughly the same developmental sequence, which seems 
to suggest that the developmental trajectory of false-belief understanding is uni-
versal across cultures. The meta-analysis (ibid.) also showed that various 
methodological efforts to make the verbal task easier for children (e.g. by em-
phasizing that one of the protagonists had a deceptive motive, or by em-
phasizing the temporal aspects of the situation with the question “When Maxi 
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comes back, where will he look first for his chocolate?”) had little effect on the 
performance.  
Although three-year-olds and younger children fail in classical false belief 
tasks, more recent studies with non-verbal paradigms have produced puzzling 
results that are currently at the centre of debates on implicit mindreading. 
Studies which employed the active-helping paradigm indicate that 18-month-
olds take another person’s false belief into account when tracking the person’s 
action goals (see e.g. Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009, Knudsen & 
Liszkowski, 2012). Experiments with looking-time paradigms even suggest that 
infants younger than sixteen months may have an implicit understanding of 
false beliefs (see e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 
2007). There is currently little consensus on how to interpret these results (see 
e.g. the special issue of British Journal of Developmental Psychology, edited by 
Low & Perner, 2012). One attractive option to explain the early success in non-
verbal false-belief tasks is to suppose that humans have two cognitive systems 
for tracking mental states: an early (both developmentally and computationally), 
fast, and automatic system, and a later developing, more flexible, and more 
cognitively demanding system (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, Apperly, 2011). 
The intriguing results of hundreds of false belief studies have fuelled 
intensive theoretical discussions to which I will turn next. Before introducing 
the mainstream views on the basic cognitive mechanisms for attributing mental 
states, a few terminological remarks are in order. Since Premack and Wood-
ruff’s seminal paper psychologists have studied the human ability to attribute 
mental states often under the label “theory of mind.” This label is somewhat 
misleading, however, because it seems to assume that the human ability to 
attribute mental states is theoretical in nature, when in fact not all researchers 
share this assumption. A further problem is that the use of “theory of mind” is 
ambiguous between at least three different meanings. Depending on the context, 
it is used either as: a) a label for a particular theory – theory-theory – that 
explains the ability to attribute mental states as a theory-driven  process (in this 
sense “theory of mind” refers to a particular explanans of the ability to attribute 
mental states); b) a shorthand for the ability to attribute mental states to oneself 
and others (in this sense “theory of mind” refers to the main explanandum that 
theories of “theory of mind” seek to explain); or c) an umbrella term for a whole 
research paradigm that takes the ability to attribute mental states as key to 
human social cognition (in this sense “theory of mind” is used to refer to all 
versions of theory-theory and simulation theory, see e.g. Leudar & Costall, 
2009a or Froese & Gallagher, 2012). In addition, not only does “theory of 
mind” have several meanings, various other terms are used in parallel to it to 
designate the ability to attribute mental states. For example, the terms “mind-
reading” and “mentalizing” are also used to refer to the ability to attribute 
mental states. Philosophers also talk about “folk psychology” (sometimes also 
called “common sense psychology”, “naïve psychology”, or “everyday psycho-
logy”): a conceptual framework for thinking about mental states and processes 
that ordinary people encounter in their daily lives and talk about in vernacular 
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terms, such as “pain”, “desire”, “hope”, and “fear.” According to Ravenscroft 
(2010), “folk psychology” is used by philosophers in at least three different 
senses. It can refer to: a) a set of platitudes about mental phenomena that people 
typically endorse; b) the quotidian human ability to predict and explain beha-
viour; or to c) a sub-personally represented mentalistic “theory” of behaviour. 
The term is common in philosophical discussions on the nature and workings of 
the mind, especially in relation to eliminative materialism, which is the view 
that our ordinary understanding of the mind as consisting of mental states is a 
defective theory (Churchland, 1981, 1984). It is less frequently used in the 
context of empirical research on social cognition.  
I prefer to use the term “mindreading” instead of “theory of mind” to refer to 
the ability to attribute mental states. In philosophical literature, mindreading is 
typically defined as an ability to explain and predict the behaviour of agents in 
terms of their mental states but my definition of “mindreading” is more 
minimal: it does not require that the attribution of mental states constitute an 
ability to explain and predict behaviour. I want the definition of mindreading to 
be open to the possibility that attribution of mental states may have functions 
besides explaining and predicting behaviour. I will use the term “folk psycho-
logy” as little as possible because it is usually taken to be bound to the ordinary 
use of mental state terms whereas I want to be open to the possibility that 
people implicitly attribute mental states that have no counterparts in our 
vocabulary. Concerning “theory of mind”, in the articles that constitute the main 
part of my thesis (appendices 1–3), I have followed Gallagher and Zahavi 
(2008) by adopting the third sense of “theory of mind”: I use it there primarily 
as a label for the research paradigm that focuses on mindreading, i.e. I use it as 
an umbrella term to refer to both theory-theory and simulation theory. I later 
realized that this is not the most fortunate use of the expression. This is because 
theory-theory and simulation theory are theories about people’s understanding 
of the mind rather than theories about the mind. So in the summary article, I 
prefer to use the term “theories of mindreading” to refer to the generic frame-
work of theory-theory and simulation theory. In any case, I hope that my ways 
of using the expressions “theory of mind” and “mindreading” are sufficiently 
clear and easy to follow within the context of this summary.  
 
 
2.2. The mainstream theories of mindreading 
A major aim of research on social cognition is to identify the basic cognitive 
mechanisms that underlie social understanding and interaction. For the past 30 
years, mindreading has been considered to be the key to human social cog-
nition. Various theories have been worked out in an effort to explain the under-
pinnings of mindreading. Most of the theories are versions of either theory-
theory (TT) or simulation theory (ST), or hybrids that combine elements of 
both. TT, as the label suggests, assumes that our ability to attribute mental states 
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to ourselves and to others is theoretical in nature. According to ST, we use our 
own psychological machinery to simulate the mental states of others.  
Social cognition can be studied at different levels of description and expla-
nation. In the mindreading literature, a distinction between personal-level and 
sub-personal level processes9 is often made. Simply put, personal level descrip-
tions and explanations pick out features of whole organisms and their behaviour 
and typically involve the use of intentional vocabulary (e.g., “John believes that 
p”). Sub-personal level accounts pick out (typically with non-intentional 
vocabulary, though some authors also permit the use of intentional vocabulary 
at the sub-personal level) cognitive and neural processes that underlie personal 
level phenomena (e.g., “mirror neurons are activated”). Sub-personal level ac-
counts refer to either functional operations that need to be postulated in order to 
explain personal-level processes or to neurobiological processes in which the 
functions are realized. Table 1 lists the main questions that drive research on 






Level Personal level Sub-personal level 
Functional level Neurobiological level 
Main 
question 
How do individuals 
attribute and reason 
about mental states? 
How is mindreading 
experienced from  




and functional systems 
need to be postulated to 
explain mindreading? 
What are the 
neurobiological systems 
and processes in which 




Most theories of mindreading provide either personal-level or sub-personal 
level accounts of mindreading. However, a comprehensive account of mind-
reading (and of social cognition in general) should be able to cover both levels 
and also explain how the levels interconnect. A plausible theory of mindreading 
must minimally: 1) explain the basic mechanisms for both self- and other-
directed mental-state ascriptions; 2) unravel the typical development of mind-
reading abilities; and 3) account for the typical errors people make in everyday 
mindreading as well as for the pathological breakdowns in mindreading 
                                                 
9  This distinction was first introduced by Daniel Dennett in Content and Consciousness 
(1969). 
10  “How is mindreading experienced from the first person perspective?” is a personal-level 
phenomenological question, which is not usually investigated by the standard theories of 
mindreading. However, any theory of social cognition should be phenomenologically 
plausible, so I have included the question for completeness. 
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abilities, such as are manifested in autism and other brain disorders. Any theory 
of mindreading must obviously be compatible with real-world and experimental 
data, with scientific knowledge of the neurobiological architecture of the human 
brain, and with first-person phenomenology of how one experiences instances 
of mindreading. Furthermore, theories of mindreading need to be evaluated in 
the context of the wider issue of human social cognition: How much of human 
social cognition can these theories explain? 
In the following, I introduce the two most influential approaches to mind-




The term "theory-theory” was first introduced by philosopher Adam Morton 
(1980) (compare Wellman, 1990, p. 129, Stich & Nichols, 1998, p. 422) to label 
the view that our everyday knowledge of human psychology has the features of 
a theory. Morton sketched TT in order to contrast it to his own favoured ac-
count – “scheme theory.” Later on, unlike scheme theory, TT gained many 
supporters and was elaborated in different ways by various authors.  
The main idea of TT is that our everyday attributions of mental states to our-
selves and to other people are mediated by a largely implicit theory of the 
functioning of the human mind. To say that our folk psychological competence 
is theory-like is to say that our mental state concepts are individuated by their 
functional roles within a framework of inter-related folk psychological prin-
ciples. A basic explanatory principle could be, for example, a practical syl-
logism of the form “If a psychological agent wants event y and believes that 
action x will cause event y, he will do x” (Gopnik & Melzoff, 1997, p. 126). 
Based on such principles, it is arguably possible to predict and explain the be-
haviour of individuals. 
The roots of TT go back to mid 20th century analytic philosophy. Philosophy 
of mind witnessed the rise of functionalism in the 1960s – the view that mental 
states are functional states with causal roles in explanations of behaviour. 
Wilfrid Sellars (1997, originally published in 1956) outlined the idea that men-
tal states are posits of a commonsense psychological theory or folk psychology. 
David Lewis (1972) developed the idea further and came up with a view that 
the concepts of mental states are theoretical notions that can be defined by three 
types of psychological law which differ in what they are about. Laws of the first 
type are about the connections between observable input and mental states. 
Laws of the second type are about the interconnections between different types 
of mental states. Laws of the third type are about the connections between 
mental states and observable output. These functionalist ideas form the philo-
sophical origins of TT. (See Goldman, 2006, pp. 7–10, Ratcliffe, 2007, pp. 42–
46). 
Several contemporary analytic philosophers of mind – for example Fodor 
(1987), Churchland (1981, 1984), Dennett (1987), and Carruthers (1996) – 
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consider people’s everyday reasoning about the mind to be based on a folk-
psychological theory about mental states and their interconnections. Whereas 
Churchland (1981, 1984) argues that our folk psychological theory is funda-
mentally erroneous and needs to be eliminated and replaced by a neuroscientific 
theory, other philosophers are less sceptical about its prospects. Either way, in 
discussions of eliminativism, it is assumed that people in their everyday lives 
actually use a folk-psychological theory to explain and predict their own and 
other people’s behaviour. Philosophical discussions on folk psychology usually 
focus their attention on questions about  the metaphysics of mind and the 
meaning of mental state terms. I will not discuss here whether folk psychology 
as defined by these philosophers is a correct theory (metaphysically speaking), 
whether it needs to be eliminated11, or whether mental state terms get their 
meaning from such a theory. My interest lies in the empirical question of how 
human social cognition actually works, regardless of whether the way people 
typically understand the nature of the mind is correct or not. Therefore, in the 
following, I will introduce those versions of TT that have been developed to 
answer this question. In particular, I will focus upon TT as outlined by cognitive 
and developmental psychologists such as Alison Gopnik, Alan Leslie, Andrew 
Meltzoff, Josef Perner, Henry M. Wellmann, and others. 
According to TT, the development of mindreading skills is the acquisition of 
progressively more complex theoretical knowledge (Stueber, 2006, p.106). Two 
main ways to explain the acquisition of theoretical knowledge have been 
proposed: either it is a gradual change of theoretical understanding driven by 
the acquisition of experiential evidence and counter-evidence, or it consists of 
the maturation of an innate cognitive module (which itself may consist of 
various sub-modules). Depending on how the cognitive architecture and the 
development of the folk psychological theory are described, TT has two main 
versions: the child-scientist theory and the modular theory.  
 
 
2.3.1. The Child-Scientist Theory 
The philosophical idea that our everyday understanding of the mind is struc-
tured like a theory was picked up in the beginning of 1980-ies by developmental 
psychologists Alison Gopnik, Andrew Meltzoff, Henry M. Wellmann, Josef 
Perner, John H. Flavell, and others. Since then, countless articles and books 
have been dedicated to the hypothesis that the processes of cognitive develop-
ment in children are similar to or even identical with the processes of cognitive 
development in scientists. The book “Words, Thoughts, and Theories” by 
                                                 
11  The issue of eliminativism does not seem relevant until it has been proven that people 
actually use a folk psychological theory to understand others. For example, Ratcliffe (2007, 
p. 228) argues: “Churchland’s eliminativism recommends the elimination of something that 
was not part of social life to begin with. It is the elimination of what certain philosophers and 
cognitive scientists think that the ‘folk’ think, rather than what the ‘folk’ actually think.” 
Similar arguments have been made by proponents of simulation theory. 
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Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) is one of the most elaborate, and probably the most 
radical, account of the TT hypothesis that has come to be known as the child-
scientist theory12. Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997, p. 32) are careful to point out that 
the aim of their theory is: 
… not to show that children do science. Instead, we want to argue that the 
cognitive processes that underlie science are similar to, or indeed identical with, 
the cognitive processes that underlie much of cognitive development. It is not 
that children are little scientists but that scientists are big children. Scientific 
progress is possible because scientists employ cognitive processes that are first 
seen in very young children. 
In other words, Gopnik and Meltzoff don’t take the cognitive processes that 
underlie scientific theory-building to be a late cultural invention. They instead 
take them to be a product of human evolution. To understand and to evaluate the 
claim that children’s understanding of many aspects of the world is theoretical, 
we need to know what a theory is. There is a lack of consensus in science and in 
philosophy of science on what are the basic characteristic features of a theory 
but Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997, p. 33) alleviate this problem by adopting a 
conception of a theory that is “as mainstream and middle-of-the road” as 
possible.13 They emphasize three kinds of feature that typically characterise 
theories: structural, functional, and dynamic (ibid. pp. 33–41).  
The structural features concern the static properties of theories: theories are 
abstract and coherent, they appeal to causality, and they make ontological com-
mitments. To say that theories are abstract is to say that the vocabulary of the 
theoretical constructs differs from the vocabulary of the evidence on which the 
theory is based. In other words, theories involve entities and laws that enable us 
to explain data instead of simply restating it. Theories are coherent in the sense 
that entities postulated within a theory are firmly interrelated. The superficial 
regularities in the data are explained in terms of some causal structure that 
accounts for the regularities – this is what is meant by the appeal to causality. 
Finally, theories entail ontological commitments by postulating what exists and 
how and by generating counterfactual claims. (ibid. pp. 34–36) 
When we ask what theories do, we arrive at the functional features of 
theories. According to Gopnik and Meltzoff, theories have three important func-
tions: they enable us to predict, to interpret, and to explain phenomena. 
Although, in order to predict, we sometimes rely on mere empirical generali-
zations, theoretical predictions are more specific. Theories allow predictions 
about evidence that had no role in the initial building of the theory: “A few 
theoretical entities and laws can lead to a wide variety of unexpected 
predictions” (ibid. p. 37). Theories also lead to interpretations of evidence, 
                                                 
12  Gopnik (1996) also uses the label “theory-formation theory.” 
13  Stich and Nichols (1992, p. 46) use a much looser definition and consider “just about any 
internally stored body of information about a given domain as an internally represented 
theory of that domain.” 
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which means that in light of a given theory, some pieces of evidence are more 
important than others in the context of a particular problem. With regard to what 
concerns the function of explanation, Gopnik and Meltzoff famously state that 
“explanation is to cognition as orgasm (at least male orgasm) is to reproduction” 
(ibid. p. 38, see also Gopnik, 1998, and Gopnik, Meltzoff & Kuhl, 2001, pp. 
162–164). In saying this, the authors mean to point out that both a child’s and a 
scientist’s search for theoretical knowledge is motivated by the “pleasure” of 
having an explanation (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, pp. 36–38)14. 
A further important characteristic of theories is that they are dynamic: 
theories change over time under the pressure of new counter-evidence. Ac-
cording to the child-scientist view, theory change in science, as well as in 
human development, typically involves three phases. At first there is a denial of 
counter-evidence: the data that speaks against the theory remains overlooked or 
is considered to be irrelevant. When pieces of counter-evidence accumulate to 
the extent that they can no longer be ignored, ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses are 
created to explain away the counter-evidence without changing the core of the 
old theory. Over time, the ad hoc hypotheses begin to deteriorate the coherence 
of the theory, so finally the old theory gets replaced by a new theory. (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997, pp. 39–41).  
According to the child-scientist hypothesis, all the above mentioned features 
of theories also apply to children’s cognitive structures in various domains: in 
children’s naïve understanding of psychology but also in their early knowledge 
of biology and physics (ibid. p. 3). Since my focus here is social cognition, I 
will take a closer look at the child-scientist account of the development of social 
cognitive abilities. 
Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997, pp. 128–134) argue that social cognition relies 
on theoretical knowledge from the start: already newborn infants possess some-
thing like a “starting state theory” (see also Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, p. 169) 
about themselves and other people that is represented in an abstract and cohe-
rent way. Simply put, they claim that infants come to the world with an implicit 
theory that they are like other people in some important respects. On the basis 
of infant imitation studies (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983, and 1989), Gopnik 
and Meltzoff (1997, p. 129) write: 
… from birth, information about action that comes, literally, from inside our-
selves is coded in the same way as information that comes from observing the 
behavior of others. There is a fundamental cross-modal representational system 
that connects self and other. 
In other words, from birth, information acquired about one’s own body is gene-
ralized to others and vice versa (ibid. p. 132). The innate mapping between the 
visually perceived motions of others and the infant’s own kinaesthetic sensa-
tions enables smooth affective and temporal coordination between the infant 
                                                 
14  Perner (1991, p. 244) provides a less metaphorical account of explanation: to explain is to 
provide a mechanism (or model) that underlies the observed causal sequence of events. 
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and its caregivers. Obviously, the psychophysical states that infants are sensitive 
to are not as sophisticated as the mental states at the centre of the adult theory of 
mind: “Rather than having a concept of psychological agents, young infants 
seem to have a concept of persons, which combines mind and body” (ibid. p. 
133). What makes this early form of cognition theory-like? Gopnik and 
Meltzoff argue that theoretical structures can be inferred from the fact that 
infants respond distinctively when people’s behaviour contradicts their implicit 
theoretical predictions (ibid.). Unfortunately the authors leave unspecified how 
they come to the conclusion that infants make any theoretical predictions in the 
first place. It remains doubtful that infants’ early understanding of action carries 
the necessary structural and functional features of a theory – the newborn’s 
ability to imitate certain facial gestures seems to involve sensory-motor and 
affective abilities rather than any cognitive or “theoretical” features. Thus it 
seems unwarranted to attribute to newborn infants the ability to make theo-
retical predictions just because they react distinctively to different kinds of 
input. Yet this does not seem to worry Gopnik and Meltzoff. 
According to Gopnik and Meltzoff, infants distinguish people and objects 
from birth but it takes time before the ability to distinguish what acts are 
effective on people from what acts are effective on objects develops. Infants 
begin to make sense of the basic features of physical and psychological 
causality by around nine months. This change in infant understanding is con-
sidered to be a theoretical shift that leads to an understanding that “the first set 
of entities [people] is susceptible to communicative acts while the second [ob-
jects] is subject to actions that involve spatial contact” (ibid. p. 145). An ability 
to understand the role of communicative interaction is displayed when infants 
begin to initiate communicative intentional behaviours such as pointing. Com-
municative gestures indicate that children no longer conceive of actions as mere 
bodily movements but instead begin to acknowledge that actions are inten-
tional – i.e. they are directed towards objects or other people (ibid. pp. 138–
145).  
By around eighteen months infants become interested in regularities that 
characterize unsuccessful attempts to influence other people’s behaviour; espe-
cially cases of conflict between one’s own goals and those of another person. 
Infants seem to particularly enjoy doing things that the caregivers have prohi-
bited them from doing: they curiously explore the boundaries of what they are 
allowed to do. By this time, infants seem to understand that other people can 
have desires that contradict their desires. (ibid. p. 149) This new competence is 
demonstrated for example in the nonverbal “cracker-broccoli” test (Repacholi & 
Gopnik, 1997): when another person has previously expressed a desire for 
broccoli, 18-month-old infants gave her broccoli although infants themselves 
typically preferred crackers. In contrast, 14-month-olds solved the task ego-
centrically, giving the other person food they themselves preferred. This ability 
is linked to the understanding of the goal-directedness of behaviour: 18-month-
olds can infer the particular goals of failed attempts, thus differentiating 
intentions from outer behaviour. (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 150).  
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Between the second and the third year of life, infants arguably develop a 
mentalistic, albeit not yet representational theory of desire. By this time, 
children have learned that people tend to strive for what they desire, that they 
are disappointed when their desires are unfulfilled and happy when they are 
fulfilled, and that there may be conflicts between their own desires and those of 
other people (ibid. pp. 157–158). However, during this period, children still fail 
to understand that mental states can represent the world differently from how 
things really are, as demonstrated by their inability to pass false belief tasks. 
Before children start to understand the representational aspects of the mind, 
they treat perception and desire as simple causal links between the mind and the 
world (Gopnik & Wellmann, 1992, p. 150).  
Around the age of three, children understand also beliefs as direct links to 
states of affairs in the world. “This view has variously been called a ‘copy 
theory’ (Wellman, 1990), a ‘Gibsonian theory’ (Astington & Gopnik, 1991), a 
‘situation theory’ (Perner, 1991), or a ‘cognitive connection’ (Flavell, 1988) 
theory of belief” (Gopnik & Wellmann, 1992, p. 151).  This early theory of 
belief leads children to specific behavioural errors, as when they insist that they 
thought from the very beginning that a Smarties box was filled with pencils 
(which are shown in fact to be there), even though they had at the outset 
expressed a belief that it contained candies (which the appearance of the 
container initially suggested) (Gopnik & Astington, 1988).   
According to Gopnik and her colleagues (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, Gopnik 
& Wellman, 1992), between three and five years of age, children’s under-
standing of the mind changes from a non-representational theory to a repre-
sentational theory. Arguably, this change has all the typical features of a theory 
change. At first, children tend to ignore counter-evidence to the early simple 
causal theory of the connection between the mind and the world. Later they 
create auxiliary hypotheses to account for the phenomena that contradict the 
earlier theory but preserve the basic structure of the old theory; for example, 
they occasionally recognize that beliefs may misrepresent but ignore the 
influence of false beliefs on action. Finally, usually by the time of their fifth 
birthday, children have replaced the simple causal theory with a representational 
theory of mental states. (See Gopnik & Wellmann, 1992, pp. 151–153). 
The account outlined by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997) is one of the best 
known versions of the child-scientist theory. Other advocates of the child-
scientist approach have elaborated similar views but there are differences in 
many of the details of the different versions of TT. For example, Perner (1991, 
p. 251) does not think that the causal theory of mental states (which he calls 
both “(mentalistic) theory of behaviour” and “situational theory”) will finally be 
replaced by a representational theory of mind: “There is no simple replacement 
since … we stay situation theorists at heart.” Perner (ibid. p. 252) argues that 
around the age of four, the situational theory is extended rather than supplanted 
by the representational theory:  
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Even as adults we remain situation theorists whenever possible and treat mental 
states as straight propositional attitudes. However, in contrast to young children, 
we are also able to take a representational view when necessary – to explain 
cases of misrepresentation, for instance.  
This means that whereas Gopnik considers theory change in children to be 
analogous to the replacement of the Ptolemaic astronomical theory by Kepler’s 
theory, Perner compares it with the extension of classical genetics into 
molecular genetics (ibid. pp. 251–252).  
For Henry Wellman (1990, p. 127) our everyday theory of mind constitutes a 
framework theory (or a paradigm in Kuhn’s sense) rather than a specific theory. 
Framework theories constrain the formulation of specific theories by es-
tablishing the domain of explanation and by defining what counts as relevant 
evidence (ibid. p. 136). According to Wellman (1990), children make an onto-
logical distinction between mental entities and physical entities from a very 
early age but they acquire a first theory of mind at around three years of age. 
This claim derives from a conceptual constraint: Wellman considers the ability 
to attribute representational states to be necessary for having a theory of mind. 
However, this does not mean that children lack any understanding of mental 
phenomena before the age of three. Two-year olds arguably have what Wellman 
calls a simple desire psychology: they understand desires not as relations to 
propositions, but as relations to actual objects or events in the world. Such an 
understanding of desires is intentional (desires are directed at something) but 
not representational (see Wellman, 1990, pp. 210–212). 
According to Wellman, having a theory of mind begins with a transition 
from a simple desire psychology to a belief-desire psychology that in his account 
takes place roughly around the age of three years. In contrast, according to 
Perner (1988), Flavell (1988) and Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997), a representational 
understanding of mental states appears about a year or a year-and-a-half later 
than Wellman claims (see Wellman, 1990, p. 243). The difference here between 
the views of Wellman and others lies in whether the earliest so called “direct 
copy theory” of beliefs is considered to be representational or not. Wellman 
argues that three-year olds have an initial understanding of representations 
because they demonstrate an understanding of the difference between fictional 
and reality-oriented mental states (i.e. between imaginings and beliefs) (ibid. p. 
255). However, initially they have a “hit-or-miss type of understanding of 
misrepresentation,” which explains why they fail in false belief tests (ibid. p. 
254). Three-year olds understand the mind as containing direct copies of objects 
in the world; between the age of three and six, they progressively develop an 
interpretive understanding of representations (ibid.). This process is part of a 
larger shift from a passive understanding of the mind to an active understanding 
of the mind: “the earliest theory of mind – that of three-year-olds – can be seen 
as having a containerlike nature; the later theory of mind … can be seen as 
having a homunculuslike nature” (ibid. pp. 268–269). 
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In short, Wellman emphasizes two theoretical shifts in the development of 
theory of mind in early childhood: the shift from simple desire psychology to an 
initial belief-desire psychology (Wellmann labels it “a copy-container theory of 
mind”), and the shift from an initial belief-desire psychology to a later belief-
desire psychology (also labelled “the interpretive-homuncular theory” by 
Wellman) (ibid. p. 278).  
In sum, although there are differences in the details of the versions of the 
child-scientist theory, there is a substantial amount of agreement among the 
proponents of this approach. The advocates of the child-scientist approach agree 
that children’s understanding of the mind has a theory-like structure. The basic 
theory of mind is not innate but develops gradually through acquired experience 
and is equally applicable to self and other. There are several steps of theory-
change in the preschool years and the most important change involves a shift 
from a non-representational conception of mental states to a representational 
conception.  
Obviously, the development of theory of mind does not end by the age of six 
but empirical and experimental evidence that support the child-scientist theory 
usually come from the studies of early childhood. Much less empirical research 
has been carried out on mindreading in adolescence and in adulthood, which is 
why the debates on the mature theory of mind have taken place rarely and more 
on purely philosophical grounds. As Henry Wellman (1990, p. 97) writes: “it is 
surprising that so little effort has been spent on describing what the [adult’s] 
theory is, beyond asserting that it must exist.” He is one of the few psycho-
logists to have sketched what an adult’s theory of mind might be like but he is 
careful to add that his sketch “has not emerged from a program of empirical 
research” (ibid.).  
It is often pointed out that because no-one has been able to explicitly 
formulate more than a few illustrative examples of folk-psychological 
principles, it is doubtful that any such principles are actually represented by the 
human cognitive system. Of course, nobody expects that in order to apply a 
theory of mind, people need to be able to spell out the rules of it explicitly. 
There is an analogy between mindreading and linguistic skills: children become 
competent language users long before they know anything about the rules of 
grammar, presumably because linguistic rules are implicitly represented in their 
cognitive system. The difference is, however, that the rules of grammar for 
many languages have been explicitly formulated by linguists as a result of a 
systematic study of language but this is not the case for mindreading. It is 
unclear whether the principles upon which mindreading rests can be explicitly 
formulated. Some proponents of TT have suggested that the theory underlying 
mindreading is not represented in the form of laws or principles but rather in the 
form of theoretical models (Maibom, 2003, 2007, Godfrey-Smith, 2005; see 
also Newen & Schlicht, 2009). If the model-based version of TT is on the right 
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track, it would explain why it is so difficult to spell out any rules of theory of 
mind: theory of mind simply is not represented in the form of rules.15 
Another issue raised by the critics is the question of self-directed mind-
reading. According to TT, self-directed mental state attributions are arrived at 
by the same cognitive processes that underlie mental state attributions to others: 
the same generic folk psychological theory is applied in both cases. This seems 
counter-intuitive, however. It appears that we have a more direct acquaintance 
with the contents of our own mind than with the mental states of other people. It 
does not seem very plausible that in order to know what mental states I 
currently have, I need to make inferences that are similar to those that I have to 
make in the case of third-person mindreading. A theory-theorist reply is that 
although usually we do not make explicit inferences when we attribute mental 
states to ourselves, implicit inferences nevertheless play an important role in 
this process (Gopnik, 1993, Carruthers, 1996, p. 36). The impression of 
knowing directly or non-inferentially one’s own mental states can be explained 
by drawing an analogy with the “illusion of expertise” (Gopnik, 1993, pp. 10–
12). A chess master may no longer need to explicitly consider the positions of 
the pieces on the chess board to estimate the situation: the phenomenology of an 
expert may be simply one of seeing that, for example, the queen is vulnerable. 
Since every mindreader is an expert on reading one’s own mind, we may also 
have the experience of directly accessing our own mental states, although it is 
actually a result of swift and implicit inferences. This reply is not particularly 
convincing, though. Theory may have a role in conceptualizing the mental 
states that we experience from the first person perspective, and TT may explain 
how one reasons about one’s past or future mental states, but it is unlikely that 
one’s current mental states have to be inferred in the same manner as other 
people’s mental states are inferred according to TT: from perceptual infor-
mation. Until theory-theorists come up with a more specific account of 
detecting one’s current mental states, I have to agree with Nichols and Stich 
(2003, p. 158), who state that it is “simply preposterous to suggest that the 
reports people make about their own mental states are being inferred from 
perceptions of their own behaviour and information stored in memory.” An 
account of self-directed mindreading must be able to explain how a person can 
report her current thoughts and other mental states even when there is no 
perceivable behavioural evidence of them. TT provides no such explanation 
(ibid).  
Another serious problem for TT is related to the so-called frame problem. 
The frame problem, which first arose in the context of artificial intelligence, is 
the issue of how a cognitive system is able to compute what information is 
relevant for a particular task in any given context (see Shanahan, 2009). In the 
context of TT, the problem is to explain how the human cognitive system is able 
to swiftly pick up pieces of relevant information for determining the pertinent 
                                                 
15  If mindreading is explained as a process where we use our own mind as a model to attri-
bute mental states then we have arrived at another theory of mindreading: simulation theory. 
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mental states to explain and predict individual behaviour in any given context, 
without having to compute vast amounts of information available to the system 
(see e.g. Heal, 1996). This problem is closely related to the issue of holism: 
behaviour is never a result of a single mental state but instead arises from 
complex combinations of mental states.16 For example, the fact that I take an 
umbrella with me when I go out can be explained by my belief that it may start 
raining but only if I also have the desire to remain dry when it rains and if I 
believe that an umbrella protects me from getting wet. In principle, any beha-
vioural act might be driven by almost any mental state given some combination of 
other mental states, which makes deciding what mental states to attribute in order 
to predict or explain a particular act incredibly difficult, if not impossible. Yet, in 
most everyday contexts, people mindread with considerable ease.  
TT faces several other challenges as well but, because of scope limits, I 
brought out only the most important ones. It is, however, worth mentioning that 
the child-scientist theory bares the burden of explaining how children growing 
up in very different social, cultural, and physical environments, come up with 
the same theory of mind around the same age. This is an issue that has inspired 
theory-theorists to produce a different version of TT to which I will turn next: 
the modular approach.  
 
 
2.3.2. The Modularist Theory  
According to the child-scientist theory, children acquire a theory of mind in the 
same vein adults acquire scientific theories: by gathering evidence and 
searching for the best way to explain data. But whereas most theories in various 
fields (e.g. astronomy) are not universally shared, the basic theory of mind 
seems to be roughly identical across all normally developing humans (see 
Segal, 1996, pp. 152–153, Scholl & Leslie, 1999, p. 137). How do children 
across the world come up with the same fundamental theory of mind, around 
the same age? The answer of the child-scientist theory is largely empiricist, with 
a small nativist component. It is argued that: 1) children come to the world with 
the same basic knowledge – newborns possess a preliminary theoretical under-
standing of other people as entities “like me”; 2) children all over the world are 
exposed to similar patterns of evidence and counter-evidence concerning other 
people’s behaviour, and they are thereby pushed towards reinventing the same 
theory of mind (Gopnik, 1996, pp. 172–174). The critics of the child-scientist 
theory, however, doubt that the developmental path to acquiring the same theory 
of mind can be explained away so easily:  
… it is surely not the case that if one collected a few million scientists who 
started out with the same initial theory, then gave them the same counter-
evidence, that nearly all of them would arrive at the same revised theory – within 
roughly the same time span” (Segal, 1996, p. 153).  
                                                 
16  This line of thought applies if one buys into some version of realism of mental states. 
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An alternative way to explain the universal developmental trajectory of theory 
of mind is to shift the explanation more towards the nativist side at the expense 
of the empiricist component. This move is made by modularist theory-theorists 
who explain the development of the ability to mindread as a result of the 
maturation of an innate cognitive mechanism or module, consisting of several 
sub-modules. Before outlining the most prominent modular accounts of 
mindreading, let me briefly introduce the concept of modularity in general.  
The concept of modularity was outlined in detail by Jerry Fodor (1983) and 
it soon became an important topic in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, 
and evolutionary psychology. According to Fodor (1983), modular systems have 
all or most of the following features: domain specificity – modules have the 
function of solving problems in particular domains; mandatory operation – 
when an input is received, it is automatically processed in a particular way 
independent of voluntary control; limited central access to the mental repre-
sentations that input systems compute – the flow of information out of a mecha-
nism is restricted; high speed of computations; informational encapsulation – 
the flow of information into a mechanism is restricted; ‘shallowness’ of outputs; 
fixed neural architecture; specific breakdown patterns; particular temporal pace 
and sequence in ontogeny. Although Fodor (1983) originally applied the idea of 
modularity only to low-level systems, such as those that underlie perceptual 
abilities and language processing, and argued that higher-level cognition that 
leads to belief-formation consists of general-purpose processes, others have 
extended the idea of modularity to high-level cognition as well. For example, 
Carruthers (2006) has argued that the human mind is massively modular but he 
has considerably relaxed the definition of modularity by giving up some of the 
necessary features of the classical Fodorian modules, such as informational 
encapsulation (Robbins, 2010). As a result, modularity has become a rather 
slippery concept and in any given context, one needs to specify which definition 
of modularity one has in mind: a system may be considered modular in one but 
not in some other sense.  
Segal (1996) distinguishes between synchronic and diachronic dimensions of 
modularity: whereas synchronic modularity characterizes modules as static 
devices, diachronic modularity characterizes modules as they develop over time 
following genetically determined trajectories.17 Segal brings out four different 
notions of synchronic modularity: intentional modularity, computational modu-
larity, Fodorian modularity, and neural modularity (ibid.). A similar distinction 
is made between the following three conceptions of modularity: the epistemic 
conception, the algorithmic conception, and the hardware conception (Samuels, 
1998, Gerrans, 2002). 
                                                 
17  E.g. Chomsky’s account of the development of the language faculty can be interpreted as 
involving diachronic modularity. Language learning in childhood can be explained as a 
process of parametrization (setting of parameters) within genetically predetermined limits: 
according to the input received from the language environment, children implicitly adopt the 
rules of that particular language. (Segal, 1996, p. 146) 
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Segal’s notion of intentional modularity refers to a mental mechanism that is 
described in purely intentional vocabulary and is characterized by either 
informational encapsulation, limited accessibility, or both (see Segal, 1996, pp. 
142–143). It bares similarities to the notion of epistemic modularity, which is 
defined as a “domain-specific body of innate knowledge” (Gerrans, 2002,  
p. 307)18.  
Computational modularity characterises a computational system that turns 
input representations into output representations via the use of a set of syntactic 
rules (see Segal, 1996, pp. 143–145). This notion is similar to the algorithmic 
conception of modularity (see Samuels, 1998, p. 580, Gerrans, 2002, p. 307), 
according to which modules are defined by their computational properties. 
Whereas every computational module plausibly realizes an intentional module, 
the reverse does not hold (Segal, 1996, p. 144): an intentional module or a 
domain-specific body of knowledge may exist in a system that only contains 
domain-general computational mechanisms (see Samuels, 1998, p. 583).  
A Fodorian module is, according to Segal, a special case of the computa-
tional module, since it involves certain additional properties. In other words: 
while every Fodorian module is a computational module, not every compu-
tational module is Fodorian. I have already outlined the nine typical features of 
a Fodorian module above (but see also Segal, 1996, p. 145).  
Finally, Segal’s neural module (similar to the hardware conception of 
Samuels (1998, p. 579) and Gerrans (2002, p. 307)) is a functional part of the 
brain that can be described in purely neurological vocabulary. Any of the other 
three modules may be realized in neural modules, but they need not be, since 
intentional, computational, or Fodorian modules may also be realized by 
distributed features of the brain. At the same time, neural modules do not 
necessarily realize intentional or computational modules because a capacity 
may be fully explained by referring to neural processes only, without implying 
that the neural processes satisfy any computational or intentional descriptions.  
Let us now look at how the concept of modularity has been used in the 
context of social cognition, particularly in developmental psychology. Like 
most developmental cognitive psychologists, the defenders of the modular 
account of theory of mind are interested in those human information processing 
systems that form the basis for cognitive development. In contrast to the child-
scientist theory, which construes the development of mindreading as a domain-
general process of theory-building, modularists argue that natural selection has 
produced specific mechanisms that drive the development of theory of mind. 
The modularity account of the theory of mind was first proposed in order to 
explain the double-dissociation between the presence of an ability to mindread 
and the level of domain-general intelligence: Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 
(1985) discovered that in the case of high-functioning childhood autism, the 
                                                 
18 Whereas Samuels (1998) considers domain-specific bodies of innate knowledge to be 




ability to mindread (as measured with the standard false-belief task) was selecti-
vely impaired,  whereas in the case of severely retarded children with Down’s 
syndrome, it was selectively intact.19 In the following, I introduce two of the 
most prominent versions of the modular TT accounts, Leslie’s and Baron-
Cohen’s, and then consider some most prominent arguments for and against the 
modular view.  
Alan Leslie defends a computationally (algorithmically) modular account of 
mindreading (see Scholl & Leslie, 1999, p. 133, Gerrans, 2002, p. 308). Instead 
of picturing the child as a great scientist who passes through radical theory 
shifts under the pressure of empirical evidence, Leslie (1994) characterises the 
ontogenetic development of theory of mind as the maturing of a domain-
specific system. He distinguishes between three sub-mechanisms within this 
system. These are: ToBy (Theory of Body Mechanism) for processing 
mechanical agency; ToMM1 (system 1 of the Theory of Mind Mechanism) for 
processing actional agency; and ToMM2 (system 2 of the Theory of Mind 
Mechanism) for processing attitudinal agency. 
The first mechanism of Leslie’s account, ToBy, arguably begins to develop at 
approximately 3 or 4 months of age (Leslie, 1994, p. 140). Its purpose is to 
track three-dimensional moving objects in the environment, to distinguish 
between two categories of such objects (agents and non-agent objects), and to 
compute their mechanical properties. The module receives input from two 
distinct systems of visual processing: from the system that underlies recognition 
of three-dimensional objects and from the system that analyses motion. ToBy 
attributes mechanical properties to objects by employing a primitive notion that 
Leslie labels FORCE. When an object begins to move on its own (i.e. its source 
of FORCE is within the object), it is automatically categorized as “agent”; when 
it begins to move as a result of physical contact with another moving object (it 
receives FORCE from an external source), it is categorized as “non-agent 
object.” For example, when a child witnesses a moving object colliding with 
another object and the launching of the second object immediately after the 
collision, ToBy automatically assigns them complementary mechanical roles. 
(See Leslie, 1994, pp. 123–137) 
Whereas Leslie introduces ToBy as a module for tracking mechanical 
features of bodies, he postulates a distinct mechanism – ToMM – as the seat of 
the child’s mindreading abilities. ToMM computes intentional features of agents 
and consists of two subsystems: ToMM1 is concerned with goal-directed 
actions and ToMM2 processes propositional attitudes and meta-representations. 
(See Leslie, 1987, p. 140) 
                                                 
19 Similar results were found in a follow-up study (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) 
where high-functioning autistic children, children with Down’s syndrome, and normally 
developed children were tested for their mechanical, behavioural, and intentional 
understanding of picture stories: autistic children performed much worse than the control 
groups in tasks involving intentional understanding but they were successful in tasks 
involving mechanical and behavioral understanding. 
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ToMM1 underlies the ability to understand that, unlike non-agent objects, 
agents perceive their environment and aim for goals. Whereas non-agent objects 
can only be moved via direct physical contact, agents can also be set to move by 
factors that are at distance in time and/or space. Around 6 to 8 months, infants 
begin to attend to the direction of the gaze of their caregivers. By the end of the 
first year, they become competent gaze followers, being able to accurately track 
what the other person is looking at. At the same period of time they begin to 
display instrumental “requesting” and “refusing” behaviours, thereby 
communicating their own volitional states to adults. Leslie argues that these 
behaviours indicate the maturation of the ToMM1 module, which enables 
children to grasp simple intentional relations between agents and distant objects 
or states of affairs. (See Leslie, 1994, pp. 140–141) 
Finally, between 18 and 24 months of age, ToMM2 comes online (ibid. pp. 
141–142). ToMM2 underlies the ability to create metarepresentations and to 
understand agents’ intentional relations to fictional states of affairs (ibid.). This 
module is first put to use in children’s production and understanding of pretend 
play (Leslie, 1987). Pretence involves two simultaneous representations of the 
same situation. By pretending, for example, that my furry winter hat is a cat, I 
am not confused about what kind of object it literally is: I know that it is a hat 
but I treat it as if it was a pet – for example, by stroking it and by giving it 
imaginary milk from an imaginary bowl. Thus when one understands or 
produces pretence, one must simultaneously represent what the object or the 
situation literally is and what it is pretended to be. Leslie (1987) argues that 
children exhibit an ability to understand that the same state of affairs can be 
represented in different ways as early as they start to pretend – typically by their 
second birthday. If Leslie’s account is correct, a question arises: why are 
children unable to solve the false belief task until the age of four, although they 
are able to metarepresent other’s mental states as early as by the age of two? 
Leslie (1987, pp. 422–423) argues that attribution of false beliefs is 
considerably more complex than attribution of secondary mental states in 
pretence. In the case of pretence, what the situation is pretended to be is made 
obvious by the pretender  (e.g. one holds a banana close to one’s ear and speaks 
to it as if it were a telephone), whereas in the false belief task, what the person 
falsely believes about the situation needs to be worked out by the observer 
(Leslie, 1987). According to Leslie (ibid.), children younger than four-years old 
fail the false belief test because they are unable to select the correct content for 
the false belief. Leslie and colleagues (see e.g. Leslie & Roth, 1993, Scholl & 
Leslie, 1999) argue that because beliefs tend to be true, the ToMM 
automatically imposes the current situation as a default content for any 
ascribable belief. In the case of false belief, however, the default interpretation 
needs to be overcome. For this job, Leslie postulates yet another special 
mechanism: SP (Selection Processing). SP is a presumably a non-modular 
cognitive device that enables the mindreader to choose between various 
possible contents by taking relevant background information into account; it 
inhibits, when necessary, the default contents that the ToMM automatically 
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produces (Scholl & Leslie 1999, 147). The upshot is that a full-fledged 
mindreading competence may require both domain-specific and domain-general 
processes. This conclusion is fully compatible with Leslie’s modular account 
because he holds the view that “it is not that the entirety of ToM is modular, but 
only that ToM has a specific innate basis” (Scholl & Leslie, 1999, p. 134).  
Simon Baron-Cohen (1997) is the author of another well-known modular 
account of mindreading. He proposes that at least four mechanisms – IT 
(Intentionality Detector), EDD (Eye Direction Detector), SAM (Shared 
Attention Mechanism), and ToMM (Theory of Mind Mechanism) – underlie the 
human capacity to mindread. Baron-Cohen’s account of mindreading is modular 
in the strongest possible sense: it unites the epistemic, the architectural, and the 
hardware conceptions of modularity (Gerrans, 2002, p. 308).  
The first mechanism ID (Intentionality Detector) is an amodal perceptual 
module which has the purpose of attributing goal-directedness to selected 
stimuli. It gets activated whenever one perceives something as an agent – most 
typically when one perceives an object with self-propelled motion. ID is similar 
to Leslie’s ToBy but whereas Leslie described ToBy as having the function to 
compute mechanical properties in general, Baron-Cohen’s ID processes only 
properties of agents (Baron-Cohen, 1997, pp. 32–38). 
The next mechanism EDD (Eye-Direction Detector) is a module within the 
human visual system dedicated to processing information about what other 
agents are seeing. It automatically registers the presence of eyes (or eye-like 
stimuli), enables one to follow the direction of the gaze of another and to infer 
what the agent is looking at. In normally developing individuals, perceived eye-
contact (i.e. you and another agent are looking at each-other) triggers 
physiological arousal which is typically experienced as pleasant (ibid. pp. 38–
44). 
ID and EDD enable infants to track other people’s goals and perceptual 
states by creating dyadic representations in the form of "agent desires x” or 
“agent sees x.” In order for the child to be able to know that the same object is 
the focus of attention of both oneself and someone else, one needs to compare 
one’s own perceptual content with another individual’s perceptual content. This 
comparison is achieved via a third mechanism: SAM (Shared-Attention 
Mechanism). SAM comes online towards the end of the first year of life. It 
usually receives inputs from EDD (although it can also use information from 
other modalities) and transforms them into triadic representations; i.e. it 
represents relations between oneself, another agent, and an object (which may 
be another person). SAM also serves as a link between EDD and ID and thereby 
enables the interpretation of another’s eye direction in terms of volitional 
mental states (ibid. pp. 44–50). 
Finally, Baron-Cohen postulates a fourth mechanism – ToMM (Theory of 
Mind Mechanism). He borrows the name of the module from Leslie and 
declares an agreement “with much of what Leslie says about the workings of 
ToMM” (ibid. p. 51). Whereas the previous three modules were limited to 
processing only simple volitional and perceptual states, ToMM enables 
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attribution of the full range of mental states. It represents epistemic (or 
propositional) mental states such as pretending, knowing and believing, and 
develops over time into a cognitive mechanism that provides a coherent implicit 
theory of how different mental states relate to each other and to actions. Baron-
Cohen argues that in order to mature, ToMM needs to receive input from SAM 
– its development begins by converting the triadic representations received from 
SAM into metarepresentations. Since the functioning of SAM implies the 
functioning of ID and EDD, the development of ToMM presupposes that the 
three other modules already function properly (ibid. pp. 51–55).  
Modular accounts of mindreading differ in many respects – from what kind 
of concept of modularity is assumed to how many sub-mechanisms are 
postulated and how their functioning is explained – but they are all opposed to 
the idea underlying the child-scientist theory that the development of children’s 
mindreading capacities depends only on the domain-general ability of theory-
building. Instead, mindreading is assumed to rely on the maturation of innate 
and domain-specific cognitive mechanisms. This has led some of the critics to 
accuse the modular accounts of ”anti-developmentalism” (Gopnik, 1996, p. 174, 
Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997, p. 54). For example, Gopnik and Wellman (1992, p. 
284) argue that modular theories are unable to account for the typical sequence 
of conceptual changes that characterize the development of theory of mind, such 
as the replacement of an early non-representational understanding of mental 
states by a later representational account. They claim that unlike standard 
modular accounts, the child-scientist theory provides a dynamic picture of 
development and acknowledges the importance of the role of the interactions 
between the child and its environment: theories change in a systematic order 
under the pressure of new evidence. 
Scholl and Leslie (1999) ward off the critique by emphasising that nothing 
requires modules to be developmentally static. There are restrictions to the 
information flow into and/or outside of a module but this does not mean that 
modules cannot develop internally. One way to explain how modules develop is 
to adopt Segal’s (1996) account of parametrization of diachronic modules. 
Children in different language environments end up speaking different 
languages. This can be explained as a result of a diachronic process of adjusting 
the parameters according to the current language environment within the 
genetically specified limits of the language module. However, Scholl and Leslie 
(1999) prefer the view that the mindreading module is not subject to 
parametrization, because the end result of the maturation of the theory of mind 
module is, in their view, a uniform theory across all normally developing 
humans. They explain the early changes in theory of mind as a result of 
additional modules coming on-line and changes in later development as 
performance improvements, rather than changes in competence (see Scholl & 
Leslie, 1999). 
If both the child-scientist theory and the modular view can equally well 
explain the development of mindreading, how can we decide which of the two 
approaches is correct? A general argument in favour of the modular approach 
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appeals to the speed of everyday social cognition. Most everyday social 
situations require an ability to make swift judgements about other’s mental 
states and the modular account enables us to explain how such fast processing is 
computationally possible. Modularity enables us to avoid the frame problem 
(see section 2.3.1.) by preventing the system from searching the whole 
cognitive space for information that is relevant for mindreading in any 
particular case. This is one of the reasons why modular processing is faster than 
domain-general processing (Gerrans, 2002, p. 310). A more specific argument 
for the modular view rests on its ability to explain why children with high-
functioning autism with normal IQ (i.e. with intact domain-general cognitive 
abilities) fail the false-belief test (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). The 
child-scientist theory seems incapable of accounting for the developmental 
dissociation between mindreading and domain-general intelligence. However, if 
mindreading develops as a module independently from general intelligence, the 
dissociation seems to find a rather straightforward explanation.  
Things are more complicated than that, however. Currie and Sterelny (2000, 
p. 149) argue that mindreading is unlikely to be strongly modular (in the sense 
of being the product of only informationally encapsulated cognitive mecha-
nisms) because, in order to formulate beliefs about other people’s mental states, 
specific contextual information needs to be (and often is) taken into account. 
However, they defend what they call a modest modular account of mindreading: 
the idea is that there is a modularized layer of information processing between 
perception and social belief fixation, where socially relevant ”tags” are added to 
the perceptual inputs (ibid. p. 154). For example, when we see a good actor in 
tears, playing the role of a heartbroken character, we automatically and involun-
tarily perceive the scene as of seeing a sad person but we do not thereby 
necessarily come to believe that the actor is actually sad, since the background 
information (“this is a play”) blocks this inference. If the process of social belief 
fixation itself was modular in the strong sense of being informationally 
encapsulated, we would not be able to override the perceptual impression and 
would automatically end up with a belief that the person is sad. The modest 
modular account seems to adopt the advantages of both the child-scientist 
theory and the strongly modular theory, while at the same time avoiding their 
weaknesses: it escapes the general frame problem by introducing a modular 
level of information processing, and avoids the excessive rigidity that is typical 
of fully modular systems. 
There are additional reasons to favour a modestly modular explanation that 
regards mindreading proper as a domain-general capacity that takes as inputs 
the results of early-processing modules. When the early processing modules fail 
to do their job, the domain-general system does not receive the necessary input 
to successfully compute mental states, which explains why high-functioning 
autistic patients have great difficulties with mindreading. The lack of an ability 
to mindread is, however, not the sole characteristic of autism – autism is a 
syndrome that is associated with a number of symptoms, including sensory-
motor problems and abnormalities in perceptual processing (Gerrans, 2002, p. 
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315). A modestly modular account of mindreading may offer a more 
parsimonious explanation of a wider range of autistic symptoms, including 
problems with mindreading, whereas the hypothesis that autism is the result of a 
damaged mindreading module requires additional explanations for other autistic 
symptoms, such as problems with sensory processing.20  
A modest version of Baron-Cohen’s theory would mean that ID, EDD, and 
SAM may indeed be independent modules, whereas mindreading proper is a 
result of domain-general theorising. In fact, although Gerrans (2002, p. 308) 
claims that Baron-Cohen’s account of mindreading is overall modular in a 
strong sense, this may not hold for all four modules of the theory: Baron-Cohen 
indeed argues that ID, EDD, and SAM are likely candidates of classical innate 
modules but he concedes that the fourth mechanism, ToMM, may be more open 
to learning (Baron-Cohen, 1997, p. 57). Leslie’s account is equally flexible in 
this respect: Leslie allows the mechanism for selecting the relevant contents for 
mental-state ascriptions to be domain-general.  
In sum, the issue of whether mindreading is a result of modular or domain-
general capacities is not a black-or-white question. It is plausible that mind-
reading is a result of both, domain-specific and domain-general processes. The 
two branches of TT – the child-scientist approach and the modular approach – 
need not be understood as mutually exclusive. Instead elements of the child-
scientist theory and the modest modular approach can be combined to overcome 
some of the problems that each approach faces alone. 
 
 
2.4. Simulation theory 
You know my methods in such cases, Watson. 
 I put myself in the man’s place, and, having 
first gauged his intelligence, I try to imagine 
how I should myself have proceeded under  
the same circumstances.  
Arthur Conan Doyle, 189421 
 
For a few years after the publication of Premack and Woodruff’s 1978 paper, 
the discussion over mindreading mainly consisted of a dispute between different 
versions of TT. In 1986, a radically different approach to mindreading emerged, 
based on the claim that instead of relying on theoretical knowledge about the 
                                                 
20  The modest modularity thesis seems to leave unexplained the success in false belief tasks 
of children with Down’s syndrome, whose domain-general reasoning is impaired, (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985, 1986). However, other studies have shown that children with 
Down’s syndrome actually have difficulties with mindreading, which suggests that passing a 
false-belief test does not ensure that one is able to successfully mindread in real life contexts, 
and that mindreading is not completely independent from domain-general reasoning abilities 
(see e.g. Yirmiya et al., 1996). 
21  Quotation via Gordon (1986). 
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laws of the functioning of the human mind, people use their own minds as 
models for simulating or replicating the mental processes of other people in 
order to make sense of their behaviour. The basic assumption of ST is that in 
order to attribute mental states to others, people rely at least partly on the same 
mental processes that underlie their own psychological states. Let’s assume that 
John wants to simulate a decision making process of Mary. According to ST, the 
process proceeds roughly as follows: 1) imaginary premises (those that Mary 
presumably has) are fed into John’s decision making system; 2) the system 
forms a decision based on the given information; 3) the outcome is projected 
onto Mary in the form of a mental state attribution. But is it not the case that 
John needs to rely on theoretical knowledge in order to decide which premises 
need to be fed into the simulation mechanism to begin with? If this is so, ST 
seems to collapse into a version of TT. Defenders of pure simulationism reject 
the view that theoretical knowledge (in the sense assumed by TT) is required for 
mental simulation. In what follows, I will give an overview of various versions 
of ST to outline how simulationists have tackled various problems that a theory 
of mindreading is expected to solve. I will focus especially on Alvin Goldman’s 
account because it is the most elaborated version of simulation-based theory of 
mindreading to date.  
 
 
2.4.1. The early versions of simulation theory: Heal and Gordon  
Let us first look at the earliest publications where ST was for the first time 
sketched as an alternative to TT: articles by Jane Heal (1986), and Robert 
Gordon (1986). In “Replication and functionalism,” Heal (1986) contrasted the 
functional strategy that she considered to be at the heart of TT with what she 
labelled a replicative strategy. She argued that the functionalist TT is unlikely to 
underlie everyday social understanding because of the problem of holism: in a 
functional framework, any action could in principle result from many different 
combinations of mental states. To decide what mental states are relevant to 
explain a certain behaviour in a particular case requires extremely complex 
theorising (if it can be done at all), yet humans are able to mindread with 
considerable ease and speed. This makes it highly implausible that in order to 
mindread, people rely on the functional strategy, especially if there is a much 
easier explanation of how mindreading may be accomplished. The easier expla-
nation, according to Heal, goes roughly as follows: people imagine the world 
from another person’s point of view, they have their cognitive system process 
the input from such imagination, they then attribute the result to the person 
whose behaviour they wish to predict or explain. In order to do this, they need 
no complex folk psychological theory – all they need is to have a working mind 
and an assumption that other minds function in a similar manner to theirs. Heal 
argued that to get to the initial state that serves as an input for the replication 
process one does not need to make any functionalist-style theoretical inferences. 
She argued that, instead, the input states can be created by looking at or thinking 
about the world that surrounds the other and by assuming that others qua 
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thinkers are like oneself, rather than by theorising about the insides of other 
people’s minds (Heal, 1986, p. 137). She did not exclude the possibility that 
some pieces of theoretical knowledge are adopted in this initial stage – for 
example, one may need to use one’s knowledge of optical laws to figure out 
what is perceivable from the other’s perspective – but she emphasized that such 
knowledge is different from the use of folk-psychological laws about mental 
states and their interactions.  
In the same year, Robert Gordon (1986) published the paper ”Folk psycho-
logy as simulation” where he outlined  similar ideas. He started the paper by 
arguing that the best way to predict what I will do is to decide what I will do: in 
such cases we rely on hypothetico-practical reasoning instead of making nomo-
logical inferences. He went on to argue that one can also predict what other 
people are about to do by simulating their decision making process. For 
example, to predict what move my chess opponent will make next, I take up my 
opponent’s perspective, decide what move to make, and attribute that decision 
to the opponent. A similar process takes place when one engages in retrodicting 
and explaining the actions that have already occurred: I imagine having acted 
like the other person and consider what mental states this behaviour may have 
resulted from.  
Obviously, this process needs to include adjustments for the relevant diffe-
rences between myself and the other person – otherwise the result would 
characterize myself instead of the person of interest. Sometimes it is practically 
impossible to make such adjustments accurately, for example when an amateur 
chess player tries to simulate what is going on in the mind of a professional 
player (compare Goldman, 1989, p. 83). At other times it is rather easy, 
especially if the other person is very similar to me in relevant respects. 
According to Gordon, the ability to carry out necessary adjustments for mental 
simulation develops in early childhood and increases with age. He explains the 
fact that three-year-olds typically fail the standard false belief test by arguing 
that they simulate egocentrically, whereas older children pass the test presu-
mably because they have learned to make relevant adjustments by taking the 
other’s perspective into account (Gordon, 1986, p. 168). Gordon also pointed 
out that ST provides a more viable explanation than TT of why high-functioning 
autistic children have difficulties with the false-belief task whereas children 
with Down’s syndrome are able to pass it: it is not because the former lack and 
the latter possess an ability to theorise about mental phenomena but because 
mindreading is based on a specific (and possibly modular) ability to carry out 
mental simulations (ibid. p. 169). To prevent a potential phenomenological 
argument against ST that simulation is unlikely to be the fundamental means of 
mindreading because we rarely ever experience carrying out a simulation rou-
tine, he adopts the view that simulations usually run implicitly, below the level 






2.4.2. Varieties of simulation  
After the appearance of the early articles on mental simulation introduced 
above, several other researchers also picked up the idea that mindreading may 
be based on processes of simulation rather than theorising. Different accounts of 
ST were outlined, for example, in a double special issue of Mind & Language in 
1992, which was dedicated to the debate between ST and TT. The general 
underlying idea that mindreading is process-driven (i.e. the same processes that 
underlie our own mental states also underlie attributions of mental states to 
others) rather than theory-driven, was cashed out in various ways. As Nichols 
and Stich (2003, p. 132) note, in the early days of ST, the discussion on mind-
reading was framed as a battle between two camps – TT and ST. This created a 
situation in which proponents of ST tried to tag the label “simulation” to just 
about any process that might be understood as simulation in some sense of the 
word, despite the fact that many of these processes had little or nothing in 
common. The concept of mental simulation was put to use to capture processes 
that take place on a personal level (e.g. involving voluntary imagination and 
projection from oneself to another, see Goldman, 1989), as well as for processes 
that take place on a sub-personal level (involving automatic activation of mirror 
neurons and other neural processes, see Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Goldman 
(2006) distinguishes between low-level and high-level mindreading which 
apply to different types of mental states and are explained by different models 
of the simulation process, also allowing theoretical elements to play a role in 
mindreading. Some authors assume that simulation involves introspection and 
projection from oneself to another person (Goldman, 1992, 2006). Others 
explicitly deny that introspection plays a role in simulation and appeal to 
“imaginative identification” instead of projection from oneself to the other 
person (Gordon, 1995). Although most authors consider ST to be an empirical 
hypothesis about the cognitive processes underlying mindreading, Jane Heal 
(1995, 1998) took the route of defending the idea of simulation as an a priori 
thesis concerning the recreation of the contents of mental states of others in 
mindreading. Her main point was that in order to think about another person’s 
thinking (in the broad sense of covering all propositional attitudes), one needs to 
think directly about the subject matter of that person’s thinking.22 Going into the 
details of all of the different versions of ST23 would exceed the scope of this 
chapter. For this reason I’m going to focus on the most prominent version of  
ST – that of Alvin Goldman. Whereas earlier versions of ST were directly 
opposed to TT, more recently elements of TT and ST have been combined to 
create hybrid theories (Heal, 1995, Nichols & Stich, 2003, Goldman, 2006), and 
this is also the strategy that Goldman has recently used.  
                                                 
22  Heal (1998, p. 483) coined the term ”co-cognition” for ”thinking about the same subject 
matter.” 
23  Stich and Nichols (1997, p. 299) have even argued that the diversity among the different 
versions of ST is so vast that the term ”simulation” has become futile: ”It picks out no 
natural or theoretically interesting category.”  
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2.4.3. Alvin Goldman’s account: From pure ST to a ST-TT hybrid 
No overview of ST can ignore the contribution of Alvin Goldman. As Frédé-
rique de Vignemont (2009, p. 457) has written about him: “No philosopher has 
done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation.” Goldman has 
developed and transformed ideas on mental simulation for over two decades, 
arriving at a detailed ST-TT hybrid (with an emphasis on simulation) with his 
2006 book “Simulating Minds”.  
His early ideas (Goldman, 1989) were similar to those of Heal (1986) and 
Gordon (1986): he considered simulation to be an implicit or explicit process of 
mentally putting oneself into the other’s situation, generating further states from 
the pretend input, and projecting the result to the target. In his earlier writings, 
he attempted to avoid bringing in elements of TT, arguing that in order to create 
input for simulation, one has to rely on non-theoretical knowledge of the other 
person’s perceptual situation and may assume that the other has the same “basic 
likings or cravings” as oneself (Goldman, 1989, p. 82). Contra Dennett’s (1987) 
claim that any simulation necessarily involves theoretical knowledge, Goldman 
argued that mental simulation can work without theorising if the interpreter’s 
input states are relevantly similar to those of the interpretee, and if the processes 
driving the simulation are isomorphic to the processes producing mental states 
in the interpretee (Goldman, 1989, p. 85). According to Goldman, this is indeed 
the case for human mindreaders: in the course of mental simulation, relevantly 
similar pretend-states are created in our cognitive system and processed by the 
same mechanisms that process genuine mental states of the interpretee (ibid. pp. 
85–86). In other words, while naturally produced mental states like ordinary 
beliefs and desires give rise to other ordinary mental states (and often also to 
behaviours), pretended or imagined mental states lead to mentalistic predictions. 
Whereas according to Leslie (1994), the ability to pretend is an early mani-
festation of a theory of mind, Goldman argues that it may instead reveal an 
early ability to simulate (ibid. p. 87). But how do simulators manage to take into 
account the differences between themselves and the people they mindread? 
Goldman concedes that people need to use some empirical information to 
accommodate interpersonal differences but denies that such information needs 
to be mediated by a folk-psychological theory. He adds that his aim is not to 
claim that mental state attributions are always accurate: people often make 
errors while mindreading, and typical errors reflect an egocentric bias, which is 
another reason to support ST over TT (see also Goldman, 2006, p. 148).  
The beginning of the 1990s witnessed the discovery of mirror neurons in 
macaque monkeys: these are neurons that are activated both when an individual 
executes an action and when one observes a similar action in others (Di 
Pellegrino et al., 1992, Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Thereafter, indirect and direct 
evidence has been found for the existence of mirror neurons in humans (see 
Fadiga et al., 1995, Iacoboni & Mazziotta, 2007, Mukamel et al., 2010). Gold-
man was quick to establish theoretical links between this neuroscientific 
discovery and the simulationist approach to social cognition. With Vittorio 
Gallese, one of the discoverers of the mirror neurons, he argued that the 
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function of mirror neurons might be mental simulation (Gallese & Goldman, 
1998). Because macaque monkeys have very limited if any mindreading 
abilities, they carefully suggested that mirror neurons “represent a primitive 
version, or possibly a precursor in phylogeny, of a simulation heuristic that 
might underlie mind-reading.” (ibid. pp. 497–498) 
Later on, Goldman distinguished between low-level and high-level mind-
reading24 in his hybrid theory. Therein he laid emphasis on simulation processes 
(Goldman, 2006). He describes low-level mindreading as a “primitive” form of 
mindreading in the sense of being cognitively relatively simple (it presumably 
relies on mirroring processes and enables us to recognize types of simple mental 
states without identifying propositional contents) and in the sense of having 
evolved earlier than high-level mindreading (Goldman, 2006, p. 113). 
According to Goldman, low-level mindreading underlies face- and body-based 
emotion recognition as well as the attribution of feelings and intentions. He 
reviews empirical evidence showing that subjects who have difficulties with 
experiencing a certain type of emotion also have problems recognizing the same 
type of emotion in others, whereas their ability to experience and to recognize 
other types of emotions is preserved. For example, patients with damaged 
amygdalae, who have lost the ability to experience fear, are also impaired in 
their ability to recognize fear in others (ibid. pp. 115–116). Similar paired 
results are found in patients with damaged insula and basal ganglia who no 
longer experience nor recognize disgust, and in subjects whose experience of 
anger is temporarily blocked by a drug called sulpiride. Goldman argues that it 
is difficult to see how TT could explain such selective deficits, because it is 
unlikely that one can have an otherwise intact theory of emotions minus 
knowledge of just one type of emotion; ST, on the contrary, not only incorpo-
rates these selective deficits, but even predicts them. To explain how emotion 
recognition proceeds in detail, Goldman considers several different compu-
tational models for simulation-based low-level mindreading (see ibid. pp. 124–
132). He favours a model of “unmediated resonance” according to which when 
one perceives another person’s facial expressions, ones own neural substrate of 
the corresponding emotion is triggered, classified, and attributed to the target 
(ibid. pp. 127–129). As this model demonstrates, mirroring alone is not suffi-
cient for mindreading: the result of the mirroring also needs to be classified and 
imputed to the target. Moreover, the mental state that occurs as a result of 
mirroring must match the state of the target, but at the same time it has to 
function differently from it, because otherwise it would result in emotional 
contagion rather than recognition of another’s mental state. Moving from 
emotions to actions, Goldman argues that in the case of both genuine and 
mirrored intentions to act, the brain creates specific motor plans. The difference 
between actual and mirrored motor plans is that in the case of mirroring, the 
motor plans are inhibited from triggering real actions. They translate into 
                                                 




predictions of actions instead. If this model accurately describes action 
mirroring,  we can speculate that echopraxia (involuntary repetition of another 
person’s actions) may result from an impaired ability to inhibit the mirrored 
action plans (see also Goldman’s discussion of a patient who cannot but 
produce the movements he imagines, ibid. p. 160). 
The critics have pointed out that the use of the concept of simulation to 
characterize the activity of mirror neurons and other neural resonance processes 
is unjustified. The main critique of low-level ST is not provided by advocates of 
TT, but by authors critical of both, ST and TT (see chapter 3). For example, 
Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, pp. 178–180, see also Gallagher, 2008c) argue that 
the function of mirror neurons should be understood in terms of enactive 
perception in preparation for social interaction instead of simulation (see also 
Froese & Gallagher, 2012, p. 448). They draw on two common definitions of 
simulation and argue that what mirror neurons do satisfies neither of the 
definitions. According to pretence definition, to simulate means to pretend. But 
who is pretending in the case of mirror neurons? It cannot be the person, 
because the person has no awareness of, not to mention conscious control over, 
the activity of mirror neurons. Gallagher and Zahavi argue that it also makes no 
sense to say that the brain is pretending, because the brain is not an agent: “As 
vehicles, neurons either fire or don’t fire. They don’t pretend to fire.” (Gallagher 
& Zahavi, 2008, p. 180) According to the instrumental definition, simulation is 
understood as an activity of using something as a model for something else. 
Once more, Gallagher and Zahavi insist, the person cannot use mirror neurons 
in any way, and it is absurd to use this concept for sub-personal processes. 
Herschbach (2008), au contraire, supports the simulation interpretation, arguing 
that “brain mechanisms could ‘use’ other brain mechanisms as models without 
requiring the intelligence of a person.”25 In any case, it is important to acknow-
ledge that the simulation interpretation is not the only possible interpretation of 
the workings of mirror neurons, although it is the most prevalent one.  But let 
me now return to Goldman’s account.  
Whereas in Goldman’s account, low-level mindreading targets emotions, 
feelings and intentions and is “comparatively simple, primitive, automatic, and 
largely below the level of consciousness” (Goldman, 2006, p. 113), high-level 
mindreading targets more complex mental states such as propositional attitudes, 
and it may be to some degree conscious and partly under voluntary control 
(ibid. p. 147). However, Goldman is also quick to concede that processes that 
underlie high-level mindreading may most of the time be completely implicit 
(ibid. p. 151). In high-level mindreading, pretend-states play a central role: the 
mindreader creates in herself pretend-states, feeds them into her cognitive 
system, and attributes the results to the target. What are pretend-states and how 
are they produced? According to Goldman, pretend-states are mental states of 
the interpreter that have the purpose or function of replicating or matching in 
                                                 
25 Slors (2010) prefers the concept of ”neural resonance” instead of speaking about 
simulation or mere perception. 
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relevant respects the mental states of the target of mindreading (ibid. p. 149, see 
also p. 37). These states are created by enactive imagination (E-imagination) 
which is a process that enables the endogeneous (and sometimes voluntary) 
production of mental states that are otherwise produced exogeneously (ibid. p. 
149). In contrast to the mere supposing (or S-imagination) that characterizes 
detached hypothetical reasoning, E-imagination affects the subject’s mind more 
deeply and engages largely the same psychological processes as would be 
operative if one were really in the imagined circumstances (ibid. p. 175). For 
example, although any act of seeing requires a visual stimulus from the 
environment, one can create a similar quasi-visual experience by retrieving the 
necessary input from memory. Accurate E-imagination requires not only a 
general capacity for E-imagination, but also task-specific knowledge that can be 
used to build up pretend-states (ibid.). For example, if I have no idea what an 
elephant looks like, I cannot accurately E-imagine an elephant. To E-imagine 
something, there must be resemblance between a naturally occurring mental 
state and a corresponding pretend-state. The resemblance may, but does not 
have to, appear at a phenomenological level; for Goldman it suffices to have the 
resemblance at a functional or at a neural level (ibid. p. 158).  
What reasons are there to believe that relevant similarities actually exist 
between ordinary mental states and E-imagined states? Goldman puts forward 
several pieces of evidence. For example, patients with unilateral visual neglect 
(as a result of brain damage) experience a “gap” in a certain part of their visual 
field that manifests both while seeing and while imagining a scene, which 
suggests that seeing and visualizing rely on (partly) overlapping neural 
processes (ibid. p. 152–157). There is analogous evidence for shared neural 
underpinnings in motor imagery and in motor production (ibid. p. 157–160). In 
addition, Goldman claims that besides visual and motor imagery, E-imagination 
extends to purely conceptual domains where imagistic or motor properties are 
lacking (ibid. p. 160–162). Such broad use of the concept of E-imagination 
serves the purpose of enabling us to explain how pretend propositional attitudes 
(pretend-beliefs and pretend-desires) can be created as initial input for the 
simulation process.  
Unfortunately, the nature of conceptual E-imagination remains rather 
obscure and the empirical findings Goldman uses to support his thesis of 
conceptual E-imagination are unconvincing. He draws on studies that 
demonstrate that the bystander apathy effect26 occurs not only when other 
people are present, but also when one merely imagines other people being 
present (ibid. p. 161). But it remains unclear how this example speaks for the 
existence of conceptual E-imagination rather than a mere supposition conjoined 
with elements of visual E-imagination: imagining other people is surely not a 
case of pure conceptual thinking but seems to involve quasi-visual (or quasi-
perceptual) features. The example of a famous priming effect seems to fare no 
                                                 
26  The bystander apathy effect is the tendency to refrain from helping a person if other 
people who could also help are present. 
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better. When people are primed with words that are associated with the 
stereotype of elderly people, they are inclined to walk more slowly (Bargh, 
Chen & Burrows, 1996). Goldman argues that this might be a case of 
conceptual E-imagination: people who have been primed with the elderly 
stereotype may imagine being elderly themselves and slow down their pace as a 
result. However, there is no direct evidence that people thus primed imagine 
being elderly themselves. Furthermore, the priming effect itself has recently 
been called into doubt: Doyen et al. (2012) were not able to reproduce the 
original results of the Bargh et al. (1996) study. An even more serious fault of 
Goldman than citing unconvincing evidence is that he does not sufficiently 
clarify the concept of conceptual E-imagination. He mentions that the 
similarities between real and pretend propositional attitudes are to be found at 
the functional level (Goldman, 2006, p. 161), but leaves the reader wondering 
about what exactly this means: he does not elaborate on how pretend-desires 
and pretend-beliefs match with and at the same time differ from naturally 
produced desires and beliefs. One option to back up Goldman’s theory would be 
to claim that pretend-states and naturally produced states share a similar 
content, but differ in properties of “non-content” (see Heal, 1996). In this case, 
a pretend-state is not some “faint copy” of the genuine state but, instead, a 
particular way of representing its content (ibid.). In order to know what content 
is a suitable input for simulation, some theoretical information must probably be 
involved, but that would be no problem for a hybrid account.  
Tooming (2013) has recently argued that pretend desires cannot be 
distinguished from naturally produced desires and that therefore they cannot 
form a separate kind of mental state. He proposes an alternative model of high-
level mindreading which operates without pretend-states: mindreaders use their 
own genuine mental states as input for the simulation process and rely on 
theoretical information to adjust the result of the simulation process to match 
the mental states of the target (ibid.). This is an interesting idea but Goldman 
would probably reject it because it puts too much weight on theorising. In 
Goldman’s hybrid theory, theorising has a secondary role as compared with the 
service performed by simulation: in cases of predictive mindreading, theoretical 
information is used to adjust the input of simulation so that it matches the other 
person’s initial mental states; in cases of retrodictive mindreading, theorising 
creates hypotheses that are “tested” via simulation (Goldman, 2006, pp.183–
185). Simulation based on the genuine mental states of the mindreader may 
work in cases where the current mental states of the simulator are fairly similar 
to the relevant mental states of the target, but it is hard to see how it could work 
as an effective strategy in all or most cases of mindreading. For example, if I 
want to predict what someone who does not share my fear of heights is going to 
do on top of the Eiffel tower, it makes little sense to run a simulation based on 
my fearful state first, and to subsequently adjust the result of the simulation. It 
would be more economic to make relevant inferences without first running the 
simulation (by reasoning, for example, that the subject is likely to enjoy the 
panorama and to take pictures of Paris, because that is what people without 
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acrophobia usually do on top of the Eiffel tower).  Alternatively, I may try to 
imagine what it’s like not to be afraid of heights (i.e. I create a pretend state), 
feed this imagination to my system, and impute the result to the target. In the 
first case, theorising is doing all the work; in the second case, pretend states (in 
the sense of mental states that go beyond the repertoire of my mental states) are 
involved. One might argue that this example is no serious objection to 
Tooming’s model because only rarely will the mindreader be incapable of 
having a mental state that characterizes the target. This is not the point, 
however. What matters is that the current mental states of the mindreader and 
the target often differ. Recreating a mental state (even by retrieving one’s own 
experience from memory, for example) for the purpose of mindreading is a 
special case of mental state production. Goldman could argue that if a mental 
state has been produced for the purpose of matching the state in the target, we 
are already dealing with a pretend-state rather than a genuine mental state of the 
mindreader. So it seems that if a simulationist account of high-level mind-
reading is at all feasible, Goldman’s model is preferable to the “pretenceless” 
model sketched by Tooming (2013), given that a more detailed and convincing 
account of pretend states is provided, such as that suggested by Heal (1996). 
Alternatively, high-level mindreading may rely more heavily on processes that 
do not involve simulation, such as folk-psychological theorising.  
Besides pretend states, another important aspect of Goldman’s theory is its 
reliance on introspection. Although introspection is not appropriate as a scien-
tific method, it seems obvious that people have some sort of introspective 
access to their current mental states: for example, if I don’t express a random 
thought in any way, it is virtually impossible for others to attribute it to me but I 
can easily attribute it to myself (see Goldman, 2006, p. 230). Goldman argues 
that introspection as a specific mechanism for detecting one’s current mental 
states is a necessary element of mindreading: in order to attribute a simulated 
mental state to the target, the mental state must first be recognized and classified 
by the mindreader. 
Not all simulation theorists agree with Goldman on the role of introspection. 
Gordon (1995) argues that introspection or inference from oneself to another 
person is unnecessary for mindreading. In Gordon’s model, simulation involves 
a “re-centring” of the egocentric perspective: I transform my perspective to 
match the perspective of my target. I thereby begin to use the pronoun “I” to 
refer to the target instead of to refer to myself. As a result, projection of the 
mental state from myself to the other person becomes redundant because the 
simulated mental state is linked to the other person from the start. But how does 
a person know what mental states she currently has, either genuinely or as a 
simulator? In Gordon’s model (see Gordon, 1996, pp. 15–16), there are no 
specific introspective processes; instead, one detects one’s own mental states via 
an ascent routine. In order to answer e.g. the question “Do I believe that Tallinn 
is the capital of Estonia” one simply asks oneself “Is Tallinn the capital of 
Estonia?” – if the answer is affirmative, then one attributes the belief to oneself. 
However, the problem with this idea is that it only works with beliefs but not 
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with other mental states such as, for instance, hopes or fears: I cannot tell 
whether I hope that it will rain tomorrow by asking “Will it rain?” (see Nichols 
& Stitch, 2003, p. 194).  
 A related difference between Goldman’s and Gordon’s account is the role of 
mental concepts in their respective theories of mindreading. According to 
Goldman, mindreading via simulation requires that one be able to appropriately 
classify mental states, i.e. it presupposes that one already possesses mental state 
concepts (see Goldman, 2006, ch. 10). Things are the other way around in 
Gordon’s model, where simulation does not require the possession of mental 
concepts; rather “our ability to grasp the concepts of mind and the various 
mental states depends on our having the capacity to simulate others” (Gordon, 
1996, p. 11).  
In Goldman’s view (2006, p. 186), Gordon confuses two issues: the issue of 
who is the subject of the states that result from the process of simulation, and 
the issue of what are the contents and the tags associated with the contents of 
those states. Within the content of simulation, the pronoun “I” may indeed refer 
to the target of the simulation, but since one cannot literally transform into 
another subject, the state still needs to be introspectively identified, classified, 
and attached to the target. The pretend state is a state of the subject, even when 
the subject attributes it to someone else. As Goldman explains it, there is a 
“difference between the (pretend) state of deciding to do m, and the final 
genuine state of believing that the target will decide to do m” (ibid. p. 187). To 
proceed from the former to the latter, i.e. from a representation to a metarepre-
sentation, one needs to first classify the state via some process of self-
monitoring and further attribute it to the target (ibid.).  
To support the view that mindreading involves introspection, Goldman refers 
to neuroscientific evidence that shows there to be increased activity during 
mindreading in brain areas that are associated with self-reflection (ibid. p. 162–
164). If Goldman is right about the role of introspection, it suggests that 
introspective identification of one’s own mental states could occur without an 
ability to attribute mental states to others, whereas other-directed mindreading 
cannot function without introspection. In contrast, TT predicts that mental state 
attribution to self and mental state attribution to others go hand in hand because 
any mental state attribution draws on the same folk psychological theory (see 
e.g. Carruthers, 1996, p. 36). Although young children who fail in standard false 
belief tasks also fail to attribute false beliefs to themselves (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988), it does not show that they lack introspective access to their 
current mental states (see also Harris, 1992, p. 132). The attribution of a false 
belief to oneself is not a case of introspection, but a case of third-person 
mindreading targeted at one’s no longer held mental state. Empirical evidence 
seems to pull toward Goldman’s side: there is data of first-person mindreading 
in cases of impaired third-person mindreading (Goldman, 2006, p. 224 and pp. 
236–237). This suggests that self-directed attributions of current mental states 
rely on special processes that differ from third-person mindreading (ibid.) As for 
the explanation of how introspection works, Goldman does not provide a 
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detailed account but he hypothesises that neural properties underlying the 
current mental states of the subject are processed, represented, and classified in 
mental-state terms by some dedicated cognitive processes (ibid. p. 251). He also 
describes introspection as a perception-like process in that it operates via 
attention: I do not attribute to myself every mental state that I am having but I 
attribute those current conscious states to which I attend (ibid. pp. 242–245).  
 
 
2.4.4. Some general challenges for ST 
I have introduced several versions of ST and outlined Alvin Goldman’s hybrid 
theory in somewhat greater detail. Discussing specific counterarguments to 
different versions of ST would exceed the scope of this introduction. However, I 
would like to point out some general challenges that apply to most versions of 
ST. This will lead me to elaborate on why Goldman’s hybrid approach is more 
attractive than pure ST.  
Firstly, as already acknowledged by early simulation theorists (see e.g. Heal, 
1986, pp. 138–139), before one is in any position to simulate one’s own or 
someone else’s mental states, one already has to have some insight into the 
mental states of the target in order to choose the appropriate input for the 
simulation process. Most simulation accounts explain how one predicts one’s 
own and other people’s possible future mental states by appealing to beliefs 
about the other’s current mental states. They run into trouble in explaining how 
the simulation process gets started in the first place. So the problem is that it is 
not possible to simulate from scratch: to simulate, one already has to have some 
knowledge about the target’s mental states. Proponents of ST have tried to 
overcome this problem in various ways but their solutions are either un-
convincing or raise the suspicion that some form of theorising is in play. This is 
presumably one of the main reasons why Goldman gave up his pure version of 
ST and turned into a ST-TT hybrid theorist instead: in his model, the input states 
are chosen with the help of theoretical knowledge. Goldman’s recent hybrid 
seems to be more prominent than any pure simulation account, which also 
suggests that a pure ST might be unfeasible.  
There is no problem of choosing correct input when it comes to low-level 
simulation because it is assumed that perceiving another person’s facial and 
bodily gestures automatically triggers the necessary neural processes that pro-
duce matching states in the observer. So a possible solution to the problem of 
high-level simulation would be to argue that low-level simulation provides input 
for high-level simulation. However, low-level mindreading includes categori-
zation of mental states which requires that one possesses mental state concepts, 
and everyone except for Gordon agrees that mental state concepts cannot rely 
on pure simulation, so some form of theoretical information is likely to be 
involved even in the categorization phase of low-level mindreading.  
Another challenge for most versions of ST is to explain what ensures that the 
results of the simulation process characterize the target rather than the simulator. 
It seems that if we can know other minds only on the basis of our own minds, 
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we are locked to our own minds and can never reach to someone truly different 
from us. Thus any simulation account needs to explain how interpersonal diffe-
rences are taken into account in the simulation process. Here again, it is difficult 
to come up with an explanation for discrepant mental state attribution without 
appealing to one’s ability to make theoretical inferences about mental states. 
Not surprisingly, Goldman’s solution to this problem includes bringing in ele-
ments of TT. The issue is different in regard to low-level simulation, where 
mental states matching those of the target are directly triggered via specific 
neural processes (e.g. mirror neurons). But here we have a different issue: the 
need to explain why we attribute the mirrored mental state to the target rather 
than experience it as our own. ST assumes that, in both cases, the underlying 
neural substrate is largely the same. The critics argue that conceptualizing the 
sub-personal processes underlying low-level mindreading in terms of simulation 
is problematic. They insist that it makes more sense to conceptualize them in 
terms of enactive perception (see e.g. Gallagher, 2007).  
A further issue is that ST needs to explain how several different, and even 
contradictory, mental states – especially affective states – can be simultaneously 
present in a single cognitive system when these states rely on largely over-
lapping sub-personal processes. Gallagher (2008c) uses an example of seeing 
that an entomologist is overjoyed to hold an ugly arthropod, when at the same 
time one is experiencing repugnance towards the creature. He argues that ST is 
unable to adequately explain how one can accurately capture the mental state of 
the other person, because it is implied that in order to attribute a mental state to 
a target, the mental state of the mindreader must match that of the target. In the 
given example, neither the emotional nor the motor state of the mindreader 
matches that of the entomologist. A similar problem occurs in social situations 
which require attributions of distinct mental states to more than one person at 
the same time, which may be the case in many social situations that involve 
paying attention to more than one person. For example, when I see two children 
fighting over a toy, I may have a simultaneous recognition that one of them is 
angry and the other one is miserable, and I may in addition experience a third 
emotion – for example, irritation as a reaction to what I see. Assuming that 
although it seems that one attributes the states simultaneously, one actually 
rapidly switches between different mental states, is not likely to solve the issue, 
because emotions require some temporal duration to be experienced as emo-
tions. At the end of the day, it is an empirical issue whether it is possible to 
simulate a mental state that contradicts the simulator’s current mental state, or 
whether it is possible to simulate several different mental states at the same 
time. But as far as I know, simulation theorists have not even recognized this as 
a problem. This is presumably because the majority of empirical support to ST 
comes from simple lab experiments, where the social input is seriously impo-
verished compared to real life social situations. To my knowledge, there are no 
experiments where the experiment subject would simulate more than one person 




2.5. The hybrid account of Nichols and Stich  
Goldman’s “Simulating Minds” (2006) was not the first hybrid account that 
integrates theory-like and simulation-like components. Three years before 
Goldman published his most recent monograph, Shaun Nichols and Stephen 
Stich outlined what they characterized as an “eclectic”27 account of mindreading 
in their book “Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Aware-
ness, and Understanding Other Minds.” They combined selected elements of TT 
(both in its child-scientist and modularist versions),  ST,  and some original 
ideas of their own that have no counterparts in the standard theories of 
mindreading. Stich and Nichols argued that “eclecticism” is a good thing 
because it allows us to provide more specific explanations of a wider spectrum 
of the issues related to mindreading than any of the unified theories that are 
bound to one central idea.  
The approach of Nichols and Stich is “boxological” – they outline a model 
of the possible architecture of a mindreader’s cognitive system by postulating a 
set of functional units that carry out specific tasks in the system. They focus on 
explaining the basic cognitive architecture of three tightly related mental 
phenomena: pretence, mindreading, and self-knowledge. I will here focus on 
their account of mindreading, which forms the most central part of the book. 
The term “boxology” comes from the strategy of graphically depicting 
functional units as boxes in a larger schema that includes a complex system of 
such special-purpose units and arrows that mark the direction of information 
flow in the system. The authors hardly say anything about how the various 
functional units postulated by the theory might be implemented in a biological 
organism, but this is characteristic also to TT, for example. The book also 
provides a “just so story” – an account of how the mindreading system may 
have evolved. The whole account is highly speculative in a good sense of the 
word, and the speculative nature of it is explicitly embraced by the authors: 
Nichols and Stich (2003, p. 200) openly declare that they expect that in the light 
of new evidence and constructive critique, parts of the theory will be proven 
mistaken. They express a hope that other parts can be improved and further 
elaborated. Unfortunately, the theory has not received as much critical and 
constructive feedback as the authors hoped for, so a refined and empirically 
elaborated version of it has not emerged. However, since it was the first 
systematic hybrid account of mindreading, it is worth giving a brief overview.  
Nichols and Stich (2003, pp. 13–15) start by outlining what they call the 
basic architecture of the mind. They assume that the mind is a system which 
contains, broadly speaking, two types of representational states: beliefs and 
desires.28 These states differ functionally: they are brought about in different 
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100, and 148 of the book. 
28  See Heal (2005, p. 183) for a critique of Nichols and Stich’ clear-cut distinction between 




ways and they interact differently with other components of the mind. Beliefs 
are caused either by perceptual processes or inferred from already existing 
beliefs. In the boxological model, the Belief Box gets input from the Perception 
Box and from Inference Mechanisms, which include a special mechanism called 
the Planner that enables one to figure out ways of achieving one’s goals. 
Desires typically arise from Body-Monitoring Systems or other (unspecified) 
Desire-Generating Mechanisms that feed into the Desire Box, or they are 
formed as sub-elements of broader desires. The information typically flows as 
follows: there is an input from perceptual and inferential mechanisms into 
beliefs and from desire-generating mechanisms into desires. Beliefs and desires 
feed into practical reasoning, i.e. they provide input to the Decision Making 
System, which in turn has feedback loops back to beliefs and desires. From the 
Decision Making System, the information passes on to Action Control Systems, 
which finally generate behavioural output. Based on this model, Nichols and 
Stich begin to build up a mindreading system by adding various special 
mechanisms to the basic architecture of the mind.    
First they add a special mechanism that enables hypothetical reasoning – the 
Possible World Box (PWB). The PWB enables an individual to make more 
flexible behavioural choices by predicting the results of different actions 
without carrying those actions out in reality. It works roughly as follows: one 
feeds a representation of “I will do x” to the PWB and “clamps” it, adds one’s 
beliefs from the Belief Box to the PWB, and updates the whole system (with the 
help of the UpDater, of course), thus generating a representation of a situation 
that would have emerged if the organism had actually done x. This repre-
sentation will serve as a prediction of what would happen if one actually did x. 
Although designed by evolution for the purpose of making better decisions, the 
PWB becomes an exaptation – its function shifts in the course of evolution so 
that the PWB also enables one to predict another organism’s actions. Nichols 
and Stich assume that our evolutionary ancestors had a preliminary concept of 
“goal,” which, jointly with the PWB, enabled our ancestors to make simple 
predictions of what another individual is likely to do. (Nichols & Stich, 2003, 
pp. 62–64) This is not yet a system for mindreading, however – it merely 
enables one to predict actions.  
The evolution of an early mindreading system is described as follows. 
Gradually, Desire Detection Mechanisms evolve: our ancestors become capable 
of detecting other individual’s desires by using various behavioural cues, facial 
expressions, and later on also verbal expressions (ibid. pp. 78–80). The mind 
already contains a Planner – a special mechanism for computing the most 
optimal ways for achieving goals. The Planner becomes another exaptation; it 
originally evolved to enable the organism to plan its own actions but now gets 
recruited to represent the action plans of others (ibid. pp. 80–81). Also a third 
mechanism comes into play – the Mindreading Coordinator. The Mindreading 
Coordinator mediates information between the Belief Box and the Planner: it 
gathers relevant beliefs about the target’s goals and desires and “orders” 
plausible plans for achieving those goals from the Planner. It subsequently 
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generates a prediction that the target is likely to follow (one of) the plan(s). The 
Coordinator also generates beliefs about the sub-goals or instrumental desires of 
the target. (ibid. pp. 81–83) 
Although Nichols and Stich advise against using the term “simulation” (ibid. 
p. 133) because the term is used to denote many different processes and thereby 
creates a great deal of confusion, they point out that several elements of their 
model are borrowed from ST. For example, the idea that the cognitive 
mechanisms that enable us to make inferences and plan actions are recruited to 
predict other individuals’ inferences and actions is congenial to most versions of 
ST. Another simulation-like element in the theory is the process they call 
“default belief attribution.” Default belief attribution means that when another 
person’s mental states are modelled in one’s PWB, one’s own beliefs about the 
world are copied to the PWB as a default strategy (ibid. p. 85). However, this 
brings along one of the central problems of ST: one also needs to take into 
account interpersonal differences, thus the system needs to be able to overcome 
default attributions in appropriate ways. Solution: Nichols and Stich add 
Discrepant Belief Attribution Mechanisms to the schema (see ibid. pp. 88–92). 
This is where theory-like elements come into play. The mindreader needs to rely 
on a rich body of knowledge – a theory – to make inferences about discrepant 
beliefs. One of the simplest types of discrepant belief attribution is the inference 
of beliefs from perceptual states: one can infer, for example, that because the 
other person did not see that an object is in location x, she does not believe that 
the object is in that location. But this is not always true – the target may have 
acquired the belief that the object is in location x in some other fashion – for 
example, someone may have told her. So the mindreader gradually obtains a 
rich body of knowledge on how different types of mental state are interrelated 
and linked to behaviour. This idea is inspired by the child-scientist version of 
TT. 
The hybrid model also borrows an element from modularist theories. Na-
mely, the authors hypothesise that mindreading is triggered by some dedicated 
modular mechanism, such as an Agency Detector, which might be a separate 
mechanism or a part of Desire Detection Mechanisms.  
A theory of mindreading must be able to explain also self-directed mind-
reading. According to Stich and Nichols, one uses the same mindreading system 
in order to attribute mental states to others as well as to predict one’s own 
possible future mental states. But the authors convincingly argue that the 
theory-theorist idea that one needs to make inferences based on behavioural 
data to know one’s current thoughts and feelings is absurd, and they postulate a 
special Monitoring Mechanism that enables one to detect one’s current mental 
states. (See ibid. pp. 150–199) 
Besides combining elements of ST and TT, the most important original 
contribution of Nichols and Stich (2003) is the postulation of the PWB – a 
specific mental workspace in which rich descriptions of what the world would 
be like if the assumptions were true are built from a few assumptions. Hypo-
thetically, the PWB first evolved to enable agents to make better decisions via 
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hypothetical reasoning but it was later recruited also to enable the prediction of 
actions by other agents. With some additional functional elements, it evolved 
into a full-blown mindreading system. What seems to be a weakness of the 
model (see figure 3.4 in Nichols & Stich 2003, p. 87) is that the PWB gets 
direct input from the mindreader’s Belief Box but not from the Desire Box. In 
this respect, ST (e.g. as in Goldman’s version) seems to provide a more 
parsimonious and intuitively more plausible explanation, since it allows the 
mindreader’s cognitive system to create matching states (pretend-desires) rather 
than mere beliefs about desires. A related issue is that in Nichols and Stich’s 
model, people attribute to others by default only the content of their Belief Box 
but not the content of their Desire Box. However, there is evidence that people 
also tend to default-attribute to others their preferences and other desire-like 
states (Goldman, 2006, p. 167). Perhaps this issue can be easily fixed by adding 
a direct link between the PWB and the Desire Box.  
Another issue is that a clear-cut distinction between beliefs and desires is 
problematic – for example it would be difficult to classify evaluations as 
belonging to either category (Heal, 2005). Thus another possible solution might 
involve merging the Belief Box and the Desire Box. However, this would in 
turn require serious modifications to other parts of the model (ibid.).  
An equally serious worry is that Nichols and Stich do not explain how it is 
possible to attribute mental states that have no representational content, such as 
moods or somatic states (e.g. pains or itches). In their model, mindreading can 
proceed only via the PWB but the PWB is designed to compute mental states 
only in the format of propositional attitudes. Projecting a direct link from the 
Body-Monitoring Systems to the PWB is not likely to solve the issue because 
the PWB cannot handle mental states other than propositional attitudes.  
In sum, Stich and Nichols provide a complex boxological model of how the 
mindreading system may be built from simpler functional units. The model 
combines elements of TT and ST, as well as some original ideas.  Although it 
demonstrated how a hybrid account has the potential to explain a wider range of 
phenomena than any of the pure versions of TT or ST, this “eclectic” theory has 
remained highly speculative. 
 
 
2.6. Concluding remarks  
Although in the first years of intensive research on mindreading, the discussion 
evolved between different versions of TT, another player soon entered the 
game: ST. Instead of assuming that people rely on a rich body of law-like prin-
ciples on how different mental states interact and link to behaviour, simulation 
theorists started to defend the idea that people use their own mental mechanisms 
as models for simulating the mental processes of other individuals. For some 
years, the participants of the mindreading debate defended TT over ST or the 
other way around. More recently, hybrid accounts have started to prevail. After 
Nichols and Stich (2003) and Goldman (2006) came out with their hybrid 
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accounts, the state of the art of the mindreading debate can be portrayed in the 
words of Hutto (2009, p. 223):  
After years of marshalling philosophical considerations and evidence from 
psychology, few TT/ST purists remain; most researchers working on everyday 
psychology accept that the best hope of providing an adequate account of the 
relevant abilities will draw on resources from both camps. 
Thus the main question between defenders of TT and ST is no longer whether 
TT or ST is correct but rather how elements of TT and ST are best combined to 
explain human mindreading abilities. However, for the past decade or so, TT 
and ST haven’t been “the only games in town.” There is a new wave of 
theoretical approaches that are extremely critical of the whole framework that 
sees mindreading as the central ability in human social cognition. I will next 
turn to these new approaches and to how the standard theories of mindreading 
have been criticized.  
Theories of mindreading, either in the form of TT, ST or some combination 
of them, provide possible explanations for the basic mechanisms of self- and 
other-directed mental-state ascriptions and discuss how mindreading typically 
develops in childhood. They also offer possible explanations for various break-
downs of mindreading. All of this is done by appealing to empirical data that 
originates mostly from lab experiments, such as false belief tasks. However, as I 
will show in the next chapter, when theories of mindreading are construed as 
not only aiming to explain mindreading per se but as theories of human social 
cognition in general, they have serious limitations. The proponents of the 
standard theories of mindreading have taken for granted that mindreading is at 
the core of all human social cognitive abilities but this assumption has never 
been empirically tested. As the next chapter will make apparent, there are strong 
reasons to doubt that mindreading is ubiquitous in human social cognition.  
 
71 
3. AGAINST MINDREADING:  
THE INTERACTIONIST APPROACH 
  
The ‘theory of a theory of mind’ is little 
more than a compound of philosophical 
misconceptions and inappropriate 
experiments. 
Wes Sharrock and Jeff Coulter29 
 
 
Although the main accounts of mindreading – TT and ST – began to develop as 
rivals, they share a whole set of fundamental assumptions and methodological 
strategies. The agreement of TT and ST on basic issues concerning social 
cognition has made their union in the form of recent hybrid accounts possible 
(Hutto, 2009, p. 223). A deep-seated assumption of the mindreading approach is 
that we understand other people primarily in terms of their mental states: both 
TT and ST consider mindreading to be the key to human social cognition. 
Articles on mindreading frequently begin with a statement about the centrality 
of mindreading in human social cognition. For example, Frith and Happé (1999, 
p. 83) claim that mindreading “appears to be a prerequisite for normal social 
interaction: in everyday life we make sense of each other’s behaviour by appeal 
to a belief-desire psychology.” Currie and Sterelny (2000, p. 145) argue: ”mind-
reading and the capacity to negotiate the social world are not the same thing, but 
the former seems to be necessary for the latter.”  Cruz and Gordon (2002, p. 9) 
maintain that mindreading “makes possible the rich social dynamic that per-
vades human life.” Tager-Flusberg (2005, p. 276) writes: “successful social 
interactions depend on the ability to understand other people’s behavior in terms 
of their mental states, such as beliefs, desires, knowledge, and intentions.” The 
list could go on. 
Recent years have witnessed growing resistance to the standard theories of 
mindreading: the importance of mindreading for human social cognition is 
being called into question, predominantly (but not exclusively) by philosophers 
with a background in the phenomenological tradition and by proponents of 
embodied and enactive approaches to cognition. TT and ST are heavily 
criticized by authors such as Shaun Gallagher (2001, 2004, 2007, 2008a–e), 
Daniel D. Hutto (2004, 2008a–b, 2009), Vasudevi Reddy (1996, 2008, Reddy & 
Morris, 2004), Ivan Leudar and Alan Costall (2009a), Hanne De Jaegher and 
Ezequiel Di Paolo (De Jaegher, 2009a, 2009b, De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, De 
Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010), Matthew Ratcliffe (2006, 2007), and Dan 
Zahavi (2007, 2008, 2011). In the following, I introduce the recent critique of 
the mindreading paradigm and sketch the main ideas of an alternative approach 
                                                 
29  Sharrock and Coulter (2004, p. 580). 
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outlined by the critics. I will focus in particular on authors who argue that 
engaged second person interactions (carried out without the help of mind-
reading) are more fundamental in human social cognition than observational 
third person mindreading. I will use the term interactionism30 as a generic label 
for their approach. In the following six subsections, I will try to cover the 
central topics of the emerging interactionist framework.  
 
 
3.1. Changing the explanandum 
Interactionists argue that the mindreading approach is built on certain disputable 
philosophical assumptions that have been taken for granted and have not been 
critically investigated by researchers working within the mindreading paradigm. 
Thus the battle against the mindreading approach is largely a philosophical one. 
Proponents of theories of mindreading as well as interactionists agree that the 
general aim of studying human social cognition is to find out what enables 
people to understand and to interact with each-other. TT and ST imply that 
human social cognition relies on mindreading and explain mindreading as based 
on theorising and/or simulation. Interactionists, in contrast, argue not only 
against the view that mindreading relies on theorising or simulation31, they are 
also strongly opposed to the idea that research on social cognition should take 
mindreading as its main focus of study. For example, Ratcliffe (2007, p. 234) 
writes: “Any enquiry into the nature of interpersonal understanding ought to 
begin with an adequate explanandum, an account of what is distinctive and 
central to a typical understanding of people.” According to the view held by 
interactionists, mindreading is not an explanandum that is adequate for 
beginning the study of social cognition. They insist that instead of asking how 
people read minds, research on social cognition should begin by looking into 
how people interact in everyday life and explore what enables them to do so: 
                                                 
30  I acknowledge that there are differences between the positive proposals of the critics of 
the mindreading approach, but I will here focus on what they have in common: the 
conviction that the mindreading paradigm is seriously flawed. The positive accounts of the 
critics are still in an early state of development and constitute a preliminary general 
framework rather than a set of particular theories. See Michael (2011), Bohl & van den Bos 
(2012), Herschbach (2012), and Overgaard & Michael (2013) for a critical discussion of 
interactionism. 
31  According to the thesis of Direct Social Perception (see e.g. Gallagher, 2008b) that many 
interactionists consider to be a part of their positive account, some mental states are directly 
perceivable, and thus theorising or simulation are considered to be unnecessary for under-
standing behaviour as psychologically meaningful. As far as mental states that go beyond 
what can be directly perceived (even by the standards of the DSP thesis) are concerned, 
Shaun Gallagher has joined forces with Daniel Hutto, who argues for the Narrative Practice 
Hypothesis (see e.g. Hutto, 2008, Gallagher & Hutto, 2008, and Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). 
In a nutshell, the idea behind NPH is that children acquire a folk psychological competence 
as they are familiarized with certain types of narratives. NPH is, however, supported by only 
a few authors and as it is not central to interactionism as such, I will not dedicate much space 
to it here. 
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“investigating interaction is central to understanding social cognition.” (De 
Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010, p. 441) 
In the standard mindreading paradigm, it is common to equate social cog-
nition with an ability to explain and predict other individuals’ behaviour via 
mindreading. However, it is plausible that mindreading is not the only, nor the 
primary, means that enables people to achieve explanation and prediction of 
other people’s actions: people may anticipate and make sense of other people’s 
behaviour by means of social norms, social roles, character traits and various 
other characteristics that fall out of the scope of mindreading (Andrews, 2009, 
2012). Furthermore, to understand another person to whom you personally 
relate is not reducible to explaining or predicting her behaviour from a third 
person point of view (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 25). Interactionists conceptualize social 
understanding as “a pragmatic ability to act appropriately in a particular 
situation” (De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010, p. 442) rather than as a 
theoretical ability to explain and predict others’ behaviour via mindreading. 
Interactionists emphasize that mentalistic explanations and predictions do 
not exhaust our social competence and are less central to social interaction than 
is assumed by TT and ST (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 486). According to 
the critics, social cognition is primarily a matter of mutual responsiveness in 
everyday social practices rather than a matter of figuring out what is going on in 
another person’s mind (see e.g. Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 49). Authors with a back-
ground in enactivism have proposed, for example, that instead of mindreading, 
social interactions are based on an ability to perceive and act upon social 
affordances32 (Froese & Gallagher, 2012, p. 445). Interactionists characterize 
social cognition as a practical “know-how” (as opposed to theoretical “know-
what” or “know-why”) that enables us to initiate and sustain social interactions 
and to coordinate behaviour in various social situations. They point out that 
theories of mindreading hardly thematize, let alone explain, the issue of how 
people manage to appropriately respond to other people in particular social 
contexts. Interactionists point out that the limits of the standard mindreading 
approach become even more apparent when one considers breakdowns in social 
understanding: social understanding often fails because there is a lack of 
affective connection or engagement, not merely because people fail in their 
attributions of mental states (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 174).33 Some authors point out 
that social understanding includes not only an ability to understand others, but 
also “an ability to understand with others” (De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 
                                                 
32  The term ”affordance” was coined by James J. Gibson (1977, 1979). Affordances are pro-
perties of objects that allow inidividuals to perform certain actions. These properties are 
different for different individuals: for example, a chair allows a human to sit or to stand on it 
but it allows a cat to sleep on it or to use it as a means to get on the table. Social affordances 
are possibilities for interaction between two or more individuals. 
33  As I argue in appendix 3, mindmisreading may actually cause serious interpersonal 
problems and it is characteristic of certain psychopathologies, such as borderline personality 
disorder and schizophrenia. However, I agree that breakdowns of social understanding 
typically involve an affective component that theories of mindreading tend to ignore. 
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2010, p. 442, see also Gallagher, 2009).34 In social situations, a common under-
standing of many aspects of the world is taken for granted but theories of 
mindreading arguably ignore it.  
In short, interactionists argue that research on social cognition should first 
and foremost concentrate on the embodied and practical know-how that 
underlies real life social interactions instead of focusing on the issue of how 
individuals predict and explain other individual’s behaviour by representing 
their mental states. The critique of the mindreading paradigm is not just a matter 
of philosophy – changes in the philosophical theory necessarily lead to changes 
in research methodology. An important point of controversy concerns the issue 
of what should be seen as the main unit of analysis in research on social 
cognition. For theories of mindreading, the basic unit is an individual mind 
figuring out other individuals’ mental states. Interactionists are against such 
methodological individualism. Froese and Gallagher (2012, p. 437) even accuse 
theories of mindreading of “neuro-reductionism” – the view that the study of 
social cognition is exhausted by the study of sub-personal processes. The critics 
of theories of mindreading argue that the methodologically individualistic and 
neuro-reductive approach looses grip on what is essential to social cognition. 
Interpersonal processes are claimed to be exactly that – processes between 
persons, not just representations locked inside people’s heads (Reddy, 1996, 
Reddy & Morris, 2004, p. 653). Some interactionists argue that mental states 
can be literally shared among two or more people and are thus not necessarily 
owned by single individuals: “many thoughts, interpretations and viewpoints 
that emerge through conversation owe their creation to several people. They 
belong to nobody in particular and are shared products of interaction.” (Ratclif-
fe, 2007, p. 174, see also Gallagher, 2008a, p. 555, and Krueger, 2013) Inter-
actionists insist that social cognition cannot be studied without looking at 
situated social interactions between two or more embodied persons. They argue 
that a basic unit of analysis must minimally include two interacting subjects.  
The interactionist perspective feeds the overall criticism of the methodo-
logical limitations of the mindreading paradigm (see e.g. Ratcliffe 2007, pp. 
54–55 and 104–105). The main point is captured in the following quotation 
from Leudar and Costall (2009b, p. 11): 
… most of the Theory of Mind experiments substitute abstract puzzle-solving for 
situated, collaborative and embodied management of intentionality, with the 
result that they never really investigate the phenomena they are ultimately meant 
to explain. 
Most mindreading experiments indeed investigate how children or adults attri-
bute mental states to strangers (or puppets or cartoon characters) from a 
detached, third person point of view by passively observing a social scene. The 
                                                 
34  Some advocates of theories of mindreading, for example Jane Heal, acknowledge that 
social understanding is not just about understanding the mental states of the other person, it 
is also an understanding of the world as a common ground between people. 
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critics argue that such studies reveal little, if anything, about the way social 
cognition functions in real life engaged social interactions: “it is not clear that 
false belief tasks even require the same kind of cognitive performance as most 
interpersonal understanding and interaction” (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 105). The stan-
dard mindreading tasks are designed to identify the necessary elements of 
mindreading and to ascertain at what age children are able to attribute certain 
types of mental states. However, they provide no knowledge of how much 
children actually rely on mindreading in everyday social interactions. When and 
why people turn to mindreading in real life social situations has remained un-
studied, presumably because of the overall assumption that mindreading is 
ubiquitous in everyday social cognition (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 4). Interactionists, in 
contrast, claim that people in real life never rely on mindreading the way TT 
and ST assume35 (Ratcliffe, 2007), or that people rely on mindreading only in 
exceptional cases, for example when the other’s behaviour appears puzzling 
(Gallagher, 2001, p. 85).  
 
 
3.2. The chicken-and-egg problem:  
Mindreading or social interaction? 
When we shift the research focus from studying mindreading mechanisms to 
studying interactions between people, a question arises: is mindreading neces-
sary for social interaction, as TT and ST seem to assume? Interactionists con-
tend that it is not. The most radical critics of theories of mindreading (e.g. 
Ratcliffe, 2007) deny that mindreading has any psychological reality. Others 
concede that people sometimes attribute mental states but turn the claim that 
social interaction relies upon mindreading on its head, arguing that the 
development of mindreading presupposes basic non-mentalistic interpersonal 
abilities that are accomplished in embodied, emotional, and perceptual practices 
(see e.g. Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, p. 187). Reddy and Morris (2004, p. 660), 
for example, argue against TT as follows:  
Theorizing presupposes the knowledge of others that is evident in engagement. 
Reflections upon, and theories about, other people’s intentions and motivations 
do enter into everyday discourse, but these are developmentally and experien-
tially secondary to actual engagement with these intentions and motivations. The 
Theory-Theory has simply not taken early development and engagement 
seriously enough. 
Interactionists point out that young infants, adults with severe learning disabi-
lities, and even pets interact with people, although they lack meta-represen-
tational abilities (see e.g. Leudar and Costall, 2009b, p. 7). For instance, three-
year old children fail to demonstrate a capacity to attribute representational 
                                                 




mental states in standard false belief tasks, but they nevertheless successfully 
interact with the experimenters (Gallagher, 2008e, p. 441). Already very young 
infants actively participate in exchanges of emotional expressions with their 
caregivers (Reddy, 2008) and immediately notice if the contingency of smooth 
social coordination is disrupted, as demonstrated for example in the “still face” 
experiments (Weinberg & Tronick, 1996). Infants not only respond to social 
stimuli, but also initiate and actively contribute to sustaining social interaction: 
when a caregiver suddenly stops communicating and displays a still face over a 
period of time, infants typically try to “repair” the communication by actively 
vocalizing and gesturing, and become upset if the partner remains unresponsive. 
It has been shown that already 6-week-old infants are sensitive to contingencies 
in social coordination: they enjoy live social interaction with their mothers via a 
double video link, but become distracted and disturbed after the online stream is 
seamlessly replaced by a replay of their mother’s earlier communicative actions 
(Murray & Trevarthen, 1985). Infants quickly regain attention and positive 
affect after a second seamless shift to online interaction (Nadel et al., 2009). 
The general point of the interactionists is that in most social situations, people 
need to be able to socially interact with others and that for this purpose, 
mindreading is often unnecessary. In short, they argue that the proponents of 
theories of mindreading are simply wrong in assuming that social interaction 
presupposes mindreading.  
The chicken-and-egg problem of whether mindreading precedes social inter-
action or vice versa is actually not as black and white as it may seem from the 
way interactionists present it. Most proponents of the mindreading paradigm 
explicitly acknowledge that the development of mindreading proper relies on 
other, more basic abilities: for example, in Baron-Cohen’s theory, the Mind-
reading Mechanism can only develop if the Intentionality Detector, Eye 
Direction Detector and the Shared Attention Mechanism function properly 
(Baron-Cohen, 1997; see section 2.3.2 of the current summary article). Further-
more, Baron Cohen and Cross (1992) have explicitly argued for the importance 
of perception in social cognition. Advocates of the mindreading approach are 
unlikely to question the claim that some forms of social interaction are possible 
without mindreading – after all, many non-human social species interact with-
out displaying any evidence that they are able to attribute mental states. What 
the proponents of the mindreading approach do assume is that mindreading is 
necessary for full-blown human social competence. It is assumed that when 
children begin to mindread, they acquire more sophisticated and more efficient 
means for social understanding and interaction (Spaulding, 2010, pp. 125–128). 
Early non-mentalistic abilities for social interaction are considered to be 
necessary but insufficient for full-blown human social cognition; they are seen 
as mere precursors36 to mature social cognitive abilities. According to inter-
                                                 
36  Gallagher (2008c, p. 165) defines ‘precursor’ as an ability that disappears when the ‘real’ 
capability – mindreading – takes over in course of development. He argues that non-
mentalistic abilities are not precursors to mindreading in this sense. This use of the term in 
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actionists, however, non-mentalistic social abilities remain central to social 
cognition throughout life, and in most social situations, social interaction and 
social understanding is arguably achieved without the help of mindreading 
(Gallagher, 2008c). This brings me to the issue that the negative claims of 
interactionists about the insignificance of mindreading are actually as specula-
tive as the claim that mindreading is ubiquitous in human social cognition. 
Interactionists correctly point out that in the framework of theories of mind-
reading, embodied non-mentalistic abilities for social interaction have not been 
seriously investigated. However, as I argue in appendices 1 and 3, the exact role 
of mindreading in human social cognition needs further empirical investigation. 
In appendix 2 I show that the critique of the mindreading approach is partly 
targeted at a straw man rather than at theories of mindreading properly 
understood. 
One argument that supports the view that people may mindread rarely rather 
than all the time, is that mindreading may be too complex to be an efficient tool 
for social interaction. Several philosophers from the analytic tradition have 
argued that mindreading is cognitively too demanding to enable the swift and 
effortless social coordination that we typically experience most of the time 
while socializing (see e.g. Morton, 1996, 2003, Bermudez, 2003; for counter-
arguments, see Spaulding, 2010). Morton (1996) highlights three basic 
problems with mindreading: holism, entanglement, and complexity. Holism is a 
serious problem especially for TT, but potentially also for ST: it is virtually 
impossible to judge which mental states underlie any particular action when 
“any belief or any desire can be rationally consistent with any action, given 
suitable other beliefs and desires” (Morton, 1996, p. 128)37. Entanglement 
means that many of our decisions are related to outcomes that depend on the 
decisions of other people; it means that any decision on the part of one person 
changes the information on which the decisions of everyone else is based. If 
social interaction were based on mindreading, choosing what to do in a social 
situation would become an enormously complex task, especially when more 
than two people are involved in an interaction. Morton (1996, 2003) proposes 
that instead of mindreading, people base most of their social decisions and 
predictions on the assumption that others usually act according to shared norms. 
Likewise, Bermúdez (2003, p. 47) argues that mindreading in multi-agent inter-
actions leads easily to combinatorial explosion and computational intractability, 
and maintains that we turn to mindreading “not as a mainstray of our social 
understanding, but rather as the last resort.” However, even if these authors are 
right that mindreading is too complex to be a necessary component of all social 
interaction, and if it is true that people mindread only in rare cases, a question 
still remains: what kind of cases are they and why has the ability to attribute 
                                                                                                                       
the context of social cognition is, however, misleading: no one has defended the view that 
once children become capable of mindreading, their non-mentalistic social abilities cease to 
function. For example, in Baron-Cohen’s modular theory, the three modules (ID, EDD, and 
SAM) mature before ToMM, and continue to provide input for ToMM throughout life. 
37 See also my discussion of the frame problem in 2.3.1. 
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mental states evolved in the first place? In other words: what is the function of 
mindreading? Neither theories of mindreading nor the interactionist accounts 
provide a satisfactory answer to this question.   
 
 
3.3. Embodied social cognition 
According to interactionists, many flaws of the mindreading approach stem 
from a presupposed “disembodied” cognitivist framework which implies a gap 
between the mental and the physical (Reddy, 2008, Leudar & Costall, 2009a, 
Sharrock & Coulter, 2004). Interactionists often begin their critique of the 
mindreading approach by arguing against the view that mental states, unlike 
behaviour, are unobservable. Allegedly, a fundamental presupposition under-
lying theories of mindreading is the assumption that other minds are completely 
unobservable, which erroneously motivates the postulation of special mind-
reading mechanisms, such as theorising or simulation (c.f. Gallagher & Zahavi, 
2008, Gallagher, 2004, 2008b, Zahavi & Gallagher, 2008, Zahavi, 2007, 2005, 
Zahavi & Parnas, 2003, Leudar & Costall, 2009b, Hutto, 2009, Reddy, 2008, 
Ratcliffe, 2007). According to intractionists, TT and ST deny that we can ever 
truly experience other people’s mentality (and in the case of TT, even our own 
mentality) – other minds remain mere chimera that we need to infer or imagine, 
but can never truly meet. Interactionists propose that instead of the Neo-
Cartesian assumption that postulates a gap between the mental and the physical, 
and thereby also between any two minds, a more adequate starting point would 
be to assume that “human beings are primordially connected in their subjecti-
vity.” (Zlatev et al., 2008, p. 3) 
 On the basis of phenomenological arguments and enactive and embodied 
accounts of cognition, a sharp distinction between mental and bodily states is 
denied by interactionists. Bodily expressions are taken to be parts of mental 
states. If so, this would imply that mental states are sometimes directly 
perceived, rather than merely inferred: 
Gestures, expressions and actions are not just external expressions of internal 
thought processes; they are part of those processes. Hence we really can per-
ceive, to some extent, the mental lives of others. (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 148).  
This view is known as the thesis of Direct Social Perception (DSP), and many 
interactionists consider it to be a part of their positive account. According to 
DSP, it is possible to perceive (some of) other people’s mental states because 
mental states are embodied in expressive behaviour, and because perception is a 
relatively “smart” process, able to deliver not only thin sensory information 
about physical behaviour, but also the thick psychological meaning of it 
(Gallagher, 2008b). In the interactionist framework, mirror neurons and other 
neural resonance processes are taken to be a part of the mechanism of social 
perception rather than processes that rely on simulation apart from perception 
(Gallagher, 2007). Behaviourism is carefully avoided by emphasizing that 
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mental states are not reducible to observable behaviour: mental states are said to 
transcend their bodily expressions (Zahavi, 2007), but behavioural expression is 
nevertheless conceptualized as being literally a part of mental states. DSP is 
supported by empirical evidence which indicates that bodily expression is 
experienced as an essential aspect of certain mental states. For example, people 
with Moebius syndrome38, who are unable to express emotions facially, tend to 
have diminished experience of affect (Cole, 2010, Krueger & Overgaard, 2012). 
Various studies suggest that gestures serve as thinking and memorizing aids (see 
the review of Goldin-Meadow, 1999, and Ratcliffe, 2007, pp. 147–148).  
Unfortunately, the claim that theories of mindreading assume that we can 
only perceive meaningless physical behaviour and need to add an extra layer of 
psychological interpretation on top of it, is a straw man. Theories of mind-
reading indeed tend to underestimate the role of embodiment in social 
cognition, but as I will show in appendix 2, the interactionist attack against the 
alleged unobservability assumption of theories of mindreading is misplaced and 
confuses the discussion. Proponents of theories of mindreading do not deny that 
people sometimes have an experience of simply seeing another person as being 
in a certain mental state, for example, as happy, bored, or worried. Nobody 
questions the view that actions are typically perceived as psychologically 
meaningful (“he waves goodbye”), rather than as sequences of mechanical 
bodily movements in need of interpretation (“he raises his upper limb and 
moves it back and forth in the air”). The real controversy between the mind-
reading accounts and the interactionist view of direct social perception lies in 
how the sub-personal processes that underlie mindreading, including the 
experiences of directly apprehending another person’s mental states, are 
conceptualized, not in whether such experiences exist.  
As far as embodiment is concerned, a shortcoming of the accounts of mind-
reading that is more serious than their alleged adoption of an unobservability 
assumption is their insensitivity to the role of bodily responsiveness in social 
cognition. Neonate imitation studies (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983) 
demonstrate that newborns are already responsive to certain facial expressions. 
Interactionists argue that neonate imitation occurs not because, as theory-
theorists suggest, infants are able to theorise as soon as they are born (see my 
discussion of Gopnik’s view that suggests this in section 2.3.1.), but because 
there is an inborn cross-modal link between the structure of one’s own body and 
the bodies of other people at the level of perception, affect and proprioception 
(Gallagher & Meltzoff, 199639, Gallagher, 2004). Even low-level simulation 
accounts that pay more attention to affective and sensory-motor processes than 
TT (as for example in Goldman, 2006) fail to do justice to the role of bodily 
responsiveness (Gallagher, 2008c, p. 170). When I interact with you, various 
                                                 
38  Moebious syndrome is a congenital neurological disorder which is characterized by facial 
paralysis.   
39  Andrew Meltzoff has co-authored with both, Alison Gopnik (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997), 
and Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996). He seems to support different inter-
pretations of the imitation studies, depending on whom he is writing with. 
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affective and sensory-motor processes arise in my body and directly feed into 
my experience, affect my behaviour and inform my understanding of you and of 
the whole situation, thus influencing the whole social interaction. ST of low-
level mindreading focuses on explaining how one recognizes emotions and 
motor intentions in another person by registering their facial expressions and 
bodily gestures, but the issue of how one reacts to perceived mental states, and 
how the reaction forms a part of the understanding of the situation, is not raised 
(see also Bohl & van den Bos, 2012, p. 4). For example, neither TT nor ST 
discuss how a person’s affective response (e.g. fear) to a partner’s perceived 
mental state (e.g. anger) affects social interaction.  
 
 
3.4. Second person versus third person mode  
of social cognition   
It has become a part of the interactionist agenda to emphasize the prevalence of 
the second person mode of social cognition in contrast to the third person mode 
(see Ratciffe 2007, pp. 152–155, Reddy, 2008, pp. 26–42, Reddy & Morris, 
2004, Gallagher 2001, 2007, 2009). The distinction between the second person 
and the third person modes of interpersonal understanding derives from respec-
tive grammatical categories expressed by personal pronouns. Interactionists 
have more than just a grammatical artefact in mind, however: by differentiating 
between the third person and the second person modes of social cognition, they 
aim to highlight the distinction between observing others from a detached point 
of view and being engaged in reciprocal social interaction. Unlike the third 
person (he/she), the second person (you) exists only in relation to I: it emerges 
when one directly addresses and/or is being addressed by another person. 
Drawing on Martin Buber’s “Ich und Du” (1923) and the works of classical 
phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger, Aron Gurwitsch and Alfred Schütz 
(see Ratcliffe, 2007), interactionists argue that observational third person under-
standing of others develops against a backdrop of second person interactions 
and thus that the second person mode of social cognition is more fundamental 
than the third person mode (Gallagher, 2001, De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007,  
p. 503).  
Developmental psychologist Vasudevi Reddy (1996) was the first to point 
out (in the context of mindreading) that people primarily understand each-other 
using “second person information.” For Reddy, second person information is 
something that becomes evident in interpersonal emotional engagement40, 
giving access to aspects of another person’s intentionality that otherwise remain 
inaccessible (Reddy, 1996, p. 140). In Reddy’s example, seeing a person smiling 
                                                 
40  For Reddy, emotional engagement refers to mutual emotional responsiveness that arises 
in social interactions. Other authors also talk about engagement, but they may have some-
thing different in mind. For example, De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher (2010, p. 442) 
define engagement as capturing ”the qualitative aspect of social interaction once it starts to 
‘take over’ and acquires a momentum of its own.” 
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at a third person and seeing a person smiling at you are qualitatively different 
experiences: In the latter case, what you see of the person and what you feel in 
response become intermingled as aspects of the same experience. 
Within active emotional engagement your perception of the other always in-
volves proprioceptive experience of self-feelings-for-the-other, and your pro-
prioception of the self always involves perception of other-feelings-for-self. 
(Reddy 2008, p. 30).  
When someone smiles at you, you are called upon to respond (even not 
responding will count as a response), which is not the case when you see some-
body smiling at a third person. 
The importance of the “second personal” way of understanding others is em-
phasized in various expressions like “second person information” (Reddy, 
1996), “second-person interaction” (Gallagher, 2001, 2004, 2007, 2009, Rat-
cliffe, 2006), “second-person relationship” (Gallagher, 2004), “second 
person(al) contexts” (Hutto, 2004; De Bruin & Strijbos, 2010), “second-person 
stance” (Ratcliffe, 2006), “second-person perspective” (Gallagher, 2009, Reddy, 
2008) etc. Reddy (2008), emphasizing the role of second person information in 
social cognition, even calls her account of social cognition “a second-person 
approach” and argues that research of social cognition needs to turn to “second-
person methodology” (p. 32–39) , i.e. to participatory methods. On a closer 
look, speaking about the “second person” turns out to be somewhat confusing, 
however, because the expression as such does not refer to any clear and well 
defined category and there is a lack of consensus on how to define it. Different 
authors focus on different aspects of social cognition when they talk about the 
“second person” in contrast to the “third person.” For example, Reddy high-
lights the difference between being emotionally engaged and being emotionally 
detached, whereas Gallagher accentuates the difference between interacting 
with others and merely observing or thinking about others. Emotional engage-
ment and social interaction often go together, but they may also come apart: 
sometimes observing another person or merely thinking about someone triggers 
a strong emotional response towards that person in the absence of any social 
interaction, whereas social interactions may take place in the absence of emo-
tional engagement.  
One option is to go back to grammatical categories and to assume that 
whatever a second person mode of social cognition includes, at its core is an 
understanding of another person as a you. Ratcliffe (2007, p. 152) explicitly 
defines “the distinction between second-person and third-person understanding” 
as “the difference between understanding someone as a ‘you’ and understanding 
someone as a ‘he’ or ‘she’.” But in this case, it is not obvious in what sense the 
second person understanding is more fundamental than the third person under-
standing, as interactionists insist. From an early age, we not only interact with 
others from a second person perspective, we also observe them from a third 
person point of view. So both perspectives seem to be equally present in early 
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childhood. Later in life, social interactions involve not only dyadic (I-you) 
interactions, but also triadic (I-you-he/she) interactions (Cleret de Langavant et 
al, 2013). Our real life social encounters constantly shift between those that can 
be described by using a second person pronoun and those that can be described 
by using a third person pronoun. Furthermore, if we draw on grammatical cate-
gories, we cannot avoid the fact that having three person categories is not 
universal across languages: “many non-Indo-European languages have four 
person categories, not three, adding a ‘first-person inclusive’ to denote the union 
of speaker and addressee” (Evans, 2013). Unlike in Western individualist 
societies, in collectivist cultures in Asia and other parts of the world, the first-
person inclusive may be seen as the most fundamental social category rather 
than the second person, which suggests that people may experience daily social 
encounters quite differently in different cultures. 
Presumably, what interactionists have in mind when they talk about the 
fundamentality of the “second person” in social cognition is something more 
primordial and universal than the grammatical categories – something that 
exists before children have acquired language and learned to experience the 
world through linguistic categories. Thus it might be more adequate to under-
stand the “second person” as a metaphor that has come to be used as a short-
hand for talking about some basic aspects of interpersonal understanding that 
the critics of the mindreading account wish to emphasize. It is used to point out 
that social interaction and emotional engagement are two important (although 
not necessarily always co-occurring) components of social cognition that any 
comprehensive account of social cognition needs to explain. The ambiguity in 
the use of the term “second person” has motivated attempts to find ways to 
formulate some crucial aspects of social cognition more clearly. For example, 
Monika Dullstein (2012), drawing on ideas from Stanley Cavell (1976), pro-
poses that the difference between third person and second person understanding 
should be conceptualized as a distinction between knowing others (having 
justified true beliefs about other minds) and acknowledging others (responding 
to others appropriately). Recently, under the heading of the “second person,” 
neuroscientists have also started to look for new conceptual and methodological 
tools to study social cognition as an interactive process. For example, Schilbach 
et al. (2013) recently published a target article in Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences entitled “Towards a second person neuroscience,” where they propose 
to operationalize the “second person” by using interaction and emotional en-
gagement as two parameters that can be manipulated in an experimental design.  
 
 
3.5. Social interaction as constitutive  
of social cognition  
Interactionists emphasize that it is important to study people while they interact 
with others in real life rather than while they merely observe others in impo-
verished lab conditions, because different cognitive processes are involved in 
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the two conditions. They expect that research on social interaction will reveal 
that while interacting, people do not actually rely on mindreading, but instead 
make use of perceptual and sensory-motor abilities and non-mentalistic 
understanding of shared contexts.  
Interactionists argue that a further reason to focus on social interactions is 
that social interaction is more than simply a sum of individual processes; it is 
“not reducible to the workings of individual cognitive mechanisms” (De 
Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010, p. 441). However, not any kind of action 
of two or more individuals sharing a physical space is an interaction – 
interaction involves mutual influence or coupling41 between two or more agents. 
De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher (2010, pp. 442–443) propose the following 
definition for social interaction: “Two or more autonomous agents co-regulating 
their coupling with the effect that their autonomy is not destroyed and their 
relational dynamics acquire an autonomy of their own.” In other words, inter-
action of two or more agents which acquires its own momentum, but does not 
destroy the autonomy of the interacting agents42, is what interactionists consider 
social interaction to be. That  interaction processes have an autonomy of their 
own is most clearly seen in cases wherein social interaction emerges or carries 
on despite the efforts of the participants to avoid or to terminate it. Here is a 
simple example by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 493): 
Consider the situation in a narrow corridor when two people walking in opposite 
directions have to get past each other. They have to decide whether to continue 
walking as they are, or shift their movement to the right or to the left. Oc-
casionally, such encounters unfold like this. Instead of choosing complementary 
movements that would allow them to carry on walking, the individuals move 
into mirroring positions at the same time. This unintended coordinated change in 
individual position creates a symmetrical mirroring relation. This symmetry, in 
combination with the spatial constraints of the corridor, increases the likelihood 
that the next move will also be a mirroring one (there are not many other moves 
available). Thus, the coordination maintains a property of the relational dyna-
mics that forces the individuals to keep facing each other and consequently to 
remain in interaction (in spite of, or rather because of, their efforts to break from 
this situation). 
This example is meant to demonstrate that a system of two or more interacting 
social agents has special properties that are irreducible to properties of single 
individuals. According to the view of DeJaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher, social 
interaction is not just a result of the social cognitive processes of the parti-
cipating individuals, but it is partly sustained by the unfolding of the interaction 
process itself: “the agents sustain the encounter, and the encounter itself influen-
                                                 
41  Coupling is a central concept in the enactivist theory, which refers to one-sided or mutual 
influence between the parameters of two or more systems (see De Jaegher, Di Paolo & 
Gallagher, 2010, p. 441). 
42  “If one agent becomes the sole regulator of the coupling, as in the use of a tool, this is no 
longer social interaction.” (ibid. p. 444) 
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ces the agents” (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 492). In short, interactionsts 
argue that in some cases social interaction enables, and may even constitute43 
social cognition: “interactive processes are more than a context for social 
cognition: they can complement and even replace individual mechanisms.” (De 
Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010, p. 441) 
Inspired by the ideas associated with extended cognition, interactionists 
argue that cognitive processes are not limited to what is happening inside the 
skull; they are partly offloaded onto the environment and to the interaction 
dynamics. In social interaction, coordination – a non-accidental correlation in 
the activity of the two or more systems44 – plays an important role. Inter-
actionists point out that coordination is widespread not only in social systems, 
but also in many physical and biological systems – for example, pendulum 
clocks synchronise over time when placed in each other’s vicinity (De Jaegher 
& Di Paolo, 2007, p. 490). “If pendulum clocks can do it without mechanisms 
for “timing the beat” and “forming a temporal estimate”, why can’t babies?” 
(ibid. p. 499), they ask. Since many non-social systems achieve coordination via 
physical and biological mechanisms without having any special mechanisms for 
cognitively representing the properties of the world, it is possible that human 
social coordination also makes direct use of such physical and biological 
mechanisms so that aspects of the interaction dynamics themselves, not just the 
individual cognitive processes, allow the interaction to be sustained. Thereby 
they appeal to parsimony: “Why develop a complicated internal capacity when 
the environment can do the job for you?” (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 108)  
In order to better understand the interactionist point about social interaction 
enabling or constituting social cognition, let me come back to the experiment 
involving young infants who interact with their mothers via a double video 
monitor (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985). Why does the behaviour of the infant 
change when the live video stream of their mother is replaced by an earlier 
recording? An individualist explanation appeals to special cognitive mecha-
nisms that infants presumably have for detecting contingency and for noticing 
the lack of contingency, in which case their behaviour changes. An interactionist 
explanation gives the interaction process an enabling or a constitutive role: an 
infant’s behaviour changes because the properties of the system of one-sided 
coordination is much less stable and more difficult to sustain than reciprocal 
coordination (see De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, pp. 489–490, and De Jaegher, 
Di Paolo & Gallagher, 2010, p. 441). 
                                                 
43  De Jaegher, Di Paolo & Gallagher (2010, p. 443) distinguish between contextual, 
enabling, and constitutive factors and define them as follows: ”F is a contextual factor if 
variations in F produce variations in X”, ”C is an enabling condition if the absence of C 
prevents X from occurring” and ”P isa constitutive element if P is part of the processes that 
produce X.” 
44  De Jaegher, Di Paoplo and Gallagher (2010, p. 441) define coordination as “non-
accidental correlation in the activity of two or more systems that are coupled at present or 
were coupled in the past, or are or were coupled to another system in common, over and 
above what is expected from their normal behaviour in the absence of such couplings.” 
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3.6. Contextual understanding  
In most social situations, other people appear to us primarily as agents whose 
actions are framed in their practical activities and the meaning of their beha-
viour is not only expressed in embodied actions, gestures and facial expressions, 
it is also supported by the wider context of the situation. This means that in 
order to have an optimal understanding of other people’s actions and in order to 
be able to act appropriately in social situations, one needs to have an adequate 
understanding of the context of the situation.  
Interactionists, especially Shaun Gallagher (see e.g. Gallagher, 2004, 2005, 
2008c, 2012, Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, Gallagher & Hutto, 2008, Froese & 
Gallagher, 2012), have been inspired by Colwyn Trevarthen’s notions of pri-
mary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979) and secondary intersubjectivity 
(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). Primary intersubjectivity, already manifest in the 
behaviour of the newborn, refers to early, embodied capacities for “face-to-
face” interaction that rely upon direct perception of emotions and intentions, as 
well as upon bodily and affective responsiveness. At around 12 months of age, 
children enter into secondary intersubjectivity: they start to display abilities for 
shared attention and begin to tie actions to pragmatic contexts. According to 
Gallagher (2008c), primary and secondary intersubjectivity remain at the core 
of our social competence throughout life and constitute the non-mentalistic 
basis for human social cognition.  
Interactionists criticize theories of mindreading for not providing any 
comprehensive explanation of the role of contextual understanding of social 
situations, and for putting the whole emphasis on attributions of mental states as 
causes or reasons for actions (see e.g. Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 150). In contrast, 
interactionists insist that usually people are not trying to get into other people’s 
minds, but rather into their worlds by entering into and creating shared practical 
contexts (Gallagher, 2007, p. 354). According to Ratcliffe (2007, p. 150), we 
interpret actions "by progressively adding layers of surrounding situational 
context and moving ‘outward’, rather than by moving ‘inward’ and postulating 
internal states as causes.” Interactionists also hypothesise that serious problems 
with intersubjective understanding, such as in people with autism, involve 
difficulties with contextual understanding rather than problems with mental 
state attributions (Gallagher, 2001). But how does contextual understanding 
work in healthy subjects? 
Gallagher and Zahavi analyse the importance of practical contexts by 
drawing on the classical phenomenological descriptions of the life-world by 
Husserl, Heidegger, Gurwitsch and other phenomenologists (Zahavi, 2005, 
Gallagher, 2012, Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). With Hutto they argue that in the 
process of becoming language users, children are immersed in various narrative 
practices and thereby gradually acquire a more complex understanding of 
broader cultural and social contexts and learn to think about reasons for actions 
(see Hutto, 2008a–b, Gallagher & Hutto, 2008, Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008). 
Ratcliffe (2007, p. 58–120) emphasises that people take for granted that they 
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live in the same world with others and argues that people let the shared world 
do a lot of the work of facilitating social cognition. The shared world, however, 
is not just the physical world we live in – it is a world of social norms and 
conventions, which regulate social behaviour, arguably without mindreading 
(see Ratcliffe, 2007, pp. 58–60). In other words, it is not that mindreading 
enables us to figure out that our understanding of the world largely overlaps 
with how other people understand the world, but any act of mindreading already 
presupposes the existence of such common ground:  
An understanding that at least some aspects of a situation are shared is not 
assigned to others in the form of a belief system but presupposed. For example, 
when trying to pass a person in a busy shop, one might think ‘he wants to get to 
the checkout’ but one would not ordinarily think ‘he believes he is in a shop’. 
(Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 57) 
De Bruin & Strijbos (2010) similarly argue that in many social situations, the 
practical context of the situation is interpersonally shared, so that other people’s 
actions appear as directly comprehensible and there is no need to draw on 
explicit or implicit inferences about the context in order to figure out their 
reasons for action. They hypothesise that when another person’s reasons for 
action remain unclear and it is important to get them right, people typically 
engage in reason conversations: they ask for reasons either from the agent or 
from other people who may know better. De Bruin and Strijbos propose that 
people only turn to mindreading, which is a highly fallible strategy, in cases 
where it is either unimportant to get the other person’s reasons right, or when it 
is for some reason inappropriate or impossible to ask about them from the agent 
or from other people. They are also sympathetic to the idea that mindreading 
may be more adequately characterized as a regulative, rather than a descriptive, 
practice. The idea of mindreading being a regulative device has been elaborated 
by Mameli (2001), McGeer (2007), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013), whom I would 
classify as non-interactionist critics of the standard theories of mindreading. I 
discuss their ideas more thoroughly in appendix 3, where I hypothesise that 
mindreading may serve the purpose of regulating relationships.  
To be fair, most theories of mindreading have tried to accommodate the 
existence of a large amount of shared beliefs about the world and acknowledge 
the need to include contextual information in the process of mindreading. For 
example, recall the argument that mindreading cannot be strongly modular, 
because contextual information needs to be part of the mindreading process (see 
section 2.3.2.). According to child-scientist versions of TT, folk-psychological 
principles depend on ceteris paribus clauses; i.e. it is assumed that in any parti-
cular act of mindreading, the context of the interpreted behaviour needs to be 
taken into account when selecting the appropriate principles  for a particular 
situation (Bruin & Strijbos, 2010, p. 260).  One of the biggest challenges for TT 
is to explain how folk-psychological principles are selected in any particular 
context – this issue is part of the notorious frame problem (see section 2.3.1.). 
According to ST, people assume, as a default strategy, that other people have the 
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same beliefs about the world as they do. According to the theory of Nichols and 
Stich (2003), at the beginning of the mindreading process, the mindreader 
includes all of her own beliefs in the Possible World Box. But simulation-based 
theories need to explain how the mindreading system calculates interpersonal 
discrepancies, and here contextual information comes into play. In cases of 
high-level mindreading, for example, the system needs to select appropriate 
input states for simulation and such selection mechanism needs to reckon with 
the context. In sum, in order to explain how mindreading works in different 
contexts, TT needs to explain how the system calculates the relevance of 
different folk-psychological principles and ST needs to explain how the system 
selects appropriate pretend states for simulation; in both cases, the problem of 
computational complexity is lurking behind the scenes (see De Bruin & 
Strijbos, 2010, p. 260).  
Whereas theories of mindreading assume that our contextual knowledge of 
the shared world mainly functions as input for mindreading, interactionists 
argue that most of the time, contextual understanding of situations enables suc-
cessful interaction with, and successful understanding of, others without mind-
reading. For instance, Ratcliffe (2007, p. 90) argues against ST that instead of 
predicting what another person will decide to do based on simulating what I 
would decide to do in her situation (or in Gordon’s version of ST – what I 
would do if I was the other person), people are more likely to simply anticipate 
that other people typically behave according to shared norms. Moreover, if a 
person transgresses a social norm, she not only becomes incomprehensible to 
others, but a subject of criticism and, in more serious cases, social sanctions: 
“we make each other predictable by putting norms in the world for all to follow 
and also by interacting with each other in such a way as to influence behaviour 
so that it conforms to a greater degree with norms.” (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 18)  
Interactionists are not the first to emphasize the role of social norms in social 
cognition. Several non-interactionist critics of the mainstream theories of 
mindreading, and even some proponents of the standard theories of mindreading 
themselves – such as Jane Heal – stress the importance of norms in social 
cognition. Whereas Heal (2003) mainly speaks about norms of rationality that 
govern our thinking and mindreading, Morton (1996) and Bermúdez (2003) 
propose that normative understanding of social situations is related to an 
understanding of the social roles of the given culture. In a typical restaurant 
scene, for example, there is usually no need to attribute mental states to the 
waiter to be able to understand what he is doing and why, insofar as he behaves 
according to his role (Bermúdez, 2003, pp. 43–44). It is part of the role of being 
a waiter to bring the menu to the table and to ask from the customers what they 
would like to have, just like it is a part of the role of the customer to order a 
meal and to pay for it before leaving the restaurant. Kristin Andrews (2009, 
2012) claims that implicit knowledge of social norms of one’s community is 
fundamental to social cognition and presupposed by mindreading. On her 
account, people mindread in order to explain behaviour that violates shared 
norms, which suggests that mindreading presupposes an understanding of social 
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norms. According to Zawidzki (2008, 2013), mindreading is only possible 
because various normative and educational social practices shape our minds and 
behaviour to be interpersonally comprehensible, and in his theory, mindreading 
itself is a specific tool for mindshaping.  
In short, interactionists draw attention to the necessity of including the issue 
of contextual understanding in research on social cognition, but their 
explanations of the cognitive processes that enable contextual understanding are 
still in infancy: a comprehensive theory of contextual social cognition is yet to 
be worked out. At the same time, some non-interactionist critics of the standard 
theories of mindreading have proposed more detailed accounts of how social 
norms and roles support social cognition. 
 
 
3.7. Concluding remarks 
In sum, interactionists argue that mindreading is not what enables people to 
understand and interact with each other in most real life situations and that the 
mentalistic assumption is merely an unfortunate idea of philosophers and 
psychologists rooted in a certain philosophical background. The assumption that 
mindreading is the key to human social cognition has directed the way in which 
empirical research has been carried out in the standard mindreading framework. 
Social cognition of children and adults has been studied mainly in experimental 
conditions of low ecological validity, devoid of reciprocal social interaction and 
real life situational context. In such experiments, subjects have typically ob-
served social scenes and have thereby been forced to mindread, because more 
natural and embodied ways of social understanding have been ruled out by the 
experimental design. This in turn has kept the underlying theoretical implication 
unchallenged: since the majority of empirical studies call for mindreading, it 
has been easy to continue thinking that mindreading is ubiquitous in social 
cognition.  
In contrast, interactionists insist that instead of focusing on mindreading, 
research of social cognition needs to shift its focus to social interaction. They 
argue that for the most part, people interact with and understand each other on 
the basis of non-mentalistic interactive abilities, such as direct perception, 
bodily responsiveness, and non-mentalistic contextual understanding of shared 
situations. They also emphasize that social interaction is not just a result of 
social cognition, it in turn scaffolds social cognition, thus being an enabling, 
and possibly even a constitutive, factor of social cognition. In the interactionist 
framework, only a minimal role is given to mindreading. Interactionists 
typically claim that people mindread only in rare cases; for example when the 
other’s behaviour appears particularly puzzling. 
My main worry with interactionism is that in arguing that mindreading is 
peripheral to social cognition, interactionists have gone to the extreme and have 
thrown the baby out with the bath water. The claim that mindreading is absent 
in most social situations is actually just as speculative as the claim that 
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mindreading is ubiquitous in human social cognition: it is currently not sup-
ported by empirical evidence. The fact that theories of mindreading are based 
on studies in which people primarily observe others instead of interacting with 
them is not a reason to discredit theories of mindreading completely. It is 
undeniable that also in real life, people sometimes observe other people and 
think about other people’s mental states. Theories of mindreading provide so far 
the most elaborate explanations of such cases of social cognition. If mind-
reading plays no important role in social cognition, as the interactionists claim, 
why has the ability to attribute mental states evolved at all? In fact, it has been 
shown that children pass interactive versions of false belief tasks earlier than the 
classical observational false belief tasks (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2009, Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012), which suggests that interactive contexts 
may facilitate mindreading rather than prevent it. What needs to be studied is 
how non-mentalistic interactive abilities and mindreading both contribute to 
human social cognition. Then it will also be possible to spell out the specific 
role of mindreading that neither theories of mindreading nor interactionism 
have captured so far.   
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
My dissertation contributes to the interdisciplinary study of human social cog-
nition. The main aim of the thesis is to explain why we need to move beyond 
the current two-sided debate between theories of mindreading and inter-
actionism, and to demonstrate how new research questions and hypotheses grow 
out of an integrative approach.  
The dissertation consists of a general summary article and three theoretical 
research articles that have been published in international peer-reviewed 
journals (appendices 1–3). The summary article begins with a chapter on metho-
dology, where I consider different ways of applying philosophical methods in 
the interdisciplinary study of social cognition. I discuss how philosophical 
competence can contribute to interdisciplinary research on social cognition in 
general, and I explain how it contributed to the research articles that form the 
main part of my dissertation. Most importantly, I show that philosophical com-
petence is applicable in the critical evaluation of theoretical frameworks and 
methodologies of ongoing research paradigms. Training in philosophy is crucial 
in interdisciplinary research, as it fosters the asking of questions at the inter-
section of different disciplines and thereby contributes to the development of 
new hypotheses and research methods. At the same time, it facilitates systematic 
reflection upon how theoretical claims and empirical results of different 
disciplines and paradigms hang together or contradict one another, and enables 
to build novel and more comprehensive theoretical frameworks. Another area 
where philosophical competence is particularly helpful is conceptual 
clarification, especially in the form of the analysis of existing conceptual frame-
works and in the process of “tailoring” new concepts for specific theoretical 
purposes. I also look at the potential role of phenomenology in the inter-
disciplinary research of social cognition and show that besides reinterpreting 
scientific findings in a phenomenological framework, or using phenome-
nological descriptions as explananda for social cognition research, it is possible 
to do neurophenomenological experiments on social cognition and to “front-
load” phenomenological insights on social cognition into experimental design.  
I begin chapter 2 by introducing early mindreading studies and continue by 
outlining the standard theories of mindreading that have  dominated research on 
social cognition for more than three decades: theory-theory, simulation theory, 
and their hybrids. According to theory-theory, people make inferences about 
other people’s mental states by using a tacit theory about how different types of 
mental state link to each other and to behaviour. The child-scientist versions of 
theory-theory explain the development of mindreading in children by analogy to 
theory-acquisition in science, whereas according to modularist versions of 
theory-theory it is a matter of the maturation of an innate mindreading module. 
According to simulation theory, people do not use a theory at all, but instead 
read each other’s minds by mentally putting themselves into the shoes of other 
people: they imagine what it would be like to be in the other person’s position, 
and attribute the mental states that arise in their mind to the target. More 
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recently, hybrid theories have emerged that combine elements of both theory-
theory and simulation theory.  
In chapter 3, I introduce a recent critical approach that challenges the 
standard theories of mindreading: interactionism. In general, interactionists 
insist that the research focus needs to shift from mindreading to social inter-
actions, which is why I have adopted the label “interactionism.” Interactionists 
strongly oppose the prevailing assumption that mindreading is the key com-
ponent of human social cognition that enables people to understand and interact 
with each other throughout all or most social situations. In contrast, they argue 
that for the most part, people interact with and understand each other on the 
basis of non-mentalistic interactive abilities, such as direct perception, bodily 
responsiveness, and a non-mentalistic contextual understanding of shared 
situations. Interactionists give only a minimal role to mindreading in human 
social cognition: they argue that people rarely attribute mental states to others, 
presumably only when the other person’s behaviour puzzles them. A frequent 
interactionist counterargument to theories of mindreading is the claim that the 
standard theories are based on the flawed assumption that other minds are 
unobservable. Interactionists also point out that theories of mindreading are 
based exclusively on lab experiments where test subjects are asked to passively 
observe social scenes from a detached third-person point of view and that 
thereby engaged second-person interactions (that are far more essential to social 
cognition) have been ignored. According to interactionists, not only are different 
individual cognitive processes involved in engaged social interactions (as com-
pared to detached third-person observations), but also, the interaction process 
itself plays an enabling and possibly even a constitutive role in social cognition. 
I fully agree with interactionists that the standard mindreading paradigm is 
limited and incapable of providing a complete account of the full spectrum of 
human social cognitive abilities. We certainly need to study how social inter-
actions unfold in real life situations and avoid exclusively focusing on 
observational abilities in lab conditions. However, it is important to notice that 
the question of how much people actually rely on mindreading in real life social 
settings is an empirical issue which cannot be settled by philosophical argu-
ments alone. The standard claim that mindreading is ubiquitous in human social 
cognition, as well as the interactionist claim that people hardly ever mindread, 
are both speculative. Neither of these claims is supported by empirical evidence. 
Instead of replacing the study of mindreading with the study of social inter-
actions in the absence of mindreading, I propose to widen the research frame-
work to enable the study of both. Only then can we begin to understand how 
different components of human social cognition work in ensemble and 
investigate the specific role of mindreading in human social cognition. The 
main aim of my dissertation is precisely to lead research of social cognition 
beyond the current debate between theories of mindreading and interactionism 
and to outline plausible empirical hypotheses about how different social 
cognitive abilities function together. A more specific aim of the thesis is to 
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provide a possible explanation of the function of mindreading in human social 
cognition.  
The first research article (“Toward an integrative account of social cognition: 
Marrying theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes”, see appendix 1) explains why instead of taking the standard 
theories of mindreading and interactionism to be mutually exclusive opponents, 
these two approaches should be integrated into a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework. An integrative theoretical framework is outlined with the 
help of dual process models of social cognition that differentiate between two 
types of social cognitive processing. The first type (Type 1) refers to fast, 
efficient, stimulus-driven, and relatively inflexible social cognitive processing. 
The second type (Type 2) refers to relatively slow, cognitively laborious, 
flexible, and possibly partly conscious processing. In the article, it is argued that 
while interactionism focuses on aspects of social cognition that are likely to be 
driven by Type 1 processes, theories of mindreading typically target those 
aspects of social cognition that are likely to be based on Type 2 processes. 
Furthermore, because the two theoretical frameworks focus on two different 
aspects of social cognition, they should be seen as complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive. Based on a critical analysis of recent neuroscientific 
studies, it is hypothesised that in real life social interactions both types of pro-
cesses are involved, and thus that human social behaviour may be sustained by 
the interplay of the two types of process.  
The second research article (“Theory of mind and the unobservability of 
other minds”, co-authored with Nivedita Gangopadhyay; see appendix 2) is a 
conceptual analysis of what it means to talk about the unobservability of other 
minds. Interactionists frequently claim that the standard theories of mindreading 
presuppose that mental states are unobservable. They argue that since mental 
states are embodied and sometimes directly perceivable, theories of mind-
reading are based on a false assumption. The aim of the article is to show that 
the interactionist critique is misplaced. In the first part of the article, four 
different readings of the unobservability claim are outlined: a) a metaphysical 
reading, concerning what minds are; b) a phenomenological reading, concerning 
what the phenomenology of mindreading is like; c) an epistemological reading, 
concerning how to justify beliefs about other minds; and d) a psychological 
reading, concerning the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading. It is shown that 
it is not the case that theories of mindreading assume that other minds are meta-
physically, phenomenologically, or epistemologically unobservable. Theories of 
mindreading can be said to assume the unobservability of other minds in the 
psychological sense, i.e. in the sense that they assume that more than perceptual 
processes are involved in mindreading. The second part of the article lays out a 
more fine-grained analysis of the psychological reading of the unobservability 
claim. The psychological reading is cashed out in a strong, medium, and weak 
version. It is argued that whereas the critics tend to attribute the strongest 
psychological version of the unobservability claim to theories of mindreading, 
proponents of theories of mindreading actually subscribe to either the medium 
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or weak version. It follows that the allegation against theories of mindreading is 
seriously misdirected. The third part of the article brings out an important 
constraint on the observability of other minds by using an insight from 
phenomenology. Based on Husserl’s analysis of the structure of perception, it is 
shown that any theory of social cognition must reckon with the stipulation that 
mental states cannot be observed in the same way as sensory properties of phy-
sical objects. It is shown that theories of mindreading can easily deal with the 
above-mentioned constraint, and thus that interactionists, far from having 
proved that theories of mindreading falsely rely on the unobservability 
assumption, have something to learn from theories of mindreading.  
The third research article (“We read minds to shape relationships”) looks at 
the specific function of mindreading in human social cognition, and investigates 
the motivational mechanisms that trigger mindreading. Because of the prevalent 
assumption that mindreading is ubiquitous in human social cognition and serves 
the general purpose of behaviour explanation and prediction, questions about 
the function and motivation of mindreading have not arisen as research 
questions to be studied empirically. In contrast, interactionists claim that mind-
reading is peripheral to human social cognition, which makes the function and 
motivation of mindreading appear as not worthwhile to be studied. In article 3, I 
argue that neither side of the debate captures the specific role of mindreading, 
which is precisely why this issue needs to be empirically investigated. At the 
same time, an important aspect of human social cognition has been ignored by 
both theories of mindreading and interactionism: social relationships. I intro-
duce a theory of the basic structures of social relationships and their cognitive 
underpinnings – the relational models theory of Alan Fiske – and use it as a 
basis for thinking about the function of explicit mindreading in human social 
cognition. I put forward the hypothesis that the evolutionary function, as well as 
the individual purpose, of mindreading is to monitor and shape social relations. 
More specifically, I hypothesise that people typically mindread 1) when they are 
uncertain about what kind of social relationship they are dealing with, when 
interaction becomes problematic, or, is both important and uncertain in out-
come; 2) when they wish to change the format of the current relationship or 
some aspects of it, or apprehend that the other has such a wish; 3) when it is 
important to anticipate how a current relationship influences and/or is in-
fluenced by other relationships; 4) while they make moral judgements (in 
cultures where making moral judgements entails taking into account whether an 
act was carried out intentionally or not, as well as other aspects of mental 
states). A particular method – experience sampling – is suggested for testing the 
hypothesis. In sum, I argue that the function of mindreading is not to predict and 
explain the behaviour of other people, as if they were another set of objects in 
the environment; it is to shape social relationships by bringing forth mutual 
adjustments in the behaviour of oneself and the other party of the relationship. 
However, saying that mindreading has the function of shaping relationships is 
not to say that people are motivated to mindread by being aware of its function. 
Instead, I hypothesise that explicit mindreading may be motivated by social 
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emotions. Finally, I argue that relational cognition is more fundamental than 
mindreading in human social cognition.  
I would like to think of my dissertation as a snapshot of an ongoing work in 
progress. I hope that the theoretical considerations I have outlined in my articles 
will help to lead the research of human social cognition beyond the current 
debate between theories of mindreading and interactionism, towards an 
integrative approach that includes insights from both sides of the debate. It is 
time to move from studying single aspects of social cognition to the study of 
how different social cognitive abilities work in ensemble, and to open up the 
research agenda for novel questions, such as “What are the motivating mecha-
nisms that trigger mindreading in social situations?” In particular, I see the 
study of social relationships and relational cognition as an important part of 
future research of social cognition. I also hope that the empirical hypotheses 
presented in the dissertation will inspire empirical scientists to test the claims I 
have argued for. Hopefully, in the future study of social cognition we will see 
more collaboration between cognitive psychology, social psychology and 
anthropology, and I think that philosophers have the potential to initiate the 
bringing together different disciplines so that they can jointly study different 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN  
Kuidas me teisi mõistame?  
Teispool vaimulugemise teooriaid ja interaktsionismi 
Käesolev väitekiri uurib inimese sotsiaalset tunnetust ehk küsimust, millised 
tunnetusprotsessid võimaldavad inimestevahelist interaktsiooni ja mõistmist. 
Väitekirja peamiseks eesmärgiks on näidata, et seni teineteist välistavateks 
peetud lähenemisi – vaimulugemise teooriaid ja interaktsionismi – tuleks 
käsitleda teineteist täiendavatena. Esitatakse neid kahte lähenemist ühendav ja 
ületav teoreetiline raamistik, mis tõstatab uusi olulisi küsimusi ja annab aluse 
uutele empiirilistele hüpoteesidele sotsiaalsete tunnetusprotsesside kohta.  
Väitekiri koosneb pikemast ülevaateartiklist ja kolmest eelretsenseeritud 
artiklist, mis on ilmunud rahvusvahelistes teadusajakirjades. Ülevaateartikkel 
algab metodoloogilise peatükiga, kus käsitletakse erinevaid filosoofilisi meeto-
deid, mida saab rakendada sotsiaalse tunnetuse interdistsiplinaarsel uurimisel. 
Peatükis arutlen filosoofia rolli üle sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel üldiselt ja 
selgitan, kuidas olen filosoofilisi meetodeid rakendanud väitekirja kuuluvates 
teadusartiklites. Pean filosoofia-alast pädevust oluliseks, sest see võimaldab 1) 
teaduslike paradigmade aluseks olevaid teoreetilisi ja metodoloogilisi eeldusi 
kriitiliselt analüüsida; 2) näha eri teadusharude lõikumispunktides uusi küsimu-
si, ergutades seeläbi uute empiiriliste hüpoteeside ja uurimismeetodite välja-
töötamist; 3) reflekteerida selle üle, kuidas erinevate teadusharude ja para-
digmade empiirilised uurimistulemused ja teoreetilised väited omavahel kokku 
sobivad, viies seeläbi uute laiahaardelisemate teoreetiliste raamistikeni; 4) 
korrastada mõistevõrgustikke ja töötada välja uusi teoreetilisi mõisteid. Eraldi 
alapeatükk on pühendatud fenomenoloogia rollile sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimi-
sel. Toon välja, et fenomenoloogiat saab rakendada vähemalt neljal moel: 1) 
tõlgendades olemasolevaid empiirilisi andmeid fenomenoloogiast lähtuvalt; 2) 
kasutades fenomenoloogilisi kirjeldusi eksplanandumina sotsiaaltunnetuslike 
protsesside uurimisel; 3) neurofenomenoloogiliste eksperimentide läbiviimisel, 
kus subjektide fenomenoloogiliste kirjelduste põhjal loodud kategooriaid 
kasutatakse andmete kategoriseerimisel; 4) fenomenoloogiliste väidete ”eel-
laadimisel” eksperimentidesse. 
Ülevaateartikli teine peatükk algab olulisemate vaimulugemise eksperimen-
tide (nt vääruskumuse testide) tutvustamisega. Seejärel annan ülevaate peavoolu 
teooriatest vaimuseisundite (uskumuste, soovide, kavatsuste, emotsioonide jne) 
omistamise aluseks olevate tunnetuslike protsesside kohta: teooria-teooria 
(Alison Gopnik, Andrew Meltzoff, Henry M. Wellmann, Josef Perner, John H. 
Flavell, Alan Leslie, Simon Baron-Cohen), simulatsiooniteooria, (Jane Heal, 
Robert Gordon, Alvin Goldman) ja neid kahte ühendavate hübriidteooriate 
(Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, Alvin Goldman) tuntumatest versioonidest. 
Teooria-teooria järgi toetuvad inimesed vaimuseisundite omistamisel rahva-
psühholoogilisele teooriale selle kohta, kuidas eri tüüpi vaimuseisundid on 
seotud üksteisega ja käitumisega. Teooria-teoorial on laias laastus kaks 
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versiooni: lapsteadlase teooriad ja modulaarsed teooriad. Lapsteadlase teoo-
riate kohaselt omandavad lapsed rahvapsühholoogilise teooria analoogselt 
sellega, kuidas teadlased konstrueerivad teaduslikke teooriaid. Modulaarsete 
teooriate järgi seisneb rahvapsühholoogilise teooria omandamine vastava 
kaasasündinud kognitiivse mooduli küpsemises. Simulatsiooniteooria seevastu 
ütleb, et teistele inimestele vaimuseisundite omistamisel ei lähtuta teooriast, 
vaid kasutatakse omaenda vaimset masinavärki mudelina teiste inimeste vaimu-
seisundite simuleerimiseks: kujutletakse end teise inimese olukorda ja omista-
takse selle tulemusel esile kerkinud vaimuseisundid inimesele, keda soovitakse 
mõista. Hiljuti on tekkinud ka hübriidteooriad, mis kombineerivad simulat-
siooniteooria ja teooria-teooria elemente.  
Ülevaateartikli kolmas peatükk tutvustab viimasel kümnendil esile kerkinud 
vaimulugemise teooriate suhtes kriitilist lähenemist: interaktsionismi (Shaun 
Gallagher, Vasudevi Reddy, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Matthew 
Ratcliffe, Daniel D. Hutto, Ivan Leudar, Alan Costall, Dan Zahavi). Inter-
aktsionistid väidavad, et sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimisel tuleb keskenduda vaimu-
lugemise uurimise asemel sotsiaalse interaktsiooni uurimisele. Interaktsionistid 
lükkavad tagasi vaimulugemise teoreetikute eelduse, et vaimuseisundite 
omistamine ehk vaimulugemine on võtmeteguriks, mis võimaldab inimestel 
üksteist mõista ja sotsiaalselt interakteeruda. Nad väidavad, et inimestevaheline 
suhtlus toimub enamasti ilma vaimulugemiseta, ning et sotsiaalse tunnetuse 
aluseks on tajulised, sensorimotoorsed ja afektiivsed protsessid, millele arengu 
käigus lisandub jagatud sotsiaalse konteksti mõistmise võime. Vaimulugemisele 
jääb sotsiaalses tunnetuses üksnes marginaalne roll: interaktsionistid väidavad, 
et inimesed omistavad vaimuseisundeid vaid siis, kui teine isik käitub kum-
maliselt ja muud meetodid tema mõistmiseks ei ole vilja kandnud. Interaktsio-
nistid väidavad sageli, et vaimulugemise teooriad põhinevad eeldusel, et teiste 
olendite vaim on vaadeldamatu. Kuivõrd nende järgi on vaimuseisundid lahuta-
matult seotud nende ihulise väljendusega, siis osutub suur osa vaimuseisunditest 
vähemalt osaliselt vaadeldavaks, millest tulenevalt väidetakse, et vaimu-
lugemise teooriad põhinevad vääral eeldusel. Lisaks rõhutavad interaktsionistid 
asjaolu, et vaimulugemise teooriad tuginevad eksperimentidele, kus uurimis-
subjektid pelgalt vaatlevad sotsiaalseid olukordi kõrvalt, kolmanda isiku 
vaatepunktist, kuid seejuures need teooriad ignoreerivad sotsiaalset tunnetust 
teise isiku vaatpunktist, mis on olemuslik vahetule sotsiaalsele interaktsioonile. 
Seetõttu on ebaselge, kas vaimulugemise teooriate aluseks olevad empiirilised 
uurimused on üldse pädevad sotsiaalse interaktsiooni seletamiseks. Inter-
aktsionistide väitel ei erine sotsiaalses interaktsioonis osalemise ja pelga 
pealtvaatamise puhul mitte üksnes individuaalsed tunnetusprotsessid, vaid 
esimesel juhul mängib interaktsiooniprotsess ka sotsiaalset tunnetust võimal-
davat ja konstitueerivat rolli, mida tal teisel juhul olla ei saa.  
Ma nõustun suuresti interaktsionistliku kriitikaga selles osas, et vaimu-
lugemise teooriate seletusvõime on oluliselt piiratud, ning nad ei ammenda 
kaugeltki inimese sotsiaalse tunnetuse aluseks olevate protsesside kogu spektrit. 
Lisaks laboritingimustes läbiviidavatele eksperimentidele, mis keskenduvad 
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vaimuseisundite omistamisele kolmanda isiku perspektiivist, tuleks kindlasti 
uurida sotsiaalset suhtlust selle erinevates loomulikes kontekstides. Samas on 
oluline tähele panna, et küsimus vaimulugemise rollist inimese sotsiaalses 
tunnetuses on empiiriline küsimus, millele ei saa vastata üksnes filosoofiliste 
argumentide põhjal. Interaktsionistide väide, et vaimulugemine on sotsiaalse 
tunnetuse suhtes perifeerse tähtsusega, on sama spekulatiivne kui levinud 
aruaam, et vaimulugemisel on sotsiaalses tunnetuses läbiv ja keskne roll. Kum-
magi väite toetuseks ei leidu hetkel piisavalt empiirilisi tõendeid. Ma ei poolda 
interaktsionistide ettepanekut keskenduda vaimulugemise uurimise asemel 
sotsiaalse interaktsiooni uurimisele. Palju viljakam oleks ehitada neist kahest 
teineteisele vastanduvast lähenemisest laiahaardelisem teoreetiline raamistik, 
mis laseks uurida nii vaimuseisundite omistamist kui sotsiaalse interaktsiooni 
aluseks olevaid mittementalistlikke sotsiaaltunnetuslikke võimeid. See võimal-
daks uurida, kuidas sotsiaalse tunnetuse erinevad komponendid üheskoos 
funktsioneerivad ning vastata küsimusele, mis on vaimulugemise roll sotsiaalses 
tunnetuses. Käesoleva väitekirja peamiseks eesmärgiks ongi eeltoodud kahe 
lähenemise integreerimine. Väitekirja kitsam eesmärk on pakkuda välja empii-
riliselt kontrollitav hüpotees eksplitsiitse vaimulugemise funktsioonist inimese 
sotsiaalses tunnetuses.  
 
Artikkel 1. Esimene artikkel – “Toward an integrative account of social 
cognition: Marrying theory of mind and interactionism to study the interplay of 
Type 1 and Type 2 processes” (vt lisa 1) – on kirjutatud koostöös neuroteadlase 
Wouter van den Bosiga, kes töötab praegu Max Plancki inimarengu instituudis 
Berliinis. Artikkel ilmus ajakirja Frontiers in Human Neuroscience erinumbris, 
mis keskendus sotsiaalse interaktsiooni neuroteaduslikule uurimisele. Artiklis 
selgitatakse, miks ei tuleks vaimulugemise teooriaid ja interaktsionismi käsit-
leda teineteist välistavatena. Esitatakse neid kaht lähenemist ühendav 
teoreetiline raamistik duaalsete protsesside mudelite abil, mis eristavad kaht 
tüüpi protsesse sotsiaalse info töötlemisel. Esimene tüüp (Tüüp 1) viitab 
teadvustamata, kiirele, efektiivsele, automaatsele ja võrdlemisi jäigale info-
töötlusele ajus. Teine tüüp (Tüüp 2) viitab aeglasele, paindlikule, enam pingu-
tust nõudvale ja osaliselt teadvustatud infotöötlusele. Artiklis väidetakse, et 
interaktsionism keskendub peamiselt sotsiaalse tunnetuse neile aspektidele, 
mille aluseks on esimest tüüpi infotöötlus, samal ajal kui vaimulugemise 
teooriad (teooria-teooria ja simulatsiooniteooria) keskenduvad pigem neile 
aspektidele, mis on seotud teist tüüpi infotöötlusega. Kuna need kaks teoreetilist 
lähenemist keskenduvad sotsiaalset tunnetust võimaldavatele eri tüüpi 
kognitiivsetele protsessidele, tuleks neid käsitada mitte vastastikku välistavate, 
vaid teineteist täiendavatena. Hiljutiste duaalsete protsesside neuroteaduslike 
uuringute analüüsi alusel esitatakse hüpotees, et inimestevahelise interaktsiooni 
korral aktiveeruvad mõlemat tüüpi infotöötlusprotsessid, mis teineteist 
mõjutavad. Artiklis esitatud hüpoteesi põhjal töötame Volkswagen Stiftungi 
poolt European Platform for European Platform for Life Sciences, Mind 
Sciences, and the Humanities raames rahastatud uurimisrühmaga välja 
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neuroteaduslikke pilooteksperimente. Uurimisrühma kuuluvad lisaks minule 
filosoofid Marion Godman (Helsingi ülikool, Cambridge’i ülikool) ja Mog 
Stapleton (Stuttgarti ülikool), ning neuroteadlased Wouter van den Bos (Max 
Plancki inimarengu instituut Berliinis), Christoph Teufel (Cambridge’i ülikool) 
ja Marijn van Wingerden (Düsseldorfi Heinrich Heine ülikool). (Vt 
http://social-interaction.eu/). 
Artikkel 2. Teine artikkel “Theory of mind and the unobservability of other 
minds” (vt lisa 2) valmis koostöös filosoof Nivedita Gangopadhyayga, kes 
töötab hetkel Bochumi ülikoolis ja see ilmus ajakirjas Philosophical 
Explorations. Artikkel analüüsib interaktsionistlike kriitikute sageli esitatud 
etteheidet, mille kohaselt tuginevad vaimulugemise teooriad eeldusele, et teiste 
olendite vaim on vaadeldamatu. Kuivõrd interaktsionismi järgi on osa vaimu-
seisundeid vahetult tajutavad, siis toetuvad interaktsonistide väitel vaimu-
lugemise teooriad fundamentaalselt ekslikule eeldusele selle kohta, mida 
sotsiaalse tunnetuse teooriad üldse peaksid seletama. Artiklis näidatakse, et 
interaktsionistide kriitika põhineb vaimulugemise teooriate vääritimõistmisel 
ega pea paika. Artikli esimeses osas esitatakse neli võimalikku tõlgendust 
vaimuseisundite vaadeldamatuse väitele: 1) metafüüsiline tõlgendus (vaim on 
entiteet, mida ei ole võimalik vaadelda); 2) fenomenoloogiline tõlgendus 
(vaimuseisundid ei ole kunagi kogemuslikult antud kellelegi peale nende 
seisundite omaniku); 3) epistemoloogiline tõlgendus (meil ei saa olla vahetut 
teadmist teiste inimeste vaimuseisunditest); 4) psühholoogiline tõlgendus 
(vaimuseisundite omistamise aluseks ei saa olla üksnes tajuprotsessid). Põhjen-
datakse, miks metafüüsiline, epistemoloogiline ega fenomenoloogiline tõlgen-
dus ei rakendu vaimuseisundite omistamise teooriate kontekstis, seega jääb 
ainsaks võimalikuks tõlgenduseks psühholoogiline väide, mille kohaselt vaimu-
seisundite omistamiseks tarvilikud psühholoogilised protsessid hõlmavad 
enamat kui vaid tajuprotsesse. Artikli teises osas võetakse psühholoogiline 
väide luubi alla ja eristatakse selle kolme versiooni: tugevat (tajuda on võimalik 
vaid füüsilisi liigutusi), keskmist (taju abil on võimalik eristada subjekte ja 
objekte, kuid ei ole võimalik omistada konkreetseid vaimuseisundeid) ja nõrka 
(teatud tüüpi vaimuseisundite, nt uskumuste, omistamiseks on tarvis enamat kui 
taju, nt teoreetilist järeldamist või simulatsiooni). Lähemal uurimisel selgub, et 
interaktsionistid omistavad vaimulugemise teooriatele psühholoogilise väite 
tugevaimat versiooni, kuid viimased eeldavad psühholoogilist vaadeldamatust 
kõigest keskmises või nõrgas tähenduses. Kogu analüüsist järeldub, et interakt-
sionistide kriitika vaimulugemise teooriate väidetava vaadeldamatuse eelduse 
aadressil ei pea paika. Artikli kolmandas osas tuuakse Husserli tajuteooriast 
lähtuvalt välja oluline tingimus vaimuseisundite vaadeldavusele: nimelt ei ole 
vaimuseisundid vaadeldavad samal viisil nagu füüsiliste objektide sensoorsed 
omadused. Kuna vaimulugemise teooriad on eeltoodud tingimusega kooskõlas, 
siis selgub, et interaktsionismil on vaimulugemise teooriatelt midagi olulist 
õppida: nimelt seda, et on tarvis seletada vaimuseisundite omistamise aluseks 
olevaid subpersonaalseid protsesse tingimusel, et vaimuseisundid ei ole vaadel-
davad samal viisil nagu füüsilised objektid.  
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Artikkel 3. Kolmas artikkel kannab pealkirja ”We read minds to shape 
relationships” (vt lisa 3). Artiklis keskendutakse kahele küsimusele: 1) Mis on 
vaimuseisundite eksplitsiitse omistamise funktsioon inimese sotsiaalses 
tunnetuses? 2) Millised motivatsioonilised protsessid on aluseks vaimuseisun-
dite omistamisele? Nimetatud küsimusi ei ole vaimulugemise teooriate raamis-
tikus empiiriliselt uuritud, kuivõrd valdavalt on eeldatud, et vaimulugemine on 
igasuguse sotsiaalse tunnetuse keskne komponent, mis teenib teiste inimeste 
käitumise ennustamise ja seletamise funktsiooni. Seevastu interaktsionistid 
väidavad, et vaimulugemine on sotsiaalse tunnetuse jaoks perifeerse tähtsusega, 
mis samuti ei ole teadlasi motiveerinud vaimulugemise funktsiooni lähemalt 
uurima. Samas ei ole kumbki debati osapool pakkunud veenvat seletust sellele, 
miks inimesed teistele vaimuseisundeid omistavad ega vasta küsimustele, mis 
on vaimulugemise evolutsiooniline funktsioon, miks see on ”vaimulugejale” 
isiklikult kasulik, või mis motiveerib inimesi teatud olukordades vaimuseisun-
deid omistama. Nii vaimulugemise teooriad kui interaktsionism on ignoreerinud 
sotsiaalse tunnetuse üht olulist mõõdet: inimestevahelisi suhteid. Inimeste-
vahelised suhted on meie igapäevaelu oluline osa, mis mõjutab otseselt sotsiaal-
se interakteerumise viise ning sotsiaalseid tunnetusprotsesse. Artiklis tutvus-
tatakse inimestevaheliste suhete aluseks olevate kognitiivsete protsesside teoo-
riat: Alan Fiske poolt välja töötatud suhtemudelite teooriat. Nimetatud teooriast 
lähtuvalt esitatakse hüpotees, et vaimulugemine võimaldab sotsiaalseid suhteid 
reguleerida: vaimulugemise peamiseks funktsiooniks ei ole mitte teiste inimeste 
käitumise ennustamine ja seletamine, justkui oleks tegu teaduslikku seletust 
nõudvate objektidega, vaid inimestevaheliste suhete vastastikune reguleerimine, 
kuna vaimuseisundite omistamine mõjutab korraga nii tõlgendaja kui tõlgen-
datava käitumist. Nimetatud hüpotees kirjutatakse lahti empiiriliselt kontrol-
litavate väidetena. Nimelt võib hüpoteesist lähtuvalt ennustada, et inimesed 
omistavad vaimuseisundeid tüüpiliselt siis: 1) kui sotsiaalse suhte mudel on 
ebaselge, kui sotsiaalne interaktsioon muutub problemaatiliseks või selle 
tulemus on oluline, kuid ebakindel; 2) kui soovitakse olemasoleva sotsiaalse 
suhte vormi muuta, või usutakse, et partneril on vastav soov; 3) kui on oluline 
ette näha, kuidas erinevad inimestevahelised suhted üksteist mõjutavad; 4) kui 
antakse moraalseid hinnaguid teiste käitmisele (kultuurides, kus moraalsete 
hinnagute puhul on oluline võtta arvesse teole eelnenud kavatsusi ja muid 
vaimuseisundeid). Väidete testimiseks pakutakse välja kogemusproovi meetod 
(experience sampling). Väide, et vaimulugemisel on inimestevaheliste suhete 
reguleerimise funktsioon ei tähenda aga, et inimesed oleksid selle funktsioonist 
teadlikud. Eraldi hüpoteesina väidetakse, et vaimulugemise peamiseks vallan-
dajaks võivad olla sotsiaalsed emotsioonid. Artiklis esitatud arutlusest järeldub, 
et sotsiaalsete suhete tunnetamine on inimestevahelise läbikäimise jaoks 
fundamentaalsem kui vaimulugemine – viimane on tõenäoliselt evolutsioo-
niliselt hilisem nähtus kui esimene.  
Väitekiri põhjendab, miks oleks tarvis suunduda hetkel aktuaalse inter-
aktsionismi ja vaimulugemise teooriate vahelise debati juurest terviklikuma ja 
laiahaardelisema käsitluse poole, mis haaraks endasse mõlemad lähenemised. 
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See võimaldaks lisaks sotsiaalse tunnetuse üksikaspektide uurimisele uurida ka 
seda, kuidas erinevad sotsiaalse tunnetuse komponendid üheskoos funktsio-
neerivad. Artiklis 1 esitatud empiiriline hüpotees duaalsete protsesside 
vastastikmõju kohta on juba aluseks neuroteaduslike eksperimentide välja-
töötamisele, ning loodetavasti pälvivad ka artiklis 3 esitatud hüpoteesid vaimu-
lugemise funktsiooni kohta piisavalt huvi empiiriliste teadlaste seas. Tahaks 
loota, et tulevikus näeme sotsiaalse tunnetuse uurimise olulise osana sotsiaalsete 
suhete ja nende aluseks olevate tunnetusprotsesside uurimist. Seejuures saavad 
filosoofid olulisel määral kaasa aidata erinevate teadusharude vaheliste sildade 
loomisele – iseäranis suur arengupotentsiaal tundub olevat kognitiivpsüh-
holoogia, sotsiaalpsühholoogia ja antropoloogia vahelisel koostööl, mida on 
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